

Military Review IV

The Official Journal of the United States Army

APRIL 1992

AD-A253 321



FM 100-5 OPERATIONS (DRAFT)

DIST
contai
is for
limited
outside
publicat
or the P
made to

HEAD
DEPAR

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 23 1992

S

C

D

CHAPTER IV Operations Short of War

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

Hostilities
Short of War

IV.2

Peacetime
Engagement

IV.1

Operations
Short of War

IV.0



Lieutenant General
Wilson A. Shoffner
Commandant, USACGSC

Brigadier General
William M. Steele
Deputy Commandant, USACGSC

Military Review Staff
Colonel Steven F. Rausch
Editor in Chief

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald N. Mazzia
Managing Editor

Lieutenant Colonel Donald G. Rhodes
Major Chris J. LeBlanc
Associate Editors

Major Bruce M. King
Editor, Latin American Editions

Phillip R. Davis
Production Editor

D. M. Giangreco
Design Editor


Patricia L. Dunn
Books & Features Editor

Charles A. Martinson III
Art and Design

Consulting Editors
Colonel Marco A. Felicio da Silva
Brazilian Army, Brazilian Edition

Lieutenant Colonel Juan M. Gallardo
Chilean Army, Spanish Edition

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official: 
MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

The Mission of MILITARY REVIEW is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs; to focus on concepts, doctrine and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war; and to support the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Command and the Command and General Staff College.

Professional Bulletin 100-91, MILITARY REVIEW, appears monthly in English, bimonthly in Spanish and quarterly in Portuguese. Second-class postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66048-9998, and additional entry offices. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. MILITARY REVIEW reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers of the Active Army, and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. MILITARY REVIEW is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, and is indexed by the PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) Bulletin. Postmaster: Send change of address information to MILITARY REVIEW, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-8910. Telephone: (913) 684-5642 or AV 552-5642; FAX (913) 684-2448; Subscriptions (913) 684-5130.

MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123-630)
 US ISSN 0026-4148

Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army
 Prepared by
 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
 VOLUME LXXII - April 1992 - NO 4
 Professional Bulletin 100-92-4

CONTENTS


- 2 The XVIII Airborne Corps:
Puttin' Power on the Ground**
by Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck, US Army
- 14 Forging Security Through Peace**
by Colonel Terry L. Rice, US Army
- 27 Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and War:
The Continuum of Military Operations**
by Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Thurman, US Army
- 36 Strategic Rationale for SOF**
by Major Robert B. Adolph Jr., US Army
- 47 Victory and Compromise
in Counterinsurgency**
by Steven Metz
- 54 Military Families:
Strategic Targets in a Subtle War**
*by Major Frederick N. Garland, US Army,
and Lieutenant Colonel Franklin R. Brooks, US Army*
- 66 Taking Responsibility for Our Actions?
Establishing Order and Stability in Panama**
*by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve,
and Major Richard D. Downie, US Army*
- 78 Insights:
Protecting Subordinates' Ethics in the War on
Drugs: A New Challenge for Senior-Level Leaders**
by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos A. Velasquez R., Colombian Army
- 80 Letters**
- 83 World War II Almanac:
The Stars and Stripes**
by Michael E. Unsworth
- 87 Book Reviews** *contemporary reading for the professional*

The XVIII Airborne Corps

Puttin' Power on the Ground

Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck, US Army

During a recent Army senior leaders conference the focus was on the Army's warfighting training and doctrine. The author explores both of these subjects from the perspective of a corps commander, whose force includes airborne, light infantry and mechanized elements. He shares his views on thinking about warfighting from the strategic and operational parameters to the operational method and fighting the battles. He also offers his views and thoughts on training for war from the go-to-war mentality through the risk assessment.



Refocusing Army Doctrine in a Changing World

The Army is putting new emphasis on low-intensity conflict (LIC). With the changed international political situation, threats to US national interests may develop in any part of the globe. While Operation *Desert Storm* may be the model for the most serious threat, few countries have the capability and inclination to follow the example of Saddam Hussein.

The more likely challenge to the United States will be small-scale use of violence in combination with political, economic and psychological aggression. The threat includes terrorism, insurgency, low-level international conflicts and drug trafficking with political consequences. These conflicts exist now, and American soldiers are currently engaged in countering them in increasing numbers.

The Army has recently supported US and foreign law enforcement agencies in counterdrug operations; helped friendly governments conduct counterinsurgency operations in Latin America; provided nation assistance in Panama, Honduras and Belize, humanitarian relief to Kurdish refugees in Iraq and cyclone victims in Bangladesh. We are conducting peacekeeping in the Sinai, and there is great potential for many more peacekeeping operations. The Army of the 21st century will continue to be actively engaged in peacetime and the LIC environment.

War on any scale is to be avoided, except as a last resort. While the Army must prepare for the worst, it must at the same time engage in the pursuit of peace. The new US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, is greatly expanded in scope to prescribe doctrine for the wide variety of future Army missions. No longer focused on a single, apocalyptic war in Central Europe, it points the way to doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for many types of operations. It gives equal treatment to situations across the continuum and will probably integrate portions of FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. A new version of this publication will continue to prescribe doctrine and methods for that particular range of the operational continuum. It may be rewritten to conform better to joint doctrine in Joint Publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, and eliminate any redundancy with the new FM 100-5. It will likely include new concepts, such as "nation assistance" and "peacetime engagement," as they are defined and accepted.

Problems with the term "LIC" have been recognized for several years. It is distinguished from war not by intensity of violence but by a difference in purpose and method. Some such conflicts may be quite violent. However, the goal is to resolve a political problem by political means, with the minimum necessary use of military force.

Many ideas are under consideration by which the range of operations currently known as LIC can better be described. The accompanying articles indicate the emerging direction of doctrinal development. They acknowledge the primacy of the Army's warfighting mission and the new circumstances in which it must be accomplished. Then they look to the increasing utility of the Army in service to the country for the preservation of peace and active promotion of US national interests worldwide.

Contrary to what some believed after the great conventional war victory in the desert, LIC is not dead, and "real soldiers" do have "real missions" in LIC. These missions are increasing in both scope and importance to the national security of the United States. The new FM 100-5 will recognize and embed this reality into the doctrine of the Army of the 21st century.

Colonel Steven M. Butler
Director, Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies

92-19412



92 7 21 087

Accession Fo
NTIS
DTIC TAB
Unannounced
Justification

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

Availability

THE ARMY's senior leaders gathered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 November 1991, to probe our Army's two warfighting pillars: training and doctrine. That conference motivated me to offer one corps commander's perspective on these two subjects. My aim is to bolster efforts to cultivate our capstone doctrine while continuing to boost training excellence. My method is to describe how the XVIII Airborne Corps thinks about warfighting, thus how it trains for war.

Thinking About Warfighting

War to the XVIII Airborne Corps comes in the shape of contingency operations. The corps provides command and control (C²) for the Army's crisis response forces. This potpourri of force capabilities is as versatile and lethal as it is deployable and expansible. It is not a fixed force, but can be tailored to any contingency worldwide based on factors of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available).

The XVIII Airborne Corps commander (or one of his subordinate general officers) can expect to be designated the joint task force commander, at least for initial forcible entry operations into the objective area. Conversely, he might be designated the COMARFOR (Commander, Army Forces) under another joint force commander, or a subordinate commander to a senior COMARFOR. Accordingly, in the first case he orchestrates the joint effort; in the other two, he contributes to it.

Our mission remains unchanged: to maintain XVIII Airborne Corps as a strategic crisis response force manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea and land anywhere in the world, and prepared to fight upon arrival and win. This admittedly broad mission is derived from the strategic and operational parameters that influence how we think about warfighting.

Strategic Parameters. The fact remains that, although we covet a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, dangers persist. And, at a time when ambiguity and instability rule, military strength provides continued and necessary reassurance. Less consumed by a mas-

sive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to deal with regional contingencies will shape how the United States equips, trains, deploys and employs its Armed Forces. Amid

In the aftermath of the Cold War, dangers [still] persist. And, at a time when ambiguity and instability rule, military strength provides continued and necessary reassurance. Less consumed by a massive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to deal with regional contingencies will shape how the United States equips, trains, deploys and employs its Armed Forces. . . . The strategic imperative of deterrence remains valid.

this geostrategic change, the strategic imperative of deterrence remains valid. However, given the receding threat of a nuclear holocaust, crisis response forces constitute the primary conduit for deterrence.

Only crisis response forces can persuade potential adversaries and would-be regional hegemons the cost of aggression substantially exceeds any benefit they could hope to gain; and only crisis response forces can assure US strategic objectives should deterrence fail. Thus, while deterrence remains the object of our nation's shifting military strategy, the demonstrated ability to respond quickly and effectively to crises now underpins that strategy more than ever. Indeed, crisis response has emerged as one of the four axioms of our nation's evolving military strategy (the other three being deterrence and defense, forward presence and reconstitution).

The corps functions as part of the joint crisis response team that includes, perforce, special operations forces. Power projection is a vital ingredient of this team. We may pre-position some materiel afloat or on land, but the projection of Army crisis response forces invokes three critical strategic mobility requirements:

- Intertheater airlift to transport a sufficient mix of crisis response forces for the initial fight.
- Sealift to deploy significant combat, combat support and combat service support units and their sustainment.
- Intratheater lift to expedite movement of forces to preferred staging areas for decisive operations.

Operational Parameters. The capabilities of a power projection Army, hence of the corps, are predicated to a large extent on the dictates of the operational environment. The objective

The XVIII Airborne Corps commander (or one of his subordinate general officers) can expect to be designated the joint task force commander, at least for initial forcible entry operations into the objective area. Conversely, he might be designated the COMARFOR (Commander, Army Forces) under another joint force commander, or a subordinate commander to a senior COMARFOR.

area may be defended, or it may be benign; the enemy might be mobile and armored, or a light paramilitary force; the terrain could resemble the steep jungles of Central America, or the wide-open desert of the Middle East.

Likewise, the corps' mission could range from a simple show-of-force (Honduras 1988) to providing a deterrent force against a major and immediate threat (Saudi Arabia 1990). The corps will often have to operate in nondeveloped, austere environments without in-place logistic and communications infrastructures. Further, the most likely contingencies will require the corps to simultaneously fight in the objective area while deploying additional forces to amass the combat power necessary for decisive operations.

These and other strategic and operational factors suggest a number of operational imperatives for the corps, to include:

- Quickly deploy the proper crisis response force as part of a joint task force to the theater of operations.
- Maintain the flexibility to task organize, tailor and echelon crisis response forces into the objective area.
- Prepare to execute forcible entry operations.
- Transition rapidly from lodgment operations to offensive operations to achieve quick victory, thereby limiting conflict escalation.
- Employ Army crisis response forces in concert with sister services, government agencies and coalition forces.
- Employ Army crisis response forces for a variety of missions across the operational continuum.
- Prepare to function as a joint task force or as the Army force component command, in addition to performing doctrinal corps functions.
- Conduct deliberate and time-sensitive planning to synchronize force packaging and force deployment for fast, decisive crisis response.

The Operational Method. Inculcating a common warfighting bias is the surest way to optimize the combat potential of any force. But since corps-level doctrine has been written generally for a fully deployed corps, it has not always served the warfighting needs of the XVIII Airborne Corps. That is, doctrine has tended to fixate on the employment of forces, vice the use of military forces for crisis response.

Absent such a comprehensive doctrine, we cultivate the corps' operational method via a "warfighting philosophy." The correlation of friendly and enemy forces influences the campaign, hence the corps' operational method. Although we prefer a *coup de grâce*, METT-T conditions often dictate otherwise. In contingencies where a favorable correlation exists, such as Operation *Just Cause*, our objective is a quick victory; in others, like Operation *Desert Shield*, we seek to establish favorable terms in the theater of operations for future decisive operations. In either case, our aim is to minimize casualties as we pursue the campaign objectives.



The corps' mission could range from a simple show-of-force (Honduras 1988) to providing a deterrent force against a major and immediate threat (Saudi Arabia 1990). The corps will often have to operate in nondeveloped, austere environments without in-place logistic and communications infrastructures.

Generally, we plan and execute contingency operations in five phases. Phasing the operations ensures we do not exceed reasonable risk (our "culminating point") and aids in preparing permutations ("branches" and "sequels") to the campaign. The phases, however, are neither absolute nor necessarily sequential. Actual operations often truncate these phases, and tasks attendant to more than one phase frequently are performed concurrently. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-15, *Corps Operations*, and US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, *AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond* offer two good conceptual models derived from our operational framework. Here, we briefly highlight some factors which are key to the corps' warfighting challenges.

- Phase I: Predeployment/Crisis Action.

In many respects, this is the most critical phase of contingency operations. Using the corps crisis action system, we seek to determine the requisite military conditions for success, sequence activities to achieve those conditions and apply re-

sources accordingly. The objective in this phase is to select the proper force and to derive the correct operational concepts for subsequent phases of the campaign.

The need to plan and prepare for strategic deployment in the compressed time frame of a crisis is a particularly demanding aspect of this phase. It means we must be ready to provide the supported and supporting commanders in chief (CINCs) several elements of critical analysis: the size force required; the time needed to initiate and close the force; and the consequent lift to deploy it. Divisions and separate brigades play a vital role in this concurrent planning process by tailoring force packages according to the operational concept. This input, however, is provided in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. The generic force modules in our "Corps D" data base enable us to generate, quickly, the force package appropriate to the crisis, and therefrom provide to the CINCs the needed analysis.

When undertaking a contingency operation, two presumptions ensue: a high probability of success and a quick conclusion to the crisis. The

Generally, we plan and execute contingency operations in five phases. Phasing the operations ensures we do not exceed reasonable risk (our "culminating point") and aids in preparing permutations ("branches" and "sequels") to the campaign. The phases, however, are neither absolute nor necessarily sequential.

size force deployed to the theater of operations has a lot to do with determining if, and how quickly, the force achieves its objectives. As the CINCPAC Forces Command showed during the November Warfighter Conference (fig. 1), this is precisely why we have adopted the imperative of overwhelming force. As a hedge against unforeseen circumstances in the objective area, we always tailor the lead elements of the crisis response force for forcible entry. The unique versatility of corps units thus enables us to "design" the force to achieve overwhelming combat power at our first point of decision—securing lodgments—and to set the additional conditions required for subsequent phases of the campaign.

- Phase II: Lodgment.

This key execution phase encompasses the critical seizure of initial lodgments in the objective area. Tailored assault packages, echeloned

C² and the careful synchronization of air power with our assault operations are essential. The *sine qua non* of this phase is the capability of the crisis response force to conduct forcible entry operations, either by parachute assault or air assault, or both. Follow-on echelons of the crisis response force must prepare to reinforce the assault, not just arrive at the airport or seaport of debarkation.

Also critical during this phase of contingencies are joint deep operations, possibly across international boundaries, that include the integration of special operations forces, surveillance, target acquisition, interdiction and other deep




Figure 1. Force Projection

attack and offensive counterair operations. These illustrate the need for the joint task force to shape future operations even as it focuses on the crucial joint fight to establish a lodgment.




Figure 2. Lodgment

While this first day of battle is pivotal, it must be planned and executed with a clear view of how the last day of battle should look. Accordingly, ultimate political and military end states must be clearly understood.

- Phase III: Stabilization.

The principal focus of this phase is to buildup combat power as quickly as possible while concurrently executing combat operations. Tasks during this phase include: establishing forward operating bases; closing the preponderance of the force; expanding the lodgment; continuing deep operations; protecting the force; and linking up with other forces, both joint and unconventional.

Speed in closing the force and in setting the proper terms in the theater of operations is especially important since the success of decisive operations hinges on our ability to build combat power without losing the initiative. Not surprisingly, therefore, this phase is often the most transient of the stages in contingency operations, as commanders accept reasonable risk in using available forces to exploit favorable conditions.

- Phase IV: Restoration.

It is usually through decisive combat operations that we achieve the operational objectives that lead to attaining the strategic purpose of the campaign. While the actual circumstances might vary dramatically due to the nature of potential crises, our operational method is

characterized by the use of overwhelming force, maneuver warfare and a simple C² design that exploits subordinates' initiative through decentralized execution. Speed and high tempo in planning and execution are essential qualities of our warfighting style. We detail our operational

The need to plan and prepare for strategic deployment in the compressed time frame of a crisis is a particularly demanding aspect. . . . It means we must be ready to provide the supported and supporting CINCs several elements of critical analysis: the size force required; the time needed to initiate and close the force; and the consequent lift to deploy it.

method during this phase of contingency operations in the next section, "Fighting the Battles."

- Phase V: Redeployment.

The objectives in this final phase are to redeploy the force as rapidly as possible to the Continental United States, to an intermediate staging base or to another theater of operations, and to reconstitute, promptly, the corps' forces for other contingency missions. At the same time combat forces recock for other likely contingencies, combat support and combat service support elements




Figure 3. Stabilization

It only takes one leader who centralizes and applies excessive controls to inhibit the actions of his subordinates and everyone around him. Hence, we strongly encourage our commanders to adopt parallel C² systems. This style inspires trust and confidence between echelons of command but requires commanders and staffs to volunteer information to the rest of the team to achieve synchronization.

We work to eliminate peacetime detractors that degrade our readiness. It means first and foremost inculcating a go-to-war mentality—a contingency culture to maintain our edge and to reinforce our warfighting style. We do not advocate ad hoc relationships and methods in war; things do not “sort themselves out” on the battlefield. Hence, we abolish them in time of peace.

often remain in theater to support peacekeeping or nation assistance efforts. Echeloning C² and retaining flexibility and security are as essential here as they were in the initial combat phase.


Fighting the Battles. The corps' method of fighting battles and engagements considers the likelihood that we may have to fight outnum-

bered initially, possibly surrounded and faced with competing requirements. Our warfighting style exploits several attributes of corps readiness and versatility. Most of all, it emphasizes boldness and risk taking—we can ill afford to wait for sufficient strength to be positive of the outcome of any battle or maneuver.

A sound C² system is particularly critical to crisis response forces that must deploy and fight concurrently. We echelon our C² mechanisms during the initial stages of forcible entry/lodgment operations, not to overlay control on the combat elements already in the battle, but to synchronize the buildup of additional combat power and to buffer our tactical commanders from tasks that divert their focus from battles and engagements.

The corps' C² system is simple and decentralized. The command intent steers the assignment of tasks to subordinates and the corresponding allocation of resources. Commanders employ mission tactics to accomplish their tasks in the manner they see fit within the parameters of the commander's intent. Thus the intent provides commanders great leeway in accomplishing their mission rather than restricting them or limiting their creativity. For the same reason, we limit corps control measures to those necessary for essential coordination and synchronization.

It only takes one leader who centralizes and applies excessive controls to inhibit the actions



Phase IV Restoration

- Achieve end state as soon as possible
- Win the war
- Quick aggressive operations





Figure 4. Restoration

F-16 Falcons awaiting clearance to take off on a bombing mission during Desert Storm, 23 January 1991.



Also critical during... contingencies are joint deep operations, possibly across international boundaries, that include the integration of special operations forces, surveillance, target acquisition, interdiction and other deep attack and offensive counterair operations. These illustrate the need for the joint task force to shape future operations even as it focuses on the crucial joint fight to establish a lodgment.

of his subordinates and everyone around him. Hence, we strongly encourage our commanders to adopt parallel C^2 systems. This style inspires trust and confidence between echelons of command but requires commanders and staffs to volunteer information to the rest of the team to achieve synchronization. Recent combat operations suggest the benefits engendered by this style of command far outweigh any loss to synchronization.

Fundamentally, corps' warfighting style features maneuver. Bold, aggressive and purposeful (or relational) maneuver at all levels is paramount to battlefield success. We understand and are prepared to take risks (at the same time, we stress the difference between a risk and a gamble). We will maneuver to place the enemy at a disadvantage, to cause him to react, to pause, to become cautious and to stop frequently to protect himself and, thus, lose his sense of objective. The enemy has an orientation, a direction tied to his mission that mentally gives him a front, rear and flanks. We orient our combat power against his flanks and rear to paralyze him, and we follow up quickly to sustain our tempo that, in turn, causes his collapse. In the defense, we complement maneuver through aggressive

reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, counterattacks, tactical deception and the skillful use of terrain.

Initiative is another feature of corps' warfighting style. Closely coupled to maneuver, it means we want to throw the enemy off-balance with a powerful blow, from an unexpected direction, and follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery. Tied to C^2 , it includes several aspects: an operating style that encourages aggressive exploitation of opportunity; audacity on the part of commanders; mental and organizational agility; and anticipation, not only by commanders but also their staffs, especially intelligence and logistics.

In short, we intend to press the fight, on foot if necessary, to gain and retain the battlefield advantage and to defeat the enemy at a time and place of our choosing. Thus, neither maneuver nor initiative is the objective; both are but attributes that punctuate our warfighting style to achieve quick and decisive results while minimizing casualties.

Training for War

Training for contingency operations, with a worldwide focus, is no small task. Our mission statement and mission-essential task list provide

focus to our training programs. But the list of tasks can easily get out of hand, threatening to squander precious training resources—resources certain to dwindle in the future.

Creative training methods can alleviate some effects of fiscal constraints. Likewise, we can get

Speed in closing the force and in setting the proper terms in the theater of operations is especially important since the success of decisive operations hinges on our ability to build combat power without losing the initiative.

The corps' method of fighting battles and engagements considers the likelihood that we may have to fight outnumbered initially, possibly surrounded and faced with competing requirements.

Our warfighting style exploits several attributes of corps readiness and versatility. . . . It emphasizes boldness and risk taking—we can ill afford to wait for sufficient strength to be positive of the outcome of any battle or maneuver.

the most from our expenditure of training resources by using proven methods such as lane/situational training, multiechelon training, and so forth. But to guarantee optimum benefits, we must establish priorities. In practice, this means reducing and rank-ordering unit essential tasks—as a key warrior suggested during the conference. Also, since the corps helps to shape and resource the training programs two levels down, it means allocating resources on the basis of first-to-fight—to paraphrase one of my predecessors, “What’s right isn’t necessarily equal.” Having said that, many training goals apply universally to our corps units.

Go-to-War Mentality. History tells us we will go to war the way we are today, not the way we want to be. We cannot expect to have the luxury of time to transition to a warfighting disposition. So, we work to eliminate peacetime detractors that degrade our readiness. It means

first and foremost inculcating a go-to-war mentality—a contingency culture to maintain our edge and to reinforce our warfighting style. We do not advocate ad hoc relationships and methods in war; things do not “sort themselves out” on the battlefield. Hence, we abolish them in time of peace. We focus on what we can do today with what we have, while we shape how we will be in the future.

There are no quick recipes for attaining this goal. It takes mental toughness, discipline and ruthless application in all levels and types of training—the Battle Command Training Program at home station, a heavy-light rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, or even individual skill training in the unit area. Most important, it means training to standards, not to events or time.

It is particularly important to emphasize decentralization in our day-to-day operations. In time of peace, we are tempted to centralize for the sake of efficiency. We must resist this easier approach—it is not how we will operate in combat. Generally, if a task is accomplished in a decentralized fashion in combat, then it must be trained similarly in peacetime. Centralized training of individuals or units is a stopgap measure that should be used only until the chain of command has learned its tasks and decides how to train to the required standards. There may be times, during new equipment training for example, when commanders may choose to centralize training, but centralized training is the exception, not the norm.

Organization for Training. Our mission requires corps units to maintain forces in a posture for quick recall and rapid deployment. Alert procedures require the first set of ready forces to be on a 2-hour recall. Hence, commanders operate in three cycles: mission, training and support. To maximize training benefits, commanders rigorously control nonprogrammed leaves, and they coordinate school attendance and other requirements during their post support cycle. During intensive training, 95 percent of present-for-duty strength is the standard. Commanders continue to train their units dur-

The crew of a 101st Airborne Division 105mm howitzer in Saudi Arabia, September 1990.



Crews, squads and platoons are increasingly important to successful contingency operations. But they require much training to develop the skills, teamwork and cohesiveness necessary for battlefield success. Therefore, we reserve 25 to 35 percent of available training time for them. We insist our commanders not scrimmage on the first day of practice but use, instead, the proven building-block approach. . . . Every attempt is made to man maneuver squads and platoons and tank crews at full strength, and to protect soldiers in these units from special duties.

in mission cycle, but they do so in a manner that allows them to meet directed deployment times. To ensure soldiers get leave, commanders schedule at least one, two-week block leave period each fiscal year. Block leaves orient on maneuver battalions, to coordinate simultaneously the leaves of affiliated combat support and combat service support slices.

Training Subordinate Leaders. In combat, our subordinates carry the primary burden for success. They must issue orders and make tactical decisions routinely. They will not develop these skills unless they are specifically trained and then given the opportunity to practice on a recurring and continuing basis. Every leader must be taught to assume personal responsibility for issuing orders in combat, rather than push the responsibility for unwelcome tasks to their senior leaders. This applies equally in combat support and combat service support units. We consistently reinforce this skill by requiring daily orders and instructions be issued to soldiers through the chain of command. We believe decision making to be both a skill and an art, and

that both aspects can be learned. Leaders must be trained to make decisions as they would make them in combat. For example, we have found movements to contact, followed by hasty attack, excellent vehicles for teaching decision making at every level of command. Confronted by ambiguity and inordinate stress, young leaders soon learn that failure to make a timely decision stalls the action unnecessarily and places soldiers at increased risk. Likewise, more senior commanders learn that precipitous action on their part degrades the tempo of operations and risks losing momentum—hence relinquishes the initiative.

We seek similar opportunities to develop the staff's ability to winnow the endless stream of raw information into a synthesis of the risks and opportunities associated with our operations. Our basic rules for developing subordinate leaders are:

- Train them to standard in all leader tasks.
- Give them the authority to act on the given task commensurate to their level or position.
- Place the responsibility for accomplishing the task squarely on their shoulders.
- Hold them accountable to attain the

Black Hawks taking off for a night mission during Desert Storm.



[The] Army enjoys a considerable night advantage over potential adversaries . . . The point is that, notwithstanding the catchy slogans, we do not "own the night"; however, we do have the edge and can increase this edge by learning the capabilities and training properly on how to exploit them.

prescribed standard; and, if they fail, require them to retrain as a matter of course.

Maneuver Squads and Platoons. While the potential of a decentralized and maneuver-oriented, warfighting style is great, the benefits can only be gleaned if our crews, squads and platoons are well trained, well led and fit for combat. Crews, squads and platoons represent the basic combat strength of the Army. They engage the enemy directly by fire or maneuver and often can compensate for weak or tentative leaders. They can overcome nature's harshest elements with the same panache they demonstrate in conquering their foe. They simply have no substitute on the battlefield and must be maintained at full strength.

Crews, squads and platoons are increasingly important to successful contingency operations. But they require much training to develop the skills, teamwork and cohesiveness necessary for battlefield success. Therefore, we reserve 25 to 35 percent of available training time at squad and platoon levels, separate and apart from multi-echelon training at a higher level. We insist our commanders not scrimmage on the first day of practice but use, instead, the proven building-

block approach. Additionally, every attempt is made to man maneuver squads and platoons and tank crews at full strength, and to protect soldiers in these units from special duties, command-directed positions and extraneous assignments.

Night Training. Night operations are key to our mission accomplishment. Operations *Just Cause* and *Desert Storm* substantiated our emphasis on night operations. We know the US Army enjoys a considerable night advantage over potential adversaries—and this advantage is growing with the continuing introduction of night-capable weapons and equipment. Our goal is to conduct 50 percent of our training at night to capitalize on these capabilities. Particular emphasis is on unit night live-fire operations. The priority we accorded night combined arms live-fires prior to *Desert Storm* epitomizes this training goal. The point is that, notwithstanding the catchy slogans, we do not "own the night"; however, we do have the edge and can increase this edge by learning the capabilities and training properly on how to exploit them.

Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs). The corps' EDRE program is key to enhancing the readiness of corps units to

meet their contingency response requirements. There are two types of corps EDREs: X-hour and N-hour. The purpose of X-hour EDREs is to improve the corps' ability to exploit the warning time available in most contingencies. We measure success by our ability to derive suitable operational concepts and corresponding force packages for the specific contingency scenario. Therefore, these events train unit processes and procedures; and assessments focus on how units apply the derived concepts and force option in the field. The dates of these EDREs are provided to participants well in advance to yield concurrent planning opportunities corpswide.

We design N-hour EDREs to exercise and improve the corps deployment system. These training events focus on time-sensitive activities that enable corps units to meet established deployment times. We generate about a dozen EDREs during a typical year, each orienting on a particular contingency and exercising likely force combinations. Extensive efforts are made to include our joint and special operations partners in these events to enhance interoperability among our warfighting team. Although we take into consideration planned training activities when scheduling EDREs, units must be prepared to meet their contingency response standard at all times, with little or no notification.

Fighting Light. A commander who lets soldiers carry all their equipment places the soldiers and the mission at unacceptable risk. This notion applies to unit, as well as individual loads. All too often we fail to tailor our force packages properly, just as we neglect to trim our soldiers' loads. The consequences are an excessive requirement for strategic lift to deliver our combat forces into a contingency region, and soldiers too fatigued to maintain the desired tempo of operations. We can ill afford to deploy super-


fluous unit equipment or to squander soldiers' efforts. Yet, we need to integrate sufficient combat, combat support and combat service support units into our force packages to achieve the overwhelming combat power we desire. The challenge confronting crisis response force commanders is to strike the proper balance between fighting light and fighting outgunned. The wise commander achieves that balance without turning soldiers into 21st century pack mules.

Risk Assessment. Of course, no training requirement demands that we risk the life of a soldier. Safety in training and protection of the force in combat are related. In recent combat operations, we assessed the level of risk and took action to reduce it to an acceptable level. We must do likewise in training during peacetime. Realistic and demanding combat training is done safely every day by competent and caring commanders. They realize safety is an objective too precious to delegate.

The XVIII Airborne Corps is merely a microcosm of today's Army—an Army arguably better trained, better led and better equipped than ever before. This Army of ours faces tough challenges ahead. But the challenges do not overwhelm us because we share a collective vision of a smaller, but combat-ready, strategic force always ready to respond to the nation's call. Change we must. But as we recast to meet the challenges of the third millennium, we are comforted by our Army's grit for battle. Over the past two decades, our predecessors carefully crafted today's Army into something special, the premier land power in the world; the essence of that sculpture must remain featured in the Army we remold. Guided by the galvanizing six imperatives, training excellence ensures the Army's readiness today, and doctrine secures its combat potential for tomorrow to come. *MR*

Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck is commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from Kansas State University, an M.B.A. from Florida State University and a doctorate from George Washington University. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in Vietnam, the Continental United States, Europe and Korea, including chief of staff, 8th Infantry Division, Europe; director, Force Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D.C.; assistant division commander, 101st Airborne Division; commander, 2d Infantry Division, Korea; commander, Joint Special Operations Command; and commander, US Army Special Operations Command.

Forging Security Through PEACE



Colonel Terry L. Rice, US Army

The military, as an institution, is at a crossroads. The focus of deterring war in Europe and containing communism does not seem to be relevant. The author addresses the challenges facing the leadership in analyzing the missions and requirements that will shape the direction of the Army into the 21st century. The author also looks at the importance of the nonwarfighting utility of the Army to promote peace in the post-Cold War environment.

What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing—without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War.¹

President George Bush, 2 August 1990

THE POST-Cold War world has compelled us to reassess our approach to national security. Our longtime, well-focused policy of containment of the Soviet Union and global communism is rapidly being replaced by requirements to address diverse threats to regional stability around the world. This has created a significant challenge for the military to craft a strategy that covers the entire continuum of mili-

tary operations—peacetime engagement, hostilities short of war and war.² While, first and foremost, the military mission must never lose focus on the clear and primary purpose of “deterrence and winning decisively if deterrence fails,” we must be prepared to employ our talents and capabilities to promote the conditions for peace through support of peacetime engagement.

The US objective for the regional application of peacetime engagement is clear—a peaceful world in which democracies, at least pluralistic governments, and market economies flourish. The threats opposing US objectives are increasingly nontraditional in a national security sense.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

Instead of predominantly military threats to our interests, regional instabilities will increasingly affect our nation's security. The root causes of instability may include poor, unsustainable economies, poverty, illiteracy, ethnic and social unrest, uncontrolled or inadequate development and unresponsive or incapable government institutions, to name only a very few. The United States must be ready and able to address these root causes to achieve an enduring stability, and this is the principal challenge toward which peacetime engagement is focused.

In pursuit of the objective of regional stability, peacetime engagement has two principal components that complement continuing efforts to promote friendship and democratic ideals. While both components involve the peaceful application of our nation's capabilities, one is reactive in nature while the other is proactive. The reactive component is emergency response to crises—natural or man-made disasters—that threaten the security of life or property. Emergency response helps a nation cope with, and work through, sudden threats to stability. On the other hand, peacetime engagement also calls for our participation in proactive efforts to promote the conditions for peace that require long-term involvement.

The proactive element of peacetime engagement is, perhaps, the most important since, though often subtle, it has the mission of achieving the enduring conditions for peace. It is designed to achieve security through stability and sustainability. Stability, in this sense, is not maintaining the status quo but is establishing the conditions for orderly change. Sustainability takes into account the consequences of both uncontrolled development and resource depletion. It encourages development in an environmentally and resource-sustainable manner. Nation assistance is the proactive element of peacetime engagement, and our Army has a vital role to play in its successful execution.

Nation Assistance

As a proactive component of peacetime engagement, nation assistance requires a long-term perspective that involves all agencies of the

government, not just the military. Nation assistance is a methodical, coordinated interagency approach to enhancing security through mutually (US and host nation) agreed-upon requirements for infrastructure and institutional development. It addresses the root causes of instability by focusing collective energies and capabilities

The US objective for the regional application of peacetime engagement is clear—a peaceful world in which democracies, at least pluralistic governments, and market economies flourish. The threats opposing US objectives are increasingly nontraditional in a national security sense.

toward the development of key host nation institutions, both public and private. Its underlying principle is simply that strong, responsive host nation institutions will breed the conditions for enduring peace. Thus, the success of nation assistance is achieved when, one day, the United States can walk away, leaving behind capable institutions able to support democracy and market economies all within a genuine spirit of mutual trust and confidence.

Nation assistance requires a new way of thinking about how we should support the needs of other nations. Its philosophy should pervade every interaction we have with a host nation, emergency responses included. We should merely begin each interaction by asking ourselves: How can we use this opportunity to strengthen the host nation's ability to help itself?

As an element of peacetime engagement, nation assistance does not signify a burdensome series of new programs. There are numerous existing programs under the Foreign Assistance Act, Economy Act, Arms Export Control Act, Title 10, US Code, and others, through which the United States conducts business with foreign nations. All of these programs, when prudently planned and executed, can contribute to effective nation assistance. The key is integrated

planning and implementation to meet common goals.

Too often, the United States has responded to requests for assistance or, even worse, imposed assistance without giving due consideration to what a country actually needs. The activities

Nation assistance is a methodical, coordinated interagency approach to enhancing security through mutually agreed-upon requirements for infrastructure and institutional development. It addresses the root causes of instability by focusing collective energies and capabilities toward the development of key host nation institutions, both public and private.

have seldom been considered in the context of a global or a regional country strategy. We can provide successful and effective nation assistance only through thoughtful planning and implementation. This requires the coordination and integration of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, informational and military. In war, the commander in chief (CINC) integrates his military forces with other US agencies to achieve objectives. In peace, the ambassador integrates all US agencies, including the military, as required, to achieve our nation's objectives.

To be successful, the ambassador must be able to tap the capabilities and energies of any government agency during peacetime. To be of maximum benefit to the Country Team (consisting of the highest-ranking official of each US government agency permanently represented in a given country), the US Army must be ready to support the CINCs' contributions to the process of developing and implementing an ambassador's country plan. Nation assistance, which provides the host nation with the skills to address its own root causes of instability, must be the centerpiece of this plan.

Nation assistance must become part of our

military culture. Each and every international endeavor undertaken to assist another country requires that we, the United States, ask ourselves, "Which course of action, given the resources available, provides the best means to promote security, stability and sustainability?" These are our ultimate goals which, if attained, will greatly decrease the probability of conflict.

The philosophy of nation assistance is straightforward. Effective coordination and implementation will be the difficult part. There are many agencies that have not worked closely together in the past; many programs in each agency; and many countries who need our support. But no matter how difficult, nation assistance is the smart way to achieve enduring stability.

The Case for Military Involvement in Peacetime

Questions are consistently raised about the nonwarfighting utility of the Army. Why should government agencies such as the Department of State be interested in requesting Department of Defense (DOD) assistance with the execution of their peacetime efforts to achieve regional stability? Even more important, why should we, the military, particularly the Army, be interested in participating in nation assistance? After all, as many would be quick to point out, our business is one of violence. We are charged with the armed defense of our nation. We are the only institution capable of dealing with a military threat to our nation's sovereignty. If we divert our attention and fail in our primary purpose, our very freedom is at stake!

Unequivocally, our primary warfighting purpose cannot change, and this fact may appear to be a singularly compelling argument for shunning an active role in nation assistance. But before we "shut the door," let us consider reasons why participation is prudent.

Our Army has been, is and will continue to be called upon to provide critical, nonwarfighting, civil support to our nation. Our Army has been our nation's general military servant for more than 200 years. We were the nation builders that



Too often, the United States has responded to requests for assistance or, even worse, imposed assistance without giving due consideration to what a country actually needs. The activities have seldom been considered in the context of a global or a regional country strategy. We can provide successful and effective nation assistance only through thoughtful planning and implementation. This requires the coordination and integration of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic, informational and military.

led the expansion of our great country. Among numerous feats, we surveyed the West, opened frontiers, made inland navigation possible and built the Panama Canal. We have proved over many years that our value to our nation far transcends defending it against foreign aggression—nation assistance is simply an extension to this historical role.

We, the Army (soldiers and civilians), have unquestionably unique skills, capabilities and talents that can be effectively employed to support nation assistance. These capabilities, not found in any other organization public or private, are intrinsic to our department. We not only have the technical expertise important to many forms of institutional development, we have the ability to rapidly project these capabilities worldwide and effectively operate under the most adverse and primitive conditions. We have a command and control structure that can organize and focus efforts toward the most challenging and diverse of missions. When it comes to

internally mobilizing a tailored force and rapidly projecting that element to a remote part of the world, the Army is second to none. Our inherent mission orientation and perseverance will be keys to success in many peacetime operations.

Traditionally, under past paradigms, the military supported national security with a single focus on the deterrence of war. If that deterrence failed, we then focused on achieving a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield. Today, the primacy of this interpretation of our military purpose remains intact. However, the changed world environment has required us to turn from a single focus on Soviet/communist threats to one of regional stability issues. Deterrence is not the only feasible way and, in many cases, may not be the most appropriate means of addressing this new interpretation of the threat to our national security. Rather than just deter war, if we, the military, participate in innovative ways to promote peace, we work to obviate the necessity to fight. We will always remain ready to respond to

all challenges across the entire continuum of military operations, but the probability of having to fight will have been markedly reduced.

A collateral benefit of nation assistance is that it supports two of the four foundations of our national defense policy—forward presence and crisis response.³ Forward presence enhances US

Nation assistance must become part of our military culture. Each and every international endeavor undertaken to assist another country requires that we, the United States, ask ourselves, "Which course of action, given the resources available, provides the best means to promote security, stability and sustainability?"

access and influence. When political or cultural sensitivities require, it can be effectively maintained through the use of civilians and noncombat troop units. Crisis response is particularly important for our military, which is largely based in the Continental United States. Its readiness requirements are significantly exercised through nation assistance deployments. During an actual crisis, we will clearly benefit from the host nation institutions and infrastructure that are developed through our nation assistance efforts.

The Army can set the right example—actually the best example of what a military force should be in a democratic country. Although the quality of militaries varies widely across the developing world, the military generally plays a very influential role. It either leads the country, guarantees the authority of a civilian leader or ensures his fall if allegiances shift. If a country is to be a stable democracy, it is of paramount importance that a country's military operates as part of a system of checks and balances, with an apolitical loyalty to an elected government and the people of the country. As stated in the first paragraph of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army*:

"In every important aspect, the United States Army reflects the democratic nature of our social


and political structure—both directly, in the Army's purpose and legal basis, and indirectly, in the professional ethic that commits its members to serving the public good."⁴

This public service and submission to legal civil authorities is not at all well understood in the developing world. By working directly with a country via the ambassador, our Army will provide a very positive example of how the military serves the nation; how a military contributes beyond fighting by providing medical services, performing disaster relief, building infrastructure, and so forth; how a code of ethics and standards of conduct are fundamental to an effective force; and how we professionally carry out our responsibility of being the nation's general military servant. The existence of armies is immutable—we have the potential of playing a momentous role in making these armies contributors to the stability of democratic institutions.

Through nation assistance, with its focus on proactively addressing the root causes of instability, our military—our Army—can make key contributions to the efforts of other government agencies that have the clear lead in this area. Most important, not only do we have capabilities that should be brought to bear for these peacetime purposes, but we also are the greatest stakeholders in the preservation of that peace. As General Douglas MacArthur stated, "The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war."⁵ America's soldiers are the ones who must pay the price if our nation assistance efforts fail—the ultimate motivation to do the right things well.

The Cost of Nation Assistance

Can we afford to devote Army resources—funds, time and troops—to any mission other than our principal ones during this period of diminishing resources? Even in light of the above analysis, there are those who would be reluctant to accept nation assistance, regardless of obvious merit, because they perceive such involvement would detract from our warfighting capabilities. Further, some would say that in a time of cut-



Our Army has been our nation's general military servant for more than 200 years. We were the nation builders that led the expansion of our great country. Among numerous feats, we surveyed the West, opened frontiers, made inland navigation possible and built the Panama Canal. We have proved over many years that our value to our nation far transcends defending it against foreign aggression—nation assistance is simply an extension to this historical role.

backs and reductions, we should reduce our commitments to the peacetime activities that we are currently undertaking. I argue to the contrary—we simply cannot afford not to participate in nation assistance. Consider the following.

Our business is security. If we can enhance security without fighting, we save resources. Saving resources is always prudent but, given the state of our economy, it has added significance now. The US government no longer has the flexibility to fight wars without substantially affecting our economic health. The United States cannot afford to disengage and allow the root causes of instability to turn into conflicts that require the military to take action on the battlefield. It is a matter of "You can pay me now or you can pay me later," and nation assistance is the proactive way of paying just a little now instead of more later.

There should be no expensive drain on scarce DOD resources. Nation assistance can be effectively executed through the efficient and prioritized use of existing resources already being expended on international activities. As an

example, within DOD, joint training exercise resources can be leveraged to provide collateral nation assistance benefits. Hence, with foresight and appropriate planning, our department can concurrently enhance US military readiness and contribute to nation assistance without the requirement for additional resources. Beyond DOD, there are numerous opportunities to leverage interagency programs, as well, and synergistically apply the available resources. The nation assistance "value-added" is derived from the philosophy of institution building and skill transfer, not from the unique and dedicated expenditure of funds on large projects. Armed with a focused purpose toward nation assistance, our government can effectively leverage the use of all interagency money. Promoting peace via nation assistance makes economic sense and does not increase the DOD/Department of the Army resource burden.

When fully and judiciously integrated into our training process, peacetime engagement activities will enhance the combat readiness of our soldiers and units. The beauty of nation assistance

opportunities is the extent to which they prepare our soldiers and civilians for war—a collateral benefit, which is not counterproductive to our

The Army can set the right example—actually the best example of what a military force should be in a democratic country. Although the quality of militaries varies widely across the developing world, the military generally plays a very influential role.

warfighting mission, but enhancing. In addition to the obvious training benefits derived from deploying units' performing missions that are related to their combat roles, the following are also worthy of consideration:

- **Rigorous, realistic planning:** Our staffs, at all levels, will benefit from complex and demanding planning requirements. Planning will be key and its success clearly measurable; if inadequate, the price will be much more than a negative critique.

- **Cultural and environmental acclimation:** We have no idea where the next battle will be fought, but it is almost certain to be in a part of the world where cultural sensitivity and environmental acclimation will be key elements in success—soldier skills must be adapted and conduct must be appropriate. Actual deployments to such locations demand that soldiers do the right things or pay serious consequences. Basic soldier skills are learned and reinforced, another key to winning on the next battlefield. Experience in foreign countries will be a very beneficial byproduct. By working in a foreign country, soldiers and civilians will experience firsthand the dynamics of the government, military and people; they will intimately know the physical environment. They will, by circumstance, acquire essential elements of information. A picture will be painted that will be critical to accurately determining and adjusting strategies and policies. In some cases, these insights will spawn measures that strengthen peace while, in others,

they will better prepare us for conducting contingency operations.

- **Preparation for post-conflict realities:** As has been clearly evident after each and every conflict in which our nation has been involved, the initial responsibility for post-conflict recovery has been given to the military, perhaps due to the fact that we are on the scene when the needs are most severe. The missions that we can expect through nation assistance will be very similar in nature to those for which we can expect responsibility after a conflict.

- **Appreciation of American ideals:** Finally, although not as tangible, these missions create a greater appreciation, within our own ranks, for "our way of life" and, thus, a more loyal and motivated soldier. At the same time, it will provide an expanded basis for attracting the quality youth of our nation to military service.

True, peacetime engagements may necessitate that soldiers forgo some traditional training, but what they will gain has the potential of significantly enhancing our overall readiness.

Whatever strategy we adopt must account for what Carl von Clausewitz called "the paradoxical trinity of war"—the people, the commander and his army, and the government:

"These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. . . . Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."⁶

In other words, the people, the government, and the Army must support the concept; otherwise, it is doomed. The threat of communism and the Soviet bloc gave us clear justification. Today, the necessity of a mighty force is not nearly as intuitive and is being questioned by the government and the people. No matter how clearly the Army sees the need, they say we simply do not have the money to field a large force. We



Cultural and environmental acclimation: We have no idea where the next battle will be fought, but it is almost certain to be in a part of the world where cultural sensitivity and environmental acclimation will be key elements in success—soldier skills must be adapted and conduct must be appropriate. Actual deployments to such locations demand that soldiers do the right things or pay serious consequences. Basic soldier skills are learned and reinforced, another key to winning on the next battlefield.

won through strength, and the Army does not want to relinquish the advantage that took so long to establish. Therefore, if we are to “break the mold” of decline after victory, it is essential for the Army to broaden the public’s perception of the military’s peacetime relevance, as well as its wartime relevance. We must make it more palatable to the people and Congress to maintain a capable and ready force. Peacetime engagement helps narrow the gap; it demonstrates that we do not merely exist to fight wars, but also to support our national economic, humanitarian and environmental goals in the world. We become more useful and relevant—obviously with good reason.

The Army’s Role

If we in the Army are to acknowledge our role in support of nation assistance, what must we do to ensure that our department is successful and able to contribute most effectively? Must we restructure the Army? Must we adjust current resourcing policies? The answers to these questions are not as difficult as one might initially think. (Keep in mind that nation assistance contributes a great deal of added value to existing programs for very little additional cost.) No, we do not need to make major resource or structure changes within the Army. Primarily, it only requires a philosophical adjustment—a change from the way we have traditionally viewed our

national security and a change from the way we have approached work in host nations. I recommend the following three steps to institutionalize nation assistance.

Clearly, if we are to successfully accomplish any mission, we must embrace that mission within our institution. We must establish it as a

The US government no longer has the flexibility to fight wars without substantially affecting our economic health. The United States cannot afford to disengage and allow the root causes of instability to turn into conflicts that require the military to take action on the battlefield. It is a matter of "You can pay me now or you can pay me later," and nation assistance is the proactive way of paying just a little now instead of more later.

clear Army purpose—not as a challenge to the primacy of our deterrence and warfighting missions, but as a legitimate mission, deserving of formal attention and planning. Explicit mission recognition avoids the "ad hoc" that has eroded our effectiveness in the past and has made the execution very difficult for the CINCs and their Army component commanders.

The next step toward mission recognition is to include nation assistance in our doctrine. Our doctrine needs to capture the concepts to assist Army leaders executing these critical programs. Doctrine should be the expression of the Army's approach to the successful conduct of all missions across the entire continuum of military operations, not just the warfighting missions. This is particularly important as we move forward into a postcontainment security environment where we will find ourselves called upon more frequently to exercise our role supporting peacetime engagement than that of warfighting. We currently have a remarkable opportunity to make these adjustments in the rewrite of our keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*. We must

include and integrate doctrinal thought to cover nation assistance and provide the guidance needed to effectively meet the challenges of this mission.

Once our doctrine has established adequate guidance, we must continue to integrate and celebrate the concept of nation assistance into our Army's culture. We must be ready and willing to respond to missions that promote peace just as energetically as we approach our missions of deterring war and fighting to win. Clearly, at a minimum, the following is required:

- **Proponency:** We must assign proponency for peacetime engagement and nation assistance in much the same as we have assigned proponency for light and heavy maneuver. The mission deserves the same critical thought and support that is accomplished only through the assignment of a clear proponency responsibility.

- **Leadership training:** In addition to appropriate "how to" manuals, we must train our leaders to work effectively in a multiagency environment. We must train all our soldiers and civilians to be most effective in an environment where cultural differences pose difficulties and challenges to the successful and effective transfer of skills to their counterparts. We must continue to instill the "warrior spirit," but at the same time, instill the sense of being able to contribute to the preservation of peace through close working relationships with diverse peoples around the globe.

Setting the Ground Rules

In order to effectively develop the necessary doctrine, we must clearly understand the nation assistance battlefield. The rules of (peacetime) engagement are quite different than those to which we have grown accustomed. These rules, which establish the pillars upon which a viable, unified nation assistance ethos must be anchored, are manifested in what I call the tenets of nation assistance.

Demand Teamwork. Effective nation assistance actively orchestrates the involvement of all instruments of our national power and all US government agencies represented on the

ambassador's Country Team. Also, the ambassador is able to harness all capabilities found throughout the US government, including those not normally associated with international missions. While other agencies will be charged with the orchestration and prioritization of effort, military participants must be

trained to effectively interact and contribute to a nontraditional, interagency team.


Work With the Host Nation. Nation assistance is accomplished in partnership with the host nation—the host nation must perceive that it is the guiding force. Sovereignty is a powerful force, especially in the developing world,

SAUDI ARABIA—A CASE IN POINT

Probably the best and most widely recognized example of a successful nation assistance program, although it was certainly not done under a comprehensive, integrated framework, was the support that the United States gave to Saudi Arabia during the last three decades. Over this period, the Army has worked hand in hand with the Saudis, the cornerstones of this cooperation being security assistance and reimbursable construction. These programs successfully endured periods of strained diplomatic relations over issues related to Israel, oil embargoes and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. The Saudis gained security, infrastructure and much more. We won the trust and confidence of an important ally.

The dividends of these nation assistance efforts were reaped during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Cooperation in many facets of these operations was indisputably key to success. Politically, it is clear that the unprecedented diplomatic successes of Secretary of State James A. Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in convincing the Saudi Arabian government to accept the massive deployment of the coalition forces, no matter how culturally offensive, were rooted in mutual respect. Quoting from the president's 1991 *National Security Strategy*: "When in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, the Saudis invited foreign forces onto their soil, King Fahd observed: 'I trust the United States of America. I know that when you say you will be committed, you are, in fact, committed. I know that you will stay as long as necessary to do what has to be done, and I know you will leave when you are asked to leave at the end, and that you have no ulterior motives.'"

A relationship had been nurtured over the years which was unequivocally key to our combined success.



One of the most demanding, if not the most onerous, challenges of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* was providing the requisite logistics support. It is intuitive that mission accomplishment would have been virtually impossible, or at least much more costly in terms of lives and resources, if not for the existing, well-developed infrastructure—ports, air bases, military cantonments, and so on. Prior to our involvement three decades ago, these facilities did not exist or were primitive. Over the years, we guided the development that made the massive deployment of coalition forces possible—just as important, we built the institutions that allowed them to function as envisioned and provide the essential contracting services.

Over a period of many years, we established the foundation that allowed us to successfully respond to an ominous threat to our security. The Army nurtured, developed and left behind trained and able counterparts capable of managing their own business—even more, we established trust and confidence. Nation assistance may be subtle but the dividends are enormous. It is difficult to envision from where our next crisis will spring, but it will. Hopefully, we will have paved the way for success via peacetime engagement. What a marvelous way to enhance our national security. ■

upon which we must never infringe under normal circumstances. Even a hint of overstepping our bounds can jeopardize progress. At some point, the assisted country will be expected to assume total responsibility for each and every program. This will occur sooner and more efficiently if it is a major player right from the beginning. Finally, it is important that host nation leaders maintain credibility in the eyes of their people. Again, this is best accomplished by maximizing their responsibility at program inception and continuously increasing their role

The people, the government, and the Army must support the concept; otherwise, it is doomed. The threat of communism and the Soviet bloc gave us clear justification. Today, the necessity of a mighty force is not nearly as intuitive and is being questioned by the government and the people. No matter how clearly the Army sees the need, they say we simply do not have the money to field a large force.

as circumstances permit. Bottom line: It is essential that citizens of the host nation play a meaningful role in every facet of a program to the greatest extent possible.

Coordinate Continuously. All activities must be planned to take advantage of host nation and third party programs, like those of other nations and international organizations. Planning in isolation will create redundancy and, even worse, ill-feelings. Sincere coordination and cooperation is a must—the results will be synergistic.

Build Institutions. The primary focus of all programs must be on building strong, independent, democratic institutions. Yes, we will provide or assist in creating tangible products such as roads, equipment, trained personnel, computer systems, water treatment plants, communication facilities, spare parts, and so on. But these must be viewed as the means by which we

impart our values and know-how to host nation personnel who comprise the institutions that will, one day, allow the host nation to provide for itself. In addition, tangible products are important to demonstrating our commitment to the people of a nation and the effectiveness of their government in improving conditions, but, for their long-term well-being, it is more important to give them what they need—democratic institutions.

Seek Low-Cost/High-Payoff Programs.

Programs that provide the “most bang for the buck” are a must. As is painfully obvious now, we are not a nation of endless resources. Great care must be taken to identify cost-effective courses of action that contribute to the host nation’s ability to function independently. The host nation should share the cost when appropriate, but never should these contributions be unilateral demands on the part of the United States. They must be negotiated agreements based on the countries’ ability to pay. It is a give-and-take process in which the most foolhardy outcome is the abandonment of a vital initiative because of intransigence on our part.

Take the Long Term View. Sustainable development demands a long-term perspective. It demands that we look well into the future, decades in some cases, to visualize a desirable end state and then determine what we can do to assist the host nation to get there. The limits of our foresight must be taxed.

Promote Private Enterprise. To the greatest extent feasible, programs are designed to facilitate participation by US and host nation private sectors. Ours holds the overwhelming preponderance of our capabilities and unparalleled insight into the workings of the market system. It is best poised to instill free enterprise principles. Theirs holds the key to their success in stimulating internal economic growth and operating in the global market. We in the Army tap into these capabilities through our ability to contract.

Maintain Simplicity. The most basic solutions are best in the developing world. The host nation must be able to sustain the efforts once

our involvement has ceased. Complexity creates counterproductive maintenance and training requirements. Sophistication will grow with time.

Plan Flexibility. Flexibility is a must. Nation assistance is evolutionary in nature and entails many unknowns; it requires the persistent application of planning, resourcing and implementing actions that are adaptive to changes and revelations. Adjustment will be continuous—be ready for them.

Encourage Innovation. Innovation in developing and implementing courses of action holds a premium. The paucity of resources, combined with the numerous cultural and developmental conditions facing us, demands new and innovative solutions to some very challenging problems. No idea can be dismissed without due consideration. "American ingenuity" is renowned around the globe—nation assistance will test it.

Evaluate All Possible Impacts. It is essential that programs do not adversely affect the local economy or other aspects of local life. Unwittingly, one can easily make such errors. All possible impacts must be explored before proceeding and continuously assessed after initiation.

Be Sensitive to Cultural Differences. Those who work with nation assistance programs must openly accept, but subtly work to reconcile, cultural differences. Although many of these differences such as those related to corruption, work ethic, nepotism, integrity and racial bias are representative of the very things that detract from sustainable development. These values have evolved over hundreds of years and cannot be expected to change overnight. On the other hand, there are differences that favor the host nation; it would only be prudent for us to reinforce these and even learn from them. An overtly righteous and arrogant defense of American values and contempt for those of the host nation will only impede progress. Only personnel with the right diplomatic savvy should be permitted to work with nation assistance programs.

Manage Expectations. Expectations establish the criteria for success—false expectations must not be allowed to develop. Planning should always be finalized with a Memorandum

Now we find ourselves with an unprecedented opportunity to apply our national resources and know-how to perhaps the noblest goal to which man can aspire—an enduring peace. Working just as diligently at promoting peace as we do in preparing for war certainly transcends the traditional military ethos, but our magnificent history is replete with innovation, ingenuity and vision.

of Understanding that clearly describes the scope to which all parties have agreed. Along with an explicit outline of program goals and US and host nation responsibilities, the agencies and action personnel involved on each side must be specified.

Build Trust and Confidence. Mutual trust and confidence are indispensable to progress. They do not just happen—they must be nurtured at every interaction with the host nation. A host nation's perception of the sincerity, competence and dedication of a US representative will often make the difference between success and failure and certainly serves to instill a positive image of the entire United States. We must all be diplomats of our country.

Be Committed. We must have the conviction and perseverance to stick to a course of action. Adjustments will be warranted, but cancellations and seemingly capricious changes of direction often cause more harm than if the programs were never started. Never introduce support without being committed to seeing it through.

The Bottom Line

An operative role for the Army in peace is not a revelation. Since the birth of our nation, we have been actively contributing both at home

and around the world. Although peacetime operations continued, the Cold War period was not peace; it was an enduring crisis that clearly dictated our purpose and priorities. We simply could not risk the slightest possibility of succumbing to Soviet dominance. We were compelled to establish and maintain the requisite military force to counter this threat—everything else was secondary. With skill, intellect, dedication and commitment, we persevered—our way of life won.

Now we find ourselves with an unprecedented opportunity to apply our national resources and know-how to perhaps the noblest goal to which man can aspire—an enduring peace. Working just as diligently at promoting peace as we do in preparing for war certainly transcends the traditional military ethos, but our magnificent history is replete with innovation, ingenuity and vision. If we are going to optimize the use of available resources in serving our national interests, it is now time to make peacetime engagement (along with its major component—nation assistance) a clear Army purpose. We must establish a framework that focuses analysis, planning, training, resources and implementation on establishing the conditions of peace—security, stability and sustainability.

We must be ready to contribute to nation assistance. We have the needed capabilities and have proved our relevancy in the past. The mission is a cost-effective complement to our role

of deterrence and readiness to fight. The fruits of this effort are regional stability and enhanced national security, which are, in fact, our business and in our institution's best interests. And, attractively, by participating we can actually enhance our readiness to respond to our primacy of missions—warfighting.

While not interfering with our warfighting readiness, the Army's contribution must be effective and it must be mainstream. To be mainstream, it must be a part of our doctrine, FM 100-5. We can no longer afford to address peacetime activities on a nonintegrated, ad hoc basis. We need the order, priorities and precepts that doctrine establishes.

Our president spoke of a vision—a vision for making this a world of democracies and market economies—a vision of enhancing security via the promotion of peace. The US Army must, as must all departments and agencies, support a policy of peacetime engagement “every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War.”⁷ We must expand our focus; we must establish in the minds of all a new paradigm that prudently uses peacetime opportunities to create security. President George Bush clearly wants us to promote peace; and as was demonstrated during the past two years in Europe, perhaps the most decisive victories for America and the free world will continue to be won off the battlefield. **MR**

NOTES

1. President George Bush, “Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium,” (Aspen, CO: The White House, 2 August 1990), 2.
2. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army*, Prepublication Edition, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1991), 7-8.
3. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The

White House, August 1991), 25-30.

4. FM 100-1, 1.

5. Douglas MacArthur, speaking at West Point, 12 May 1962.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 89.

7. Bush, 2.

Colonel Terry L. Rice is a War College fellow at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He received a Ph.D. from Colorado State University and is a graduate of the US Military Academy (USMA) and the University of Illinois. In addition to a variety of command and staff positions in Asia, Europe and Africa, he has been involved in several nation assistance-type programs such as adviser to the executive director of the Niger Basin Authority, West Africa; liaison officer for the Dirkou Airfield Rehabilitation Project, Niamey, Niger; and security assistance officer, Rabat, Morocco. He has also served as an assistant professor at the USMA.

Shaping an **ARMY** for **Peace, Crisis and War** *The Continuum of Military Operations*

Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Thurman, US Army

The world's strategic environment is changing and, as such, the Army's role in helping secure US national policy objectives is being reviewed. The author looks at three strategic environments and discusses the Army's role in each as a means to pursue national objectives. He also points out how each one is different and offers a discussion on how various government agencies must work together to achieve success in these activities. Finally, the author looks at the complexity of post-conflict activities.

THE *National Security Strategy of the United States*, published in August 1991, delineates a changing strategic environment caused by recent events in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere around the world. Although the Commonwealth of Independent States (formerly the Soviet Union) retains the capacity to wage war against the United States, this is seen as an unlikely event. Consequently, our evolving security strategy is built on the realization that regional threats, with more clearly focused regional interests, must be addressed as we seek

to secure our nation's strategic goals.

Our former strategy of deterrence and the use of force should deterrence fail does not provide the full range of response options necessary to secure our aims. We must establish and clearly articulate a broader, more flexible, fully integrated policy that goes beyond deterrence. President George Bush outlined the focus and challenges faced by our nation in the August 1991 *National Security Strategy of the United States* when he wrote:

"Our response . . . is shaped by what we are as a people, for our values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose. It is our deepest belief that all nations and peoples seek political and economic

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

freedom; that governments must rest their rightful authority on the consent of the governed, and must live in peace with their neighbors."¹

If our nation is to achieve this strategic goal in an evolving world order, we require a full spectrum of mature policy options. This warrants a

The first [strategic] environment is one of peace. . . . A second environment, characterized by confrontation, conflict and the need to conduct higher-risk operations to secure strategic objectives, is categorized as "hostilities short of war." The most violent and high-risk environment is one in which a state of war is entered.

three-layered national policy that promotes peace, deters war and yet clearly articulates a preparedness to fight and win should deterrence fail.

Continuum of Military Operations

"Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the existence, at one and the same time, of many nations and great governments related to one another in close intercourse. Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace."² This observation was made by President Abraham Lincoln over a hundred years ago, yet it remains valid today and is an intrinsic part of the continuum of military operations.

The continuum of military operations recognizes the existence of three strategic environments in which our nation seeks to achieve its strategic aims. The first environment is one of peace.³ During peace, the nation pursues a policy of peacetime engagement that encompasses those activities that routinely occur between nations. A second environment, characterized by confrontation, conflict and the need to conduct higher-risk operations to secure strategic objectives, is categorized as "hostilities short of war." The most violent and high-risk environment is one in which a state of war is entered. Figure 1 graphically depicts the continuum of military operations and facilitates an understanding of the linkage between national policy, the three strategic environments and the military's role as an instrument of national policy.

Peace

As nations pursue independent national objectives in the normal and preferred manner, they use economic, political and other means to influence other nations. Trade agreements, foreign aid, technological transfer, military training and other forms of nation assistance provide examples. The United States promotes this self-development of nations through the engagement of US resources and assistance. Bush described the engagement of national power in this manner during his 1990 speech to the Aspen Institute when he stated:

"What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing—without neglecting the enduring realities

National Policy Objective	Activities (Environment)	Use of Force or Forces	Military Role	Examples of Operations
*Fight and Win	War (War)	Level of Violence Coercion Compel Deter Post-Conflict Activity	Force	Conventional Theater Operations
*Deter War	Hostilities Short of War (Conflict)	Suasion	Force Forces	Raid/Strike Peacemaking Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Counter-terrorism
Promote Peace	Peacetime Engagement (Peace)	Influence Peacetime Engagement Activities	Forces	Nation Assist Counterdrug Antiterrorism Peacekeeping

* Desired end state of use of force or forces includes a return to the environment of peace.

Figure 1. Continuum of Military Operations



Typical operations include nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug, antiterrorism, arms control, support to US civil authority and peace-keeping operations. In fact, our soldiers serve daily in this capacity. Engineers build roads to improve infrastructure; medics provide inoculations against disease; and mobile training teams enhance friendly foreign nation military expertise.

that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War.¹⁴

This description of peacetime engagement describes activities through which the United States is actively promoting peace and instilling democratic ideals, as well as promoting the development and building the confidence of friendly nations. It is predominantly a peaceful environment; however, it also describes a band of acceptable turbulence and tension. It is a clear recognition that isolationism is not the proper course for our nation to follow. Rather, we must remain "engaged" in pursuit of national security aims. Forward-presence operations, involving representatives from multiple agencies of government, accomplish this, as

evidenced in the following definition of this environment:

"[Peacetime engagement] . . . is the national level strategic concept that coordinates the application of political, economic, informational, and military means to promote regional stability, to retain US influence and access abroad, and to defuse crises."¹⁵

The key is that *influence* is the principal means to *promote peace*. Peace emerges from the right conditions, and our remaining engaged helps develop and maintain these "right conditions." Our nation prefers to remain in this environment as it conducts trade, promotes democracy, fosters peace and seeks to achieve its strategic aims. The military, and particularly the Army, performs a very important role in peacetime engagement. The direct use of military capability for purposes other than combat can

serve as a major means of influence. Specifically, the use of forces to help other nations develop infrastructure, care for their citizens, obtain enhanced technological or other skills and thus

The ultimate focus of our Army is warfighting, yet its role in time of peace is critical. Activities conducted during periods of peace help keep the day-to-day activities and tensions between nations below the threshold of hostilities short of war.

remove underlying causes of instability is a powerful tool in our nation's arsenal. Typical operations include nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug, antiterrorism, arms control, support to US civil authority and peacekeeping operations. In fact, our soldiers serve daily in this capacity. Engineers build roads to improve infrastructure; medics provide inoculations against disease; and mobile training teams enhance friendly foreign nation military expertise, to mention only a few. This use of forces to assist our allies and preserve the peace includes the entire Army: Active, Reserve and civilian components. It is not a new mission; it is one in which the Army has a rich heritage.

The ultimate focus of our Army is warfighting, yet its role in time of peace is critical. Activities conducted during periods of peace help keep the day-to-day activities and tensions between nations below the threshold of hostilities short of war. These activities are critical to our nation's success in pursuing prime policy objectives. Promoting the democratic development of nations, retaining forward presence and access and eliminating preconditions for conflict are central to a strategy that makes full use of our nation's military potential.

Hostilities Short of War

Although remaining in an environment of peace constitutes a major component of a desirable strategic end state, situations occasionally

arise when diplomatic influence alone falls short. When this influence fails, suasion may be required. When this occurs, the nation enters a second, more intense environment—that of conflict—in which nations pursue national aims through “hostilities short of war.” The national policy objective at this point moves from promoting peace to deterring war and returning to peacetime at the earliest opportunity, but on conditions favorable to the United States and its allies.

Two distinct levels of suasion exist as policy options to control a critical situation. The first is the use of forces to deter enemy action. For example, the conduct of a show of force might preclude enemy action by making the perceived risk of such action too great. In this case, the physical presence of our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen serves as a deterrent and facilitates the achievement of strategic aims. Should this fail, or if more severe measures are necessary, the use of force to compel another nation to act in a manner consistent with established policy objectives may be required. A raid or strike such as occurred in 1986 to compel Libya to conform with international law concerning terrorism is an example. An important point is that in hostilities short of war, the use of force or forces is in direct response to a physical enemy threat, regardless of whether shots are fired. During periods of peace, actions are also taken in reaction to a threat, although the threat may be a condition causing or having the potential to cause instability in a nation.

Thus the use of forces to deter and the use of force to compel are both viable policy options within the environment of “hostilities short of war.” Regardless of the specific type of operation conducted in this environment, a major component of the desired strategic end state, after decisively resolving a crisis, is to return to an environment of peace. The term “decisive” does not, however, imply an overuse of force, rather it proposes that we understand the nature of the crisis at hand and undertake a properly structured response.



Members of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) wait to fire at a nearby range as Honduran Special Forces soldiers pass by, March 1988. The 7th was sent to Honduras when the frequency of border violations by the Honduran army increased and there were signs that invasion was imminent.

Two distinct levels of suasion exist as policy options to control a critical situation. The first is the use of forces to deter enemy action. For example, the conduct of a major training exercise as a show of force might preclude enemy action by making the perceived risk of such action too great. . . . Should this fail, or if more severe measures are necessary, the use of force to compel another nation to act in a manner consistent with established policy objectives may be required.

War

As a last resort, our nation may be required to apply military force as coercion to implement or sustain policy. In the worst case, this might place our nation in an environment of war. This may be a war of limited or general nature. Limited war is armed conflict short of general war, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations. General war involves armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. In either instance, the Army, in conjunction with its fellow services, should apply decisive force to fight and win in as short a time as possible. Further, we engage in combat in a manner that will result in the minimal cost in terms of casualties and national treas-

ure. This is the traditional role of the Army and one on which it principally focuses and trains. Even in war, the desired strategic end state remains focused on concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its allies, minimizing the duration of post-conflict activity, and returning to an environment of peace as quickly as possible.

Simultaneity of Operations

The continuum of military operations clearly highlights the simultaneity of actions with which the theater commander must contend. International and domestic operations conducted during peace require the contributions of many governmental agencies. The Department of State normally takes the lead, while others participate. The Department of Defense works

through the commander in chief (CINC), who is responsible for the integration of military materiel and forces. He coordinates these through the ambassador and Country Team. In performing this role, the CINC considers his entire area of responsibility (AOR). Should events escalate to hostilities short of war, necessitating more violent action, the CINC may more clearly focus operations in the AOR by defining a

The duration of post-conflict activity is affected by internal and external influences over which control can be exerted. Resorting to a level of violence in excess of what is required to resolve the situation may prolong post-conflict activity. The "right" level of violence means selecting the proper response.

theater of war. This does not mean that other peacetime activities cease. In fact, they continue throughout the AOR. If war erupts and more intense combat operations result, the CINC can provide more defined focus and better control of operations by declaring a theater of operations inside the overall theater of war. This usually occurs when multiple campaigns are being conducted in a theater of war. Thus, the CINC may simultaneously conduct combat operations in a theater of operations, respond to contingency requirements elsewhere in a theater of war and conduct normal peacetime activities throughout his AOR. This simultaneity of operations is a prerequisite feature of any valid conflict model. Nation assistance and similar activities do not cease when higher levels of violence arise. These activities continue. Further, they retain or may even increase their importance relative to other operations within the context of achieving theater strategic aims.

Post-Conflict Activities

Operations conducted during war, or hostilities short of war, extend beyond the shooting and through a period of post-conflict activity. When the enemy capitulates or a cease-fire occurs,

post-conflict activities occur. Initially, they are directly related to the earlier combat and are predominantly a military activity. The initial stages of post-conflict activity typically consist of consolidation, reorganization and similar operations. During this stage, tactical units provide care to the wounded, consolidate and repair equipment, process prisoners of war, reposition units to posture for future operations and regenerate combat power. At the operational and strategic levels, peacekeeping, operations to restore order (peacemaking), nation assistance, restoration of governmental control and the determination of terms of surrender and armistice provide examples.

Subsequent phases of post-conflict activity extend beyond the tactical units on the battlefield and the military command and control structures directing them. These operations increasingly become interagency in nature as the ambassador and Country Team resume a larger role. Our strategy is to direct these activities at countering instability, promoting the legitimacy of the nations involved and establishing a climate where peacetime endeavor is once again an effective means of interaction.

Post-conflict activities are intricate, involve the activities of multiple agencies and ultimately transfer authority from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. The post-conflict environment can be a confusing one and may last from a few days to several years. The objective of these activities is to return to an environment of peace as expeditiously as possible, but also to increase the probability of sustained peace. Operational-level commanders must realize that the strategic end state is not reached until peacetime activities are once again viable and diplomacy becomes the norm.

The duration of post-conflict activity is affected by internal and external influences over which control can be exerted. Resorting to a level of violence in excess of what is required to resolve the situation may prolong post-conflict activity. The "right" level of violence means selecting the proper response to the situation at hand. This does not, however, preclude the use



The use of forces to deter and the use of force to compel are both viable policy options within the environment of "hostilities short of war." . . . As a last resort, our nation may be required to apply military force as coercion to implement or sustain policy. In the worst case, this might place our nation in an environment of war. This may be a war of limited or general nature.

of overwhelming force, once a response option is selected, in order to reduce casualties and stabilize a situation. Further, the effectiveness of peacetime engagement activities conducted prior and subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities has a direct impact on a nation's ability to contend with post-conflict turmoil. Effective nation assistance or similar programs may well

result in reduced periods of post-conflict activity and an expeditious return to peacetime. Figure 2 depicts a series of possible reactions to a strategic situation and hypothesizes a correlation between levels of response as well as the duration and extent of post-conflict activity.

As previously stated, the turbulence and duration of post-conflict activity directly relate to the




Figure 2. Continuum of Military Operations (Duration of Post-Conflict Activities)



Soldiers distributing food and other essentials in Santo Domingo, 4 May 1965.

When the enemy capitulates or a cease-fire occurs, post-conflict activities occur. . . . During this stage, tactical units provide care to the wounded . . . process prisoners of war . . . and regenerate combat power. At the operational and strategic levels, peacekeeping, operations to restore order (peacemaking), nation assistance [and] restoration of governmental control and the determination of terms of surrender and armistice provide examples.

effectiveness of previously conducted peacetime activities and the level of violence required to control a situation. Normal turbulence observed in peacetime is shown in block A of figure 2.

As minor crises occur, positive steps are taken to sustain peace. There are, however, instances that go beyond the band of peacetime activities. In any given situation—outside the environment of peace—a range of response options is available. These include the employment of minimal force or forces to deter action, as well as the employment of significant force in an environment of war to coerce an enemy. As the amount of force used increases, the turmoil created after the cessation of hostilities also increases. As shown in the shaded area of block B, figure 2, the time required to recover from activities undertaken in an environment of hostilities short of war and subsequently return to peacetime engagement may be relatively short. The requirement to use significantly more force than

is necessary to coerce an enemy will most likely result in a prolonged period of post-conflict activity as shown in block C, figure 2. For example, the deployment of a unit for training on an international boundary to deter cross-border interference with an election or a limited raid or air strike should result in significantly less post-conflict activity than would an operation like *Just Cause* or *Desert Storm*.

Turbulence associated with post-conflict activities can be reduced by using the least amount of force required to accomplish strategic aims in the theater. Also, the further the original theater campaign plan extends beyond the end of shooting and through the resolution of post-conflict activities, the more likely it is that the plan will result in smooth, efficient and effective post-conflict activities and an expeditious return to peacetime engagement. Further, effective programs undertaken during peacetime engagement (prior to a conflict) can influence intrinsic

national stability, and thus reduce the duration of post-conflict activity.

The continuum of military operations model depicted in figure 1 illustrates four major points. The first is that a direct linkage must exist between national policy objectives and the use of the military. The Army must remain centrally focused on warfighting, yet has a viable and critical mission to perform in the environment of peace. The second, and closely related, point is that while the use of force (combat power) to defeat an enemy is still central to our Army, the engagement of forces (military capability) to build, protect, inform and otherwise assist other nations is both viable and effective. Third, a simultaneity of operations in both space and time characterizes the CINC's role across the continuum of military operations. Activities such as nation assistance, humanitarian support, disaster relief and combatting terrorism may not cease when higher levels of violence arise. They occur across the continuum.

Activities conducted during peacetime engagement directly focus on eliminating causes of instability, thus precluding conflict. They may well reduce the level of force required if influence fails and the requirement to deter, compel or coerce becomes necessary. Additionally, the effectiveness of activities conducted in peace, prior to the commencement of hostilities, may miti-

Turbulence associated with post-conflict activities can be reduced by using the least amount of force required to accomplish strategic aims in the theater. Also, the further the original theater campaign plan extends beyond the end of shooting and through the resolution of post-conflict activities, the more likely it is that the plan will result in smooth, efficient and effective post-conflict activities and an expeditious return to peacetime engagement.

gate the turbulence confronted in a subsequent post-conflict period.

The construct of the continuum of military operations is a powerful one. It is consistent with our nation's purpose, intent and direction in dealing with other nations. Further, it provides a viable model for the use of the nation's military. Our Army, as the predominant land power, is central to the successful implementation of these concepts. As a result, the focus of our doctrine, force structure, equipment, training and leadership must be examined and, if necessary, revised in a disciplined manner to accommodate these notions. This must occur if we are to best serve our nation's needs. **MR**

NOTES

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: The White House, August 1991).

2. Frank Lieber and Abraham Lincoln, "Instructions for the Government of the Armies in the Field," Article 29, *General Order Number 100*, 24 April 1863.

3. The notion of a continuum of military operations is consistent in evolving doctrine, although refinement continues on precise terminology. One version, termed the "operational continuum," consists of three environments: peacetime, conflict and war. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The*

Army, discusses the Army's contribution and is termed the "continuum of military operations" that also has three subcategories: peacetime engagement, hostilities short of war and war. This article attempts to clarify concepts generally consistent to both without encumbering the reader with the details of the evolution of terminology.

4. President George Bush, "Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium," (Aspen, CO: The White House, 2 August 1990).


5. Although the precise definition continues to evolve, this is accurate as of the writing of this article.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Thurman is a doctrine writer with the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Washington, an M.S. from the Naval Postgraduate School, and an M.M.A.S. from the USACGSC. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course and the School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC. He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments in the Continental United States and Korea, including command of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division.

Strategic Rationale for SOF

Major Robert B. Adolph Jr., US Army

With military budget and force reductions underway, the military is attempting to develop a strategy to deal with an unknown threat. The author describes the effects of American political culture on the development of US security policy. He puts forth a strategy involving special operations forces to train and advise Third World militaries in their struggle to counter terrorism, narcotics and insurgencies. Finally, the author suggests that the strategy be analyzed by using the strategic analysis model taught at the US Army Command and General Staff College.



THE United States has been unable to develop an integrated and coherent long-term strategy for dealing with the threat posed by low-intensity conflict (LIC). According to Steven Metz, "Because of the multidimensional nature of low-intensity conflict, it requires a "grand," or "total," strategy integrating military political, psychological, ideological and economic responses."¹

This fact is recognized by everyone who has studied the problem in depth for over a decade. Unfortunately, the American people, and thus Congress, do not perceive the danger as sufficiently clear and present to support the kind of grand strategy required to reach the stated US goals of fostering democracy, stability and expanding free markets throughout the Third World. But a national security strategy in support of US objectives in the Third World and based on the employment of a triad of US Army Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), supported by other service special operations forces (SOF), may provide a potential answer to this dilemma. In other words, SOFs, because of their unique capabilities and characteristics, can be a viable surrogate for a coherent national strategy aimed at the potential threats found in LIC.

President George Bush describes the post-Cold War period in terms of a "new world order." The dissolution of the Soviet Union, no doubt, bodes well for humanity. It appears that we will not have to face the possibility of global thermonuclear destruction. While Congress was planning the reduction of US Armed Forces, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the single largest movement of US troops since World War II began. Had Hussein waited a few years, America might not have had the capability to come to Kuwait's aid. Even before Hussein's aggression, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney characterized the last 10 years of the 20th century as "the decade of uncertainty."² But it is also true that:

"... world events in the coming decade will likely be dominated by the quest for freedom and democracy. Not only have men and women the world over demonstrated the pow-

For decades, officers of the American military have bemoaned the inability of the US political system to develop long-range and coherent national security strategies concerning threats beyond the Soviet Union. . . . The American political process is too pluralistic to produce the kinds of strategies that the military desires.

er of ideas, even after decades of oppression, but they have also shown a willingness to lay down their lives for liberty."³

The opportunities and challenges that America now faces are without parallel in history. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, James R. Locher III, stated that, "Though peace and freedom are our goal, it is not always shared by others. As a result, the United States requires a flexible military force that is manned and equipped to handle a wide range of security challenges."⁴

Now that US troops have returned from the Persian Gulf War, Congress will again pull out its budgetary pruning shears. The Armed Forces will become much smaller in an era where America does not know what or where the next threat will be. This situation demands that we take a hard look at every one of the arrows in our national security quiver and decide how to best use all the elements of national power at our disposal.

For decades, officers of the American military have bemoaned the inability of the US political system to develop long-range and coherent national security strategies concerning threats beyond the Soviet Union. Astute observers of American political culture recognize the problem and know that there is no immediate solution. The American political process is too pluralistic to produce the kinds of strategies that the military desires. According to two specialists:

"Authority in the American political system is diffused and, at times fragmented. The division of powers in the Constitution institutionalizes

Americans generally believe that democracy, despite its obvious problems, is still the best form of government in comparison with all others. This idealism is reflected in American outrage over Iraqi human rights abuses and the rape of Kuwait by the tyrant Hussein.

some diffusion of power, but its actual extent varies according to popular attitudes and moods."⁵

Given this understanding, America seemingly has a disease with no ready cure. But there is an explanation.

There are two generally well-recognized characteristics of American political culture that affect the development of US security policy. The first of these is pragmatic self-interest. The interests of the United States usually predominate. Our security structure is designed to ensure that vital strategic interests are protected. The US deployment in support of Kuwait was, at least in part, because of oil. This self-interest is also reflected in business, where unimpeded access to raw materials and manufactured goods is considered essential and proper.

The other characteristic of American political culture is idealism. Sam Sarkesian describes it as a "messianic spirit":

"... the American people and political system are 'ordained' to undertake the mission of being 'the light' for other nations—lending added moral weight to their notion of democratic faith."⁶ This attitude is reflected in the many presidential pronouncements made in the post-World War II period that have demonstrated concern for human rights and called for fostering democracy around the globe. This kind of idealism may be unique to the United States. Americans generally believe that democracy, despite its obvious problems, is still the best form of government in comparison with all others. This idealism is reflected in American outrage over Iraqi human rights abuses and the rape of Kuwait by the tyrant Hussein.

It is not unusual for these two characteristics


to be seemingly at odds with one another. America does not immediately come to the aid of every country that is invaded or suffers from an insurgent movement. But where our self-interest and idealism clearly converge, American action at many levels can be expected—including armed intervention. This is not a moral statement, but simply a recognition that because of a pluralistic government, US foreign policy and resultant security strategy seem to accurately reflect American popular opinion. The American style of democracy does not promise the best government for all, but the best government for the most people. Where the two characteristics do not clearly converge, long-range and coherent security strategy development is often not possible.

For over 40 years, the former Soviet Union provided such a sufficiently clear threat to US security that America was able to design a long-range strategy (containment). It worked! Hussein also presented a clear threat—sufficient to deploy over 500,000 troops to bring him to heel. Unfortunately, not all potential threats will be so clear. This lack of clarity is the predominant characteristic of LIC, making long-range and coherent strategy all but impossible for the United States. Yet, obviously, America must address the problem. According to Cheney:

"Low-intensity conflict continues to be the most likely form of violence involving US interests. . . . We must prepare an active and timely defense against such violence, one that presents a credible deterrent and remains capable of using power when necessary. The Department of Defense (DOD) must also address the underlying causes of instability by assisting in the nation-building process."⁷

The immediate question is how can this be accomplished, given our political system, when clarity is required in order to develop strategy? Aaron Friedberg, in an article for the *Washington Quarterly*, suggested that the United States consider "second best strategies."⁸ Since American popular opinion is generally against the employment of conventional combat forces to deal with anything other than obvious threats, Friedberg's recommendation appears to make sense. What

A Missouri National Guardsman fuels a UH-1 at Oso Grande during Operation General Terencio Sierra 88, a Honduran-US road-building exercise.



In LIC, as in other conflict environments, political objectives must remain preeminent. Although organizations such as the US Information Agency and US Agency for International Development play important roles in the Third World, the Department of State has the lead in the attempt to address Third World problems by political, diplomatic, informational, economic and military means. The US military is the element of national power best prepared to assist in developing a stable security environment.

type of forces would support a second best military strategy?

First, it is imperative to note that "... the Department of State must lead in setting policies."⁹ In LIC, as in other conflict environments, political objectives must remain preeminent. Although organizations such as the US Information Agency and US Agency for International Development play important roles in the Third World, the Department of State has the lead in the attempt to address Third World problems by political, diplomatic, informational, economic and military means. The US military is the element of national power best prepared to assist in developing a stable security environment toward the accomplishment of our nation's foreign policy goals.

US Army Special Operations Forces (AR-SOF), which for the purposes of this article includes CA and PSYOP, supported by other serv-

ice SOFs, lend themselves to a "second best military strategy" for addressing LIC because of their organic characteristics and capabilities. According to a report written for the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy, "US force structure, equipment, and doctrine, designed for accustomed combatant missions, are not well-suited to pursuing non-combat roles in assisting any Third World nation."¹⁰

General purpose forces' capabilities in combat are not in question, but combat is not necessarily the objective. Army divisions, even light divisions, are ill-suited to the preponderance of roles demanded in LIC. "Military roles in low-intensity conflict are best performed by specially trained individuals or detachments."¹¹

SOF possesses both the requisite characteristics and capabilities to operate successfully in this environment. And, because SOFs are recognized as specially trained volunteers who

According to FM 100-5, "The low end of the conflict spectrum requires special force composition and task organization, rapid deployment, and restraint in the execution of military operation." SOF possess all the characteristics mentioned. The 12-man SF operational detachment, for example, is a very flexible instrument. Even if the detachment is task organized to include CA or PSYOP personnel, because of its small size, rapid deployment is seldom a problem.

regularly perform inherently hazardous missions, American popular support for a strategy using SOFs does not present the problem that the commitment of US ground combat troops does. But what are the characteristics and capabilities?

Characteristics

According to US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, "... the low end of the conflict spectrum requires special force composition and task organization, rapid deployment, and restraint in the execution of military operation."¹² SOF possess all the characteristics mentioned. The 12-man SF operational detachment, for example, is a very flexible instrument. Even if the detachment is task organized to include CA or PSYOP personnel, because of its small size, rapid deployment is seldom a problem. The same is true for the employment of US Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams). In addition, these forces are, in the words of the report to the commission, "unobtrusive." This is of great importance because:

"Usually, the presence of any foreign military stirs nationalist abhorrence in a Third World nation, and in some places (e.g., Central America), US military forces operate encumbered by historical burdens, so that their mere presence creates political problems for a host nation."¹³

SOFs are well practiced at operating in ways that are low in visibility. It is not at all unusual

for SOFs to enter a country, perform their mission in support of a host nation, and then leave without their presence ever being reported in that country's media. According to Locher, "These soldiers, sailors and aircrew members have been actively, effectively, and quietly engaged around the world for decades."¹⁴

Fiscal concerns are often a significant consideration when developing national security strategies. A strategy using SOFs, by comparison with other kinds of forces, is cheap. Support to Third World militaries is commonly a low-technology affair. More often, such support is human resource intensive for missions like those conducted by SOF mobile training teams. According to the Security Assistance Training Management Office at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the greatest cost incurred in accomplishing these missions is often for transportation. SOFs regularly operate in spartan environments where costs are low.

Unlike general purpose forces, ARSOFs are unusually mature. This is of critical importance. Currently, the SF branch only accepts officers at the grade of captain for training. Enlisted personnel are not permitted to apply for SF training until they are sergeants. Active duty CA and PSYOP officers normally will not complete their training and be assigned to units until they are senior captains or majors. The importance of maturity cannot be overstated. These officers and noncommissioned officers often work with Third World counterparts who are more senior in grade. To advise and assist Third World military personnel without appearing to be condescending requires tact, patience and experience, all characteristics of maturity.

It is axiomatic that the best way to gain the trust of people in other lands is to attempt to speak their language. Aside from foreign area officers and some military intelligence personnel, ARSOFs are *the only US military forces* trained in language skills. In fact, language ability is a prerequisite of entry into ARSOF. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



A member of the 87th Brigade
displays assembly and breakdown
procedures for the M-60 machine
gun during FUERZAS UNIDAS 87,
El Salvador, 1991.

SOFs are well practiced at operating in ways that are low in visibility. It is not at all unusual for SOFs to enter a country, perform their mission in support of a host nation, and then leave without their presence ever being reported in that country's media. According to Locher, "These soldiers, sailors and aircrew members have been actively, effectively, and quietly engaged around the world for decades."

runs its own language school for SF soldiers. Some SF officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers, and most PSYOP and CA officers, study languages at the well-regarded Defense Foreign Language Institute, Monterey, California, for periods up to a year. Once they are trained, it is not unusual for these soldiers to perform multiple tours of duty in positions or regions where their language skills are required. General purpose forces do not receive this kind of education or assignments consideration.

Cross-cultural communications is one of the most difficult chores for any military forces operating in the Third World. Cultural anthropologists will tell you that knowledge of a Third World culture is second only to language skills when it comes to creating a bond of trust toward establishing a working relationship. ARSOFs are trained extensively in cross-cultural awareness. But beyond this, because SF, PSYOP and CA organizations are regionally oriented, ARSOF soldiers have repetitive opportunities to reinforce and expand their knowledge throughout their careers. As a matter of policy, the SF branch attempts to assign officers to positions and locations where language and cultural skills will be reinforced.

CA and PSYOP officers undergo an especially long and rigorous training program that includes a graduate degree and not only language, but an in-depth regional course of instruction as well. The entire training program may take over two years to complete. And, according to the CA and PSYOP assignments officer at the Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia, they too will perform repetitive tours of duty in regions and positions requiring their linguistic and regional skills.

Capabilities

ARSOF's characteristics provide an extraordinary range of capabilities in high- and mid- as well as low-intensity conflict environments. SF skills have recently been proven on the mid-intensity battlefield—performing direct action, special reconnaissance and other special activity missions. Cable News Network reported that PSYOP leaflets were found on the majority of Iraqi prisoners of war who surrendered to coalition forces. CA personnel were deeply involved in helping the Kuwaitis rebuild their country. It is not my intent to regurgitate the missions of ARSOF here. FM's provide an excellent source for those who are interested. Instead, it

"Winning hearts and minds" is an often-quoted phrase. These days it is mentioned sometimes derisively. But if there is a central theme to US goals in the Third World, I believe this phrase captures it. It is the oppressed peoples in many countries of the Third World who long for something better than that proposed by . . . insurgents.

may be more useful to focus on the most likely ARSOF mission area in LIC in order to support my assertions.

First, I wish to highlight the fact that ARSOFs possess extraordinary capabilities as trainers and advisers. Methods of instruction are a significant part of SF basic skills. This is very important and has to do with what should be America's philosophical approach to assisting Third World nations attain freedom, democracy and stability. It is common sense that governments and political cultures seldom change rapidly without violence. Even though the United States has demonstrated a willingness, on occasion, to use violence to achieve its objectives, nonviolent means are preferred in almost every case. America desires a stable world where democratic change can occur gradually with the least potential disruption. Such disruption is too often measured in terms of human lives lost.

Third World nations must solve their own unique problems without intrusive, sometimes overbearing, US intervention. SOFs, acting as trainers and advisers in support of a foreign internal defense (FID) mission (believed by most experts to be their most likely role), can be employed in countries experiencing security problems such as an insurgency or assist in the attempt to stem the tide of violence. American lives will occasionally be lost, as in El Salvador. But this is a price the American people have been seemingly willing to bear.

Americans recognize that SOF volunteers are significantly different from regular soldiers. Americans know that SOF members have accepted unusual risks inherent in performing their


various missions. This is especially important when one considers America's difficulty in developing a national strategy for addressing LIC. The employment of SOFs, in times of relative peace, is acceptable to the people of the United States and supports the use of a second best strategy.

Counternarcotics, although historically not a formal mission area for SOFs, is rapidly becoming one. "By the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Department is substantially engaged in the national fight against illegal drugs."¹⁵ Narcotics also threaten other nations: "... drug trafficking constitutes a clear and present danger to the very survival of democracy in certain countries long friends and allies of the United States."¹⁶

There is little question that the American people generally support DOD involvement in the war on drugs. But the drug war's efficacy to date is in question. Although some SOF activities are classified, it is known that they are currently engaged in training and advising Third World militaries in their attempt to stem the flow of narcotrafficking. SOF personnel are also engaged in training Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel in countering the techniques of guerrilla warfare, which has, in some cases, been adopted by narcotraffickers.

Although the problems of Third World insurgency and narcotics trafficking seem dissimilar at first glance, upon deeper examination the potential solution for both may be remarkably alike. According to two experts, "... both insurgency and narcotrafficking have similar root causes and are susceptible to similar countercampaigns."¹⁷ America's military has been predominantly focused on the attempt to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through air, sea and land interdiction. But the most effective way to halt the drugs, aside from diminishing the demand, is to attack and eliminate the sources of drugs found mostly in the Third World.

The joining of forces between the drug cartels and insurgent movements in Central and South America highlights the problem. In the words of one knowledgeable officer, "SOF help provide a balanced response of social development,



US and Ecuadorian airmen discuss various pick-up techniques during BLUE HORIZON 85.

Cross-cultural communications is one of the most difficult chores for any military forces operating in the Third World. Cultural anthropologists will tell you that knowledge of a Third World culture is second only to language skills when it comes to creating a bond of trust toward establishing a working relationship.

training and interdiction which . . . will have a significant impact on the present US cocaine epidemic."¹⁸ This officer shares my opinion that domestic demand reduction is the best policy to follow. But, if that is not possible, a second best strategy using SOF has considerable utility.

"Winning hearts and minds" is an often-quoted phrase. These days it is mentioned sometimes derisively. But if there is a central theme to US goals in the Third World, I believe this phrase captures it. It is the oppressed peoples in many countries of the Third World who long for something better than that proposed by tyrants or Marxist insurgents. It is characteristic of tyrants and successful Marxist insurgent groups to muzzle their press and brutally suppress dissent. According to FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, Army PSYOP elements in FID support:


- Assisting the host nation in gaining the support of its people.
- Assisting the host nation in defeating the insurgents.
- Establishing a favorable US image in the host nation.
- Favorably influencing neutral groups and the world community.
- Assisting the host nation in supporting defector rehabilitation programs.

- Providing close and continuous PSYOP support to maximize the effect of CA operations.¹⁹

Hussein used his control of the Iraqi media for over a decade in order to control his population successfully. PSYOPs can be an extraordinary US tool in attempting to get *the truth* to those people suffering oppression. Through organic print, audio and visual media, PSYOP units can assist either fledgling democracies or democratic insurgent movements in developing PSYOP campaigns aimed at demonstrating to the people of a Third World country the legitimacy of the democratic cause. It is, after all, the people who decide whether their government is legitimate. But in order to do so, they have to be told the truth.

There is another military component to winning hearts and minds. That is the component best addressed by CA. According to an initial draft of Joint Publication 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs*, "Use of CA assets in support of special operations (SO) is most likely to occur in FID and unconventional warfare operations. . . ."²⁰

A fledgling democracy may have significant difficulties in attempting to redress the legitimate complaints of disenfranchised classes or ethnic or religious minorities. Given the poverty



PSYOPs can be an extraordinary US tool in attempting to get *the truth* to those people suffering oppression. Through organic print, audio and visual media, PSYOP units can assist either fledgling democracies or democratic insurgent movements in developing PSYOP campaigns aimed at demonstrating to the people of a Third World country the legitimacy of the democratic cause.

of much of the Third World, this is not surprising. CA advisers can provide valuable technical expertise in developing national infrastructures to address the root causes of popular discontent within the capabilities of the host nation.

Other SOFs

The ARSOF umbrella also encompasses Rangers, SO aviation, counterterrorist forces and other special mission units. Dependent on the nature of the security threat to a Third World nation, these forces are ready and available on short notice. They differ from SF, CA and PSYOP units in that they are not regionally oriented. They are predominantly strike forces. Their utility in LIC is unquestioned. SO aviation, because of its advanced avionics, night operations training, air refueling capability and ability to work in relatively unsophisticated support environments, obviously possesses significant capabilities in support of a Third World host nation suffering an insurgent movement. Ranger bat-

talions are America's premier strike units, but they have limited utility beyond their primary mission in the environment generally characterized by LIC.

The SEAL forces represent a significant capability in their strike role involving near beach and riverine operations. They were used successfully in Operation *Desert Storm*. In the past, though, they have been used sparingly as trainers and advisers to Third World militaries because they generally lack both language and cultural training, giving them generally less utility in support of Third World host nations.

Personnel of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are specially trained and habitually work with ARSOF. They support ARSOF in a multitude of mission areas, including counternarcotics, and are largely self-contained for internal support. They are accustomed to working in austere environments characterized by the Third World. Again, it is not my intent to review the mission capabilities

An MH-60G Hawk helicopter, with its sensor-reflected profile, and the image of a helicopter's control station, as seen from a night-vision device.

Personnel of the Air Force Special Operations Command are specially trained and habitually work with ARSOF. They support ARSOF in a multitude of mission areas, including counternarcotics, and are largely self-contained for internal support. They are accustomed to working in austere environments characterized by the Third World [and] . . . ARSOF depends on the support of AFSOC assets for infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and numerous other special activities.

of the assets of AFSOC. Service manuals are available to those interested. For my purposes, it is only important to note that ARSOF depends on the support of AFSOC assets for infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and numerous other special activities.

It is the *habitual working relationship* between ARSOF and AFSOC and their relatively new command and control architecture that I wish to highlight. By order of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, as modified by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, Special Operations Commands (SOCs) were formed under each of the combatant commanders in chief (CINCs). These new joint commands exercise operational control of SOFs from each service, as assigned to the theater CINC. This command and control relationship further strengthens the working relationships of multi-service SOFs. All SOFs in a given theater work for the same boss. They operate under the same

employment principles. Under a SOC, all service SOFs have unity of command, with the exception of CA and PSYOP forces, which may be assigned in peace or war to support SO missions. This situation will, without question, improve overall SOF mission capabilities and employment characteristics.

The US Army Command and General Staff College teaches a "strategic analysis model" that suggests three criteria by which to examine a potential strategy for efficacy. Those criteria are suitability, feasibility and acceptability. It may be useful to evaluate the strategy I suggest through the use of this methodology.

A strategy that relies heavily on ARSOF, supported by other service SOFs, and in support of State Department objectives, appears to be eminently *suitable* in addressing the threats posed in LIC. In addition to their new and integrated command and control structure, these forces are uniquely trained and equipped to perform the

myriad of missions characterized by LIC. They are mature, linguistically capable and culturally attuned and sensitive. The combination of their military capabilities and personal and professional characteristics mark them as unique in the US military. No other forces possess this degree of training, skills and knowledge. This gives SOF an extremely high degree of flexibility and versatility regardless of the level of conflict, but with particular applicability in LIC.

Feasibility asks the question: Is it supportable? I believe the answer is yes. SOF employment is both low cost and low visibility. SOF employment will not stretch the national budget. Remember that the greatest cost for mobile training teams is often for transportation. And, in many cases, that cost is borne by the host nation. SOF employment, also, should not give dissident groups in Third World nations cause for particular alarm. They are few in number and generally operate well outside highly politically charged urban areas.

Whether or not a strategy is *acceptable* requires a largely subjective judgment. But, I be-

lieve a strategy using SOF is acceptable to the American people, and thus Congress. Americans realize that the business in which SOF is engaged is inherently more dangerous than normal peacetime military activities. SOF personnel are the ultimate volunteers. There is no one serving in SOF that does not want to be there. The periodic deaths of SOF members, while always regrettable, are part of the price we pay for pursuing our interests and attempting to spread freedom and democracy in an often violent Third World.

Finally, it is of paramount importance to remember that the now defunct Soviet Union is going through a period of tremendous domestic political turmoil. Despite the fact that the former Soviet Union is now "perceived" as less of a threat to US interests, it is not clear that it will remain so. Until the new Commonwealth of Independent States completely embraces democracy—allowing the peoples of the former Soviet Empire to be free and stable—it would be prudent for America to develop as many friends and allies around the globe as possible. It is clear that SOF can play a critical role toward that end. *AMF*

NOTES

1. Steven Metz, "Foundation for a Low-Intensity Conflict Strategy", *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 8, no. 2, (1989):265.

2. James R. Locher III, "Peacetime Engagement," *National Defense* (December 1989):26.

3. "US Special Operations Forces Status Report," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Joint Staff, and US Special Operations Command, Washington, DC, June 1990, 19.

4. *Ibid.*, 2.

5. Frederick M. Downey and Steve Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," *Parameters* (September 1988):36.

6. Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988), 44.

7. Richard B. Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and Congress* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), January 1990), 3.

8. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Is the United States Capable of Acting Strategically?" *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 1, (Winter 1991):19.

9. Gordon R. Sullivan, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Support for Democratic Resistance Movements," Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC, 7 January 1988, X.

10. "Supporting US Strategy For Third World Conflict," report by The Regional Conflict Working Group submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy, June 1988, GPO, Washington, DC, 26.

11. *Ibid.*

12. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 May 1986), 4.

13. "Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict," 26.

14. Locher, 29.

15. Cheney, 3.

16. "Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict," 65.

17. August G. Jennerone and Ray E. Stratton, "Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: Different Problems, Same Solution?" paper presented at the 58th MORS Symposium, Annapolis, MD, 12 June 1990, 12.

18. Mark A. Hazleton, "The Role of Special Operations Forces in Counter-Narcotic Operations," MMSAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990, 114-15.

19. US Department of the Army FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 31 July 1987), 8-6.

20. Joint Publication 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs* (initial draft), US Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, May 1990, II-4.

Major Robert B. Adolph Jr. is executive officer, 8th Psychological Operations (PSY-OP) Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from the University of the State of New York, an M.A. from American University, and an M.M.A.S. from the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of both the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course and the School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC. He has served in numerous Special Forces, military intelligence, PSYOP and Civil Affairs command and staff positions in the United States and overseas. After Operation Desert Storm, he served as 22d Support Command's host nation liaison officer to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation in Riyadh.

VICTORY and COMPROMISE in

Counterinsurgency

Steven Metz

In recent years there has been an increasing focus on the military role in low-intensity conflict. The author looks at the current US strategy that calls for the eradication of insurgency and establishing the legitimacy of the local government. The author points out that this is politically dangerous and can lead to ambiguous outcomes. Finally, the author offers alternatives that are attainable and could be assisted by specific military actions.

DURING the past decade, low-intensity conflict played an increasingly prominent role in US national security strategy. Great strides were made in analysis, doctrine, training and force development. Based on our Vietnam experience, we developed strategy and doctrine that emphasized the political nature of counterinsurgency, the need to focus on underlying causes rather than military manifestations and the need for an indirect US role. But today progress has stalled and can only be reinvigorated by breaking through some key intellectual barriers. Foremost among these is an inability to smoothly link the application of force to desired policy outcomes. This has haunted US strategy throughout our history; its roots are deep in

our fundamental attitudes toward conflict.

As a nation, our attitude is decidedly un-Clausewitzian. The great philosopher of war continually stressed the interrelationship of war and policy. Military strategy, he argued, should serve, and be shaped, by policy objectives. Americans, however, see war and peace as diametric states rather than parts of a unified continuum. War, in the American tradition, occurs when policy fails. Moreover, our positivism and intellectual isolation make us weak in the psychology of conflict—we misunderstand Sun Tzu as much as Carl von Clausewitz.

Our organization for national security reflects this dichotomous attitude toward conflict. The State Department, with its thousands

of bureaucrats, deals with policy, and the Department of Defense, with even greater thousands, deals with war. Only the very small National Security Council is designed to integrate the two—although, in practice, it is more a liaison than an

A strategy that seeks total, unambiguous victory, however, is politically dangerous. It can breed public frustration with ambiguous outcomes and leave us able to deal only with relatively simple problems such as those in Panama and Grenada. Counterinsurgency is not simple. Quick, unambiguous outcomes are unlikely; domestic support for US involvement is inherently weak, and we must work, indirectly, through allies.

integrator. The openness of our political system further complicates any attempts to link the application of force to desired policy outcomes. We must build a broad consensus in support of the use of force. This can only be done by using vague, symbolic objectives that constitute a weak foundation for strategy. When realistic goals do exist, they often remain secret.

As a result of all of this, we use a process-oriented approach to strategy and doctrine. This assumes that the proper *technique* for the application of national power will automatically generate proper outcomes. Our strategy is thus steeped as much in hope as in logic. Even more problematic, we tend to define the desired end state as total, unambiguous victory. This is politically alluring and helps compensate for our lack of skill in the psychology of conflict. After all, the perceptions and beliefs of a crushed enemy are irrelevant, and overwhelming force negates the need for psychological acumen. Total victory is morally satisfying, uses our strengths and bypasses our weaknesses.

A strategy that seeks total, unambiguous victory, however, is politically dangerous. It can breed public frustration with ambiguous outcomes and leave us able to deal only with rela-

tively simple problems such as those in Panama and Grenada. Counterinsurgency is not simple. Quick, unambiguous outcomes are unlikely; domestic support for US involvement is inherently weak, and we must work, indirectly, through allies. Thus US efforts in counterinsurgency face a pervasive and paralyzing contradiction: We tend to define the end state in vague, absolute terms, but are unable or unwilling to make a commensurate effort to attain it.

Alternatives

The *National Security Strategy of the United States* is vague on the desired end state of US involvement in low-intensity conflict. It sets our basic goal as "an international environment of peace, freedom and progress within which our democracy—and other free nations—can flourish."¹ Clearly this is inadequate for crafting a coherent strategy or campaign plan. More specifically, the United States seeks to "aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies . . ." and to help friendly nations protect their own interests.² This is still amorphous and implies that our strategic goals are determined solely by our friends' political procedures. Hidden deep in rhetoric, however, the *National Security Strategy of the United States* does posit a realistic end state: "diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts."³

Some of the clearest thinking on counterinsurgency is found in joint Army–Air Force doctrine.⁴ Even here, though, there are two alternatives. On one hand, the manual suggests that the United States attains success when a friendly government *eliminates* the insurgency.⁵ Later, US Army Field Manual (FM) 100–20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3–20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts*, stresses that the end state is reached when the friendly government establishes legitimacy.⁶

These two notions of the end state are not inherently incompatible. Instead, the problem lies in their absolute nature. *Eliminating* an insurgency implies that it is gone forever, totally destroyed. Furthermore, FM 100–20/AFP 3–20 stresses legitimacy, but does not define it in



A Salvadoran soldier distributing water to an army of hungry, thirsty guerrillas. Urban guerrilla populations can depend on having a permanent supply of food and drinking water.

All discussions tend toward the absolute: A government either has legitimacy or does not. The logical conclusion is that total victory over the insurgents is possible. Likewise, the doctrine states that if the root causes of insurgency—poverty, corruption, repression and inequity—are eliminated, then victory occurs. But we were not willing to commit the level of resources necessary for this task in even a tiny country such as El Salvador.

detail. All discussions tend toward the absolute: A government either *has* legitimacy or *does not*. The logical conclusion is that total victory over

Collection of accurate intelligence and its analysis [is required] to identify centers-of-gravity as the insurgents define them. Counterinsurgent strategists, in other words, must emulate US nuclear strategists who discovered that deterrence was best served if we targeted what Soviet leaders considered important and not what we would consider important had we been Soviet leaders.

It should state explicitly that, in most insurgencies, we seek a negotiated compromise between the government and the insurgents rather than unambiguous victory by the government. The goal of the United States should be to make both belligerents recognize that absolute victory is unattainable—to serve as balancer and interlocutor.

the insurgents is possible. Likewise, the doctrine states that if the root causes of insurgency—poverty, corruption, repression and inequity—are eliminated, then victory occurs. But we were not willing to commit the level of resources necessary for this task in even a tiny country such as El Salvador. To use the jargon of strategic analysis, we face a serious “means/ends mismatch” in the counterinsurgency arena.

When absolute goals are pursued in an environment of constrained resources, the outcome is most often a simmering, low-level persistent insurgency. US advice and aid can help friendly governments limit an insurgency to subversion, guerrilla activity and terrorism, but cannot totally eradicate it. Recent US counterinsurgency efforts in El Salvador and the Philippines provide ample evidence. In both cases, the insurgency is diminished but alive. Put simply, as long as the United States believes total, unambiguous

victory in counterinsurgency is possible and encourages our friends to think likewise, insurgencies will be controlled but not extinguished.

Since we are not likely to substantially increase the economic and military resources dedicated to counterinsurgency, our strategy should change. It should state explicitly that, in most insurgencies, we seek a negotiated compromise between the government and the insurgents rather than unambiguous victory by the government. The goal of the United States should be to make *both* belligerents recognize that absolute victory is unattainable—to serve as balancer and interlocutor.

There is justification, both practical and moral, for such an approach. Practically, pursuit of negotiated compromise reflects the fact that in an environment where the friendly government cannot eradicate the insurgency without outside help and where US assistance is politically or economically constrained, total victory is impossible. In fact, around the world, outright victory by insurgents or counterinsurgents is rare and stalemate, common. Some experts on counterinsurgency such as Bard O'Neill argue that any given insurgency can be categorized, and that certain categories rule out accommodation.⁷

This overlooks the polyglot nature of most insurgencies. The segment of the insurgency that would totally reject compromise is usually small. Negotiated compromise would thus denude this hard core of support and render it impotent.

From the 1940s to the 1980s, insurgents leaped ahead of counterinsurgents in terms of strategy and understanding the nature of revolutionary war. Today, there is more balance; counterinsurgents are smarter. Moreover, the task of revolutionary mobilization is more difficult in the post-colonial era. For these reasons, insurgencies in Nicaragua, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador, Philippines, Afghanistan and Kampuchea led to stalemate. Barring the Ethiopian-type collapse of will by one belligerent, neither insurgents nor counterinsurgents can consummate total victory. Thus negotiated compromises are becoming the norm; but because we cannot throw off the intellectual blind-

ers of the Cold War, US strategy and doctrine still seek total victory.

Morally, US support for negotiated compromises would reflect the fact that few Third World revolutions pit unequivocal good against unequivocal evil. There are exceptions. In Peru, for example, the nature of the insurgency leaves no moral grounds for compromise. But in most cases, revolutionary insurgents are driven by legitimate griefs, usually oppression, corruption or inequity. The "moral high ground" often lies somewhere in between the insurgents and the government. Given this, US counterinsurgency strategy should be modeled on our efforts in Angola where we encouraged both belligerents to reject total victory through military means and seek compromise.⁸

Implications

Even if the United States adopted a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at encouraging negotiated compromise, this would not automatically solve the problem of linking military efforts and desired political outcomes. After all, we remain anti-Clausewitzian and consistently misunderstand the relationship of force and diplomacy. To make this connection, we would have to develop counterinsurgency doctrine that explicitly used military force to encourage and facilitate negotiated compromises.

Traditionally, American attitudes toward the use of force focused on its "carrot" dimension rather than the "stick." In Vietnam, for example, President Lyndon B. Johnson eased military pressure (and offered economic assistance) to reward what were seen as positive diplomatic moves by Hanoi. President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger had a much deeper (and un-American) understanding of the relationship of force and diplomacy. They used dramatic escalations of military pressure, especially the bombing of North Vietnam, to break logjams in the peace talks.


The key here is dramatic escalation. There are two objectives of the use of force in a strategy seeking negotiated compromise: to bring the insurgents to the bargaining table and to



The insurgents and the true target of the counterinsurgency.

In most cases, revolutionary insurgents are driven by legitimate griefs, usually oppression, corruption or inequity. The "moral high ground" often lies somewhere in between the insurgents and the government. Given this, US counterinsurgency strategy should be modeled on our efforts in Angola where we encouraged both belligerents to reject total victory through military means and seek compromise.

An air policeman on Guam watches as a B-52 returns to base during the Vietnam War, March 1967.



Traditionally, American attitudes toward the use of force focused on its "carrot" dimension rather than the "stick." In Vietnam, for example, President Johnson eased military pressure to reward what were seen as positive diplomatic moves by Hanoi. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger had a much deeper understanding of the relationship of force and diplomacy. They used dramatic escalations of military pressure. . . . to break logjams in the peace talks.

encourage successful resolution of the negotiations. Insurgents, especially those schooled in Marxism-Leninism, tend to use negotiations for political warfare rather than for resolution of the conflict. The use of force by the government can help prevent this, which suggests that, in a very general sense, a counterinsurgent campaign plan should have three phases.⁹ The first stabilizes the military and political situation. The second (and longest) uses sustained, gradually escalating military, psychological and political pressure (including key reforms) to bring the insurgents to negotiations. The third uses a dramatic political, psychological and military offensive to consummate the negotiations.

Such a plan does entail major risks. To do it correctly, counterinsurgent planners must husband intelligence about insurgent political and military activity during the second phase. The government, in other words, must uncover insurgent underground networks and bases but not act on the information until the dramatic offensive in the third phase. This means that the insurgency may spread and prosper while the government is awaiting the proper time for the dramatic offensive. Launching a dramatic offen-

sive as negotiations start or are about to start also entails political risks. It will certainly provoke opposition from softliners in both the United States and the host nation who misunderstand the relationship of force and negotiation. There is also a chance that the insurgents will back out of negotiations; but if they do, that means they were not serious about compromise in the first place. In any case, the insurgents will certainly make continuation of the negotiations contingent on a cease-fire. Government negotiators will thus have to assess the insurgents' commitment to compromise and decide whether to halt or continue the offensive.

Finally, a dramatic offensive will encourage the belief that total victory is possible on the part of hardliners in the government who misunderstand the essential nature of insurgency. This group—which will be especially prevalent in the military—will oppose negotiations and could threaten to overthrow the government. The political leaders must thus pilot a tricky course between the softliners and hardliners. This requires leadership of the highest order.

The military—including both the military of the government fighting the insurgency and US

advisers—can facilitate negotiations in two ways. First, they can constrain hardliners. All key decision makers and strategists must understand that revolutionary insurgencies are not amenable to total, unambiguous victory. Second, they can engineer the third phase offensive so that it generates the greatest possible trauma for the insurgents. This requires collection of accurate intelligence and its analysis to identify centers-of-gravity as the insurgents define them. Counterinsurgent strategists, in other words, must emulate US nuclear strategists who discovered that deterrence was best served if we targeted what Soviet leaders considered important and not what we would consider important had we been Soviet leaders.

Current US strategy and doctrine for counterinsurgency does little to explore problems associated with a poorly defined end state and a weak linkage of the application of force and desired outcomes. The standard explanation for this shortcoming is that every insurgency is different. That is true, but irrelevant. The fact that distinctions exist between all insurgencies does not justify ignoring the notion of the desired end state. What this sort of extreme subjectivity does is hinder our ability to smoothly link the application of political, psychological and military power to a desired outcome. As former Undersecretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle wrote, "Those who aim for nothing are guaranteed to hit it."¹⁰ By using a strategy and doctrine devoid of clear

thinking on the end states of insurgencies, we aim mightily for nothing.

Unfortunately, US military planners who become involved in counterinsurgency often pay

US military planners who become involved in counterinsurgency often pay the price for this. The military is far in the lead among government agencies in developing a rational approach to counterinsurgency based on an accurate assessment of insurgency. But without a fundamental commitment to a desired outcome, truly effective military doctrine is impossible.


the price for this. The military is far in the lead among government agencies in developing a rational approach to counterinsurgency based on an accurate assessment of insurgency. But without a fundamental commitment to a desired outcome, truly effective military doctrine is impossible. Hopefully, those who craft our national strategy will soon jettison the remnants of Cold War Manicheism and accept negotiated compromise as the usual desired outcome in counterinsurgency. Once this is done, military doctrine could be developed to reflect this strategic premise, and cogent planning for US support of counterinsurgency can proceed. **MR**

NOTES

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 1990), 1.
2. *Ibid.*, 3 and 28.
3. *Ibid.*, 2.
4. US Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, 5 December 1990). Hereafter cited as FM 100-20/AFP 3-30.
5. *Ibid.*, Figure 2-2.
6. *Ibid.*, 2-15.

7. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's 1990), 126.
8. Chester A. Crocker (assistant secretary of state for African Affairs), "The U.S. and Angola," statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 18 February 1986, reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1986, 60.
9. This campaign plan organization mirrors the three-phase revolutionary strategy advocated by Mao and his various disciples.
10. Fred C. Ikle, "The Modern Context," *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, ed. Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1969), 10.

Steven Metz is associate professor of low-intensity conflict, Department of Warfare Studies, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University. He previously served as professor of national security affairs, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His articles, "US Strategy and the Changing LIC Threat," and "Analyzing Strategic and Operational Risk," appeared in the June and November 1991 issues of *Military Review*.



Military Families as Strategic Targets in a Subtle War

Major Frederick N. G... Army, and
Lieutenant Colonel Frank... US Army

During operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Iraq's offensive strategy encouraged terrorists to attack facilities of the United States and members of the coalition. The authors argue that defending against terrorism as a strategic weapon requires the same type of long-range planning as the conventional battlefield. They describe how terrorism has caused nations to withdraw or alter a military presence. Following a discussion of the psychological effects of terrorism on the military family members, the authors point out areas in the current system that require attention.

AS TRADITIONAL axes of power shift with new post-Cold War alliances, there will emerge ambitious Third World leaders seeking to fill the vacuum and define new international conditions. The Gulf War is a case in point. Saddam Hussein's objectives in capturing valuable Iranian territory and, failing that, annexing Kuwait represent a bid for both economic and Pan-Arab power. Despite Iraq's considerable arms and a large standing army, this conflict has demonstrated that direct military confrontation with First World countries is foolhardy.

However, the Gulf War provided a theater for examining the emergence of a subtle war strategy

from a position of secondary importance to one of prominence. The introduction of media access, analysts and public opinion polls has created an information feedback loop that can have a substantial and fairly immediate influence on international policies. The importance of this loop was recognized by Iraqi planners, and their ability to influence that system is no doubt being studied by other leaders with regional interests. Lessons learned from this war of impressions may be used with increasing expertise in future bids for power.

The Tet offensive of 1968 demonstrated that style, not substance, can lead to the psychological victory that weakens public support neces-

sary to sustain combat by the forces of a democracy. In recent years, terrorism has evolved into the preferred "style over substance" strategy for influencing policy by directly intimidating the resolve of citizens to support their government's policy. In the wake of Iraq's devastating defeat in the Gulf War, it is quite likely Hussein, as well as his sympathizers, will return to the familiar strategy of terrorism as a means of exploiting any ambivalence on the part of the allied nations for maintaining forces in the Middle East.

The strategy for undermining the support for war is nothing more than AirLand Battle on a psychological plane. In this context, the deep battle takes on a wholly different character. The remainder of this article discusses one potential sphere of influence that is vulnerable to the subtle strategy of terrorism and has immediate relevance to the maintenance of morale and cohesion of our military force.

Terrorism and the Military Community

S. L. A. Marshall argued that no war is won without conquering the will of the people.¹ Conquest requires subjugation of social, economic and government institutions that determine domestic behavior and quality of life. Armed conflict and a subsequent surrendering of arms may change the policies of the government but cannot, by themselves, assure the cooperation of the people or the adoption of the victor's political philosophy. Yet, this must be the ultimate goal of war if there is to be a permanent change. Terrorism provides a less provocative attempt to coerce compliance by avoiding open confrontation and focusing directly on the strength of the people's convictions in the face of an ill-defined threat.

Fortunately, terrorist assaults, despite an increase in frequency, remain the exception rather than the rule for military personnel. The targets are usually of some symbolic value so that their selection can be anticipated. This has provided a sense of safety for most members of the military community, who have a relatively low profile. But what if the attention of terrorists

turned from assaults on high-profile military personnel to rank-and-file soldiers and their families? Random attacks on "innocents" have historically been a prominent tactic in terrorist strategy. It has been tried in the US Army, Europe community in the past 10 years but

Terrorism provides a less provocative attempt to coerce compliance by avoiding open confrontation and focusing directly on the strength of the people's convictions in the face of an ill-defined threat. Fortunately, terrorist assaults, despite an increase in frequency, remain the exception rather than the rule for military personnel. The targets are usually of some symbolic value so that their selection can be anticipated. This has provided a sense of safety for most members of the military community, who have a relatively low profile.

appeared to lack a coherent strategy for intimidation. When focused on military families, such attacks can have serious implications for morale and readiness by undermining the soldiers.

The recent Gulf War made it clear that a prominent leg in the offensive strategy of Iraq was to be terrorist attacks against far-removed American communities, with the goal of intimidation if a tactical stalemate could have been maintained. Terrorists believe that a pattern of random attacks will weaken the public's support for military policy within a democratic society. Targeting the military community has the potential for a more immediate challenge to the military's ability to carry out that policy. It is necessary that military leaders and strategists come to terms with this goal if we are to counter this subtle war for the hearts and minds of our soldiers' families.

Events over the past decade have suggested increasing trends in the targeting of US military personnel by terrorists. The RAND Corporation reported a 35 percent increase in the num-

ber of attacks aimed at military targets during the period 1980-1983 when compared to the previous four years. Events in Greece, the Philippines and Lebanon have demonstrated the vulnerability of military officials in foreign countries and their salience in attracting media attention.

[The] Gulf War made it clear that a prominent leg in the offensive strategy of Iraq was to be terrorist attacks against far-removed American communities, with the goal of intimidation if a tactical stalemate could have been maintained.

Terrorists believe that a pattern of random attacks will weaken the public's support for military policy within a democratic society.

The focus of threat then shifted to random attacks such as the La Belle discotheque and the Frankfurt post exchange in Germany. This suggests that the strategy may have shifted to intimidating the military community as a whole rather than targeting symbols of military presence. The cyclical trends that characterize terrorism predict that while attacks have recently abated, renewed attacks are likely as new coalitions are formed.

With the inception of the all-volunteer military, the US armed services have taken on an increasingly domestic character. More than 56 percent of military personnel are married, and less than 40 percent live in military housing. Increasingly, family-related services have been emphasized in an effort to retain well-trained mid- and senior-level technicians and leaders. Overseas assignments are more often than not accompanied tours. While recent events in Europe may significantly reduce the number of American families living in that region, commitments in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America suggest that military families living abroad will continue to be a part of military planning.

The military family is a significant positive influence on military morale and readiness.² Fam-

ily stability affects the soldier's performance. Soldiers serving in units that regard personal and family concerns as a priority demonstrate better duty performance, less absenteeism and fewer disciplinary actions.³ This relationship between unit and family is intended to create a climate of mutual support rather than competition. That is, it seeks to avoid the trap of divided loyalties for the soldier that often sabotages retention rates. However, terrorism may provide an external threat that tests soldier loyalty in a manner beyond the control of even the best-intentioned commander. It does this by reducing the family's sense of well-being and challenging the sponsor's ability to care for and protect loved ones.

Because the effects of terrorist threats to the well-being of a service member's family have not been specifically addressed by any research efforts, counterterrorism policy is vague. However, there is indirect evidence that its effect upon morale could have both immediate and less apparent implications. An incident that occurred in West Germany during the Red Army Faction's car bombings of 1982-1983 illustrates the potential influence of this threat on day-to-day unit operations as soldiers attempt to assuage family concerns for safety.

A psychologist, experienced in group dynamics, was asked to meet with residents of on-post quarters after an abrupt increase in sick call and failures to report for duty were noted among enlisted personnel on post. The psychologist found, during a community meeting, that a rumor had spread through the building of a probable terrorist attack after a random car bombing in the parking lot. Soldiers had elected to remain at home in order to defend their families against the rumored threat. A discussion of the rumor, the realistic likelihood of attack and a sharing of fears encouraged cohesion among the neighbors and alleviated the sense of vulnerability among families. However, the message was clear. The insecurity generated by the threat of terrorism effectively disrupted the military mission.

Military families can be strategic targets for terrorist coercion. The family exercises direct influence on the morale of the service member; it

An airline pilot in a hijacked TWA jet is threatened not to talk to reporters at Beirut International Airport, June 1985.




In recent years, terrorism has evolved into the preferred "style over substance" strategy for influencing policy by directly intimidating the resolve of citizens to support their government's policy. In the wake of Iraq's devastating defeat in the Gulf War, it is quite likely Hussein, as well as his sympathizers, will return to the familiar strategy of terrorism as a means of exploiting any ambivalence on the part of the allied nations for maintaining forces in the Middle East.

has symbolic appeal particularly in foreign countries where Western vulnerability can be demonstrated; it is easily accessible owing to our enculturated aversion to restriction of rights, our naiveties, and OCONUS (outside Continental United States) policies encouraging integration with host nations. It can be a powerful fulcrum for influencing public opinion through direct appeals to the government (often made public through the media) and through the empathy it evokes in nonmilitary families. The military family has value, then, as both an audience to acts of terrorist violence and as a player to the larger audience of US public opinion, whose influence on foreign policy is growing through the use of polls and lobbying groups.

The Failure to Address Terrorist Influence

While cases directly affecting military morale are not well documented, there are numerous indications that public morale is influenced by specific terrorist acts against military forces and that the public, in turn, affects government policy and military strategy. The resolve to support the military appears to be a function of the importance of the issue and the intensity of the threat.⁴ The withdrawal of US military forces from Lebanon was not a reflection of a positive change in that country's political situation. It was the result of American public pressure to reexamine decisions that led to the deaths of 241 US Marines in October 1983.⁵



Major General James L. Dozier at a press conference after he was rescued from his captors by Italian counter terrorist forces, January 1982.

The RAND Corporation reported a 35 percent increase in the number of attacks aimed at military targets during the period 1980-1983 when compared to the previous four years. Events in Greece, the Philippines and Lebanon have demonstrated the vulnerability of military officials in foreign countries and their salience in attracting media attention.

This is not a new phenomenon or even one unique to this country. The British withdrawal from Palestine was greatly influenced by the public reaction to the cost of maintaining a troop presence after the loss of nearly 100 lives in the 1945 bombing of the King David Hotel by the Irgun Zvai Leumi. Similarly, the French resolve to retain political control over Algeria lost popular support at home after the Front de Libération Nationale embarked on a campaign of random bombings and an increasing number of French soldiers were committed to what was to have been a police action against a small band of criminals. Brian Jenkins' analogy of terrorism as "theater" suggests that violence has little strategic value unless there is a vulnerable audience with political influence.⁶

There is common agreement that the target of terrorism is the audience and that media advances have increased the availability of the military as both player and audience. Nonetheless, there has been little in the way of a plan by the military for addressing the impact of terrorism on the audience other than to identify a liaison gatekeeper to manage public affairs matters in a crisis.⁷ Proactive consideration of the military audience of terrorism has been largely restricted to information regarding personal security and general threat level in a particular region, and even this has usually been relegated to briefings at the time of OCONUS moves. Raymond H. Fernandez and James H. McIntyre surveyed Navy families in Europe regarding the terrorist threat and concluded that "'experts' tend to

Marines and rescue workers sifting through the rubble of the Marine barracks after the October 1983 truck bomb attack.



The withdrawal of US military forces from Lebanon [after] . . . the deaths of 241 US Marines in October 1983 . . . is not a new phenomenon or even one unique to this country. The British withdrawal from Palestine was greatly influenced by the public reaction to the cost of maintaining a troop presence after the loss of nearly 100 lives in the 1945 bombing of the King David Hotel [and] . . . the French resolve to retain political control over Algeria lost popular support at home after the Front de Libération Nationale embarked on a campaign of random bombings.

focus on physical security issues. Those who offer suggestions outside this area support generic training in intercultural relations, language and stress management."⁸ Psychological phenomena such as resistance to influence, trust and morale are neglected. Ariel Merari and Nehemia Friedland, in addressing the psychological dimension of terrorism, noted that "our experience has taught us that decision-makers are better equipped to deal with tangible, technical aspects of a problem such as the costs of mounting an attack against terrorists than with its more subtle,

intangible features, like moods and attitudes."⁹ Yet, it is precisely these features that preoccupy terrorist strategists.

The psychological goals of terrorism have created a difficult problem for military planners, who understand attacks on cohesion and morale as phenomena best addressed through concrete policies governing personnel rotations and training. One strategy for restoring morale in the face of a terrorist threat that has been very attractive is retaliation. The air strike against Libya after the bombing at a Berlin discotheque in 1985



Because the effects of terrorist threats to the well-being of a service member's family have not been specifically addressed by any research efforts, counterterrorism policy is vague. However, there is indirect evidence that its effect upon morale could have both immediate and less apparent implications. An incident that occurred in West Germany during the Red Army Faction's car bombings of 1982-1983 illustrates the potential influence of this threat on day-to-day unit operations as soldiers attempt to assuage family concerns for safety.

and the capture of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers in 1986 after forcing down their plane are but two examples of this strategy. The positive effects on public morale, as well as the morale of hostages, has been documented by polls and after-action reports.¹⁰ But the opportunities for armed response are minimal, and the political risks associated with such interventions are often unacceptably high. Moreover, such reactive strategies for boosting morale tend to lose their restorative powers over time.

A Model for Reducing Threat

The war on terrorism, particularly as it influences public opinion and the resolve of the military community to stand fast, must be fought primarily on a psychological plane and requires a proactive approach. The effectiveness of terrorism lies in its ability to create panic within the community, not in its ability to inflict physical damage. The goal is to create an atmosphere of vulnerability—which leads us to question the importance of our mission—and to avoid creating an atmosphere where frequent and destructive attacks encourage anger and calls for revenge. Within this need for “moderation” lies a psychological ambiguity that terrorists hope will enhance a sense of threat. It is up to us to reduce this ambiguity for our communities. By hardening the audience of terrorism to its coercive intent, the integrity of the military force can be maintained. That is, soldiers whose families are committed to the mission and soldiers whose commitment is not compromised by an ambivalent public may be better able to maintain morale and personal commitments in the face of a threat of indiscriminate violence, thereby maximizing their effectiveness in combat.

But fighting this war on a psychological plane requires that strategists view the public (to include military families) as central to this subtle war of influence. To characterize the fundamental dilemma in fighting terrorism as “. . . the iron fist of [antiterrorism] attached to the limp wrist of public opinion” simply isolates the audience and fosters further distrust of the protectors by the victims.¹¹ The fact is that public opinion governs antiterrorism strategies in the long run by defining acceptable parameters, and families decide whether soldiers remain committed to the military. Dismissing the public because it does not understand terrorism will not change that. Priority must be given to developing models for understanding the manner in which terrorism might influence public opinion and undermine resolve, particularly within the military community. From these “straw man” models, effective policies can be generated.

German police examine the remains of the LaBelle discotheque in Berlin, April 1985.



The psychological goals of terrorism have created a difficult problem for military planners, who understand attacks on cohesion and morale as phenomena best addressed through concrete policies governing personnel rotations and training. One strategy for restoring morale in the face of a terrorist threat that has been very attractive is retaliation. The air strike against Libya after the bombing at a Berlin discotheque in 1985 and the capture of the Achille Lauro hijackers in 1986 after forcing down their plane are but two examples of this strategy.

Stress and Coping

The psychological effects of terrorism have been addressed by social scientists, but much of this work is abstract and difficult to apply. The "science of antiterrorism" has not met the needs of the "business of antiterrorism," at least with respect to psychological issues. Nonetheless, the available scientific work is rigorous and has highlighted the relevance of research on human stress reactions to threat of harm. This model may articulate mechanisms for understanding the public's reaction to terrorism and the factors that can be addressed in reducing terrorism's influence. Consequently, it provides a good start-

ing place in the development of a strategy for countering the terrorists' goals.

The degree to which victims, potential victims and audiences of terrorism experience stress appears to rest largely on the availability of an active response to the terrorists' acts. Navy families, as well as commanders in Europe, have complained of the absence of viable responses to the threats that they perceived to be present.¹² They frequently asked for training to prepare them for terrorist attacks. Similarly, families interviewed in Panama after Operation *Just Cause* repeatedly stated that they did not know what to do when the shooting started and cited the absence of a

Fighting this war on a psychological plane requires that strategists view the public (to include military families) as central to this subtle war of influence. To characterize the fundamental dilemma in fighting terrorism as "... the iron fist of [anti-terrorism] attached to the limp wrist of public opinion" simply isolates the audience and fosters further distrust of the protectors by the victims.

plan to reduce their families' exposure to danger as their primary concern during that conflict. Consequently, they recommended that families in similarly volatile regions be given some guidelines for behavior under threat conditions. As one mother remarked, "Give me something to do even if it's wrong!"¹³

These "coping" strategies are not likely to be useful once a real threat materializes largely because situations change and strategies learned in one setting may not be appropriate for another. Families we have interviewed acknowledge as much. The attraction of a plan of action lies in the peace of mind it affords the family under conditions of potential harm. Thus, the psychological objective of antiterrorism strategists is not to reduce the likelihood of real attack, but rather to change the subjective experience of threat associated with the lack of a self-defense plan. The goal of "hardening" the audience of terrorism appears to hinge on our ability to influence the audience's sense of vulnerability. Merari and Friedland argue that "terrorism . . . is potentially powerful because it may come to be perceived as unpredictable and uncontrollable, and thereby induce a feeling of helplessness."¹⁴ Simply stated, we can reduce the potential for despair and panic associated with terrorism if we "believe" that we can control our personal level of vulnerability.

Control

Psychological models of stress identify three spheres of personal control that reduce "appraisals" of vulnerability.¹⁵ The first, behavioral con-

trol, refers to the ability to reduce potential harm by either overcoming the source of threat or avoiding the threat. This underlies the attractiveness of proactive training such as physical security measures and evasive driving for high-risk personnel. However, we are limited in what we can do to actually increase personal control of low-risk persons such as military families not specifically targeted, when actions taken against them are purposely orchestrated to appear random and thus uncontrollable. We cannot effectively train people to avoid exploding cars on city streets or hijackings aboard public transportation. But we can continue to provide them with guidance on clues to look for in public places and offer them plans of action if they find themselves at risk. These efforts require more than cursory treatment and lip service and must be tailored to address specific audiences. "Canned programs" have little credibility.

A sense of personal control is not restricted to exercising physical mastery over danger. Because the "appraisal" of vulnerability and control implies an internal judgment about the situation, there are cognitive kinds of control that do not require a physical response to the terrorist's threat. These constitute the second and third spheres of control that can be encouraged among military families.

Maintaining a sense of control through decision making has demonstrated importance in assuaging self-reported distress, increasing compliance with authority and reducing physically debilitating conditions.¹⁶ Surveys in Europe, as well as personal interviews in Panama, have underscored the disenchantment of military families who sense that they have no input into decisions regarding their status. Logistic considerations can necessarily restrict many decisions such as PCS (permanent change of station) dates and evacuation policy, but smaller decisions are possible within acceptable parameters. Such decisions might include PCS windows for early return families, family support groups scheduling briefings rather than command-determined schedules and a variety of options for addressing increased threat.

A military family at an evacuation briefing prior to Operation Just Cause, 1989



The degree to which victims, potential victims and audiences of terrorism experience stress appears to rest largely on the availability of an active response to the terrorists' acts. Navy families, as well as commanders in Europe, have complained of the absence of viable responses to the threats that they perceived to be present. They frequently asked for training to prepare them for terrorist attacks.

Encouraging families to make their own decisions during periods of increased terrorist activity seems antithetical to the command and control mission of a military staff, but it does not have to be. Decisions that are impulsive, irrational or contrary to the welfare of the whole group are most often made by individuals when the threat is exaggerated, distorted or misunderstood. Consequently, information regarding the true nature of the threat is required, as well as clear parameters on the choices available to cope with the threat.

Information not only enhances the facilitation of decisional control in reducing the sense

of threat associated with terrorism, it is in itself a third source of personal control. Usually seen as a relatively passive activity, information dissemination and absorption is at the foundation of both terrorism's power over its audience and antiterrorism's successful thwarting of that influence.

Information has to do with perceptions and has been the primary ingredient of psychological operations tactics. Given the propensity of warring nations to manipulate information for political and military gain, the strategic use of information by the military to alter perceptions has had a notorious past.¹⁷ Nonetheless, public per-

ceptions of military and political reality are being shaped, and terrorism has proved itself to be a major player in this exercise. Consequently, we can expect that public support of defense policy,

Maintaining a sense of control through decision making has demonstrated importance. . . . Surveys in Europe, as well as personal interviews in Panama, have underscored the disenchantment of military families who sense that they have no input into decisions regarding their status.

military family perceptions of personal threat and the morale of soldiers to pursue missions with the reassurance of public and family support require our attention to perceptions, not to manipulate but rather to clarify the information that influences them. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that:

"In this world where television cameras are on the scene before the ambulances and fire trucks, perceptions are reality. In fact, perceptions are frequently more than reality because a perception that's wrong but taken for real is ten times more volatile than an adverse reality perceived correctly."¹⁸

Our goal in providing informational control is to reduce a sense of helplessness by encouraging greater understanding of the phenomena confronting the public. By providing information within a context that accurately reflects the threat, we reduce the mystique of terrorism. Or as Jenkins noted, we need to let our military families know that terrorism "is a pain, not a mortal danger."¹⁹

Unfortunately, just the opposite perception is often generated. We often fail to consider the culture of the terrorist. For example, we attempt to understand non-Western terrorist groups within a European or American framework. The result is that we do not understand their motives, do not appreciate their cultural values or history and fail to predict their behavior. This

only heightens the image of an irrational, even mystical, fanatic. Terms such as "shadow groups," "holy war," and so on evoke the most frightening images of inquisitions, executions and suicidal gestures.

Information aimed at clarification reduces ambiguity and encourages informed means of coping with threat. In the absence of information, rumors abound, and they are usually worse than the true nature of the situation. Families in Europe have complained that when the threat of terrorism increases, they have felt that the military becomes more evasive and does not keep them abreast of the true threat. They felt that the absence of information reduced their ability to make informed decisions about family security, transportation and attendance at local events. The ambiguity of terrorism is only heightened by the absence of information. Contrary to what we might expect, a sense of helplessness is reduced by a clear understanding of the nature of the threat because then the options available for coping with the threat are clarified.²⁰ Carrying this argument to its extreme, we would argue that if random terrorist attacks within the military community are to be successful in creating panic and reducing readiness, they will require an uninformed audience left to form its own conclusions from rumor and innuendo.

In presenting the military family as a potential terrorist target requiring our attention and suggesting a stress reduction model as the straw man in defense planning, we almost feel the need to apologize for being "masters of the obvious." Every commander knows the importance of information flow up and down the chain. Every leader recognizes the advantages of encouraging decision making at the small-unit level.

Strongly centralized command and control and poorly informed soldiers destroy effectiveness on the confusing battlefield of modern combat. But, if we are to continue to allow families to live in the shadows of this subtle war of threat and "violence for effect," we must expand the scope of our efforts at maintaining their resolve to stand fast as well.

It is often said within military staffs that "if you

aren't part of the solution, you're part of the problem." The purpose of this discussion is not to point out problems in the system, but to identify changes in the rules that require our attention. The areas of interest discussed here have not traditionally been a part of optional planning, but the strategies of terrorism have changed that. These changes require a modification of our perspective as well.

Military leaders are trained to believe that any offensive challenge to the unit requires action. Commanders and their staffs have a "make it happen" posture. Interestingly, the Persian Gulf War, with its extraordinary overlay of psychological ploys aimed at both Arab and Western audiences, introduced words such as "prudence" and "restraint" into the vocabulary of military analysts. Addressing terrorism as a strategic weapon requires the same farsighted planning; looking deep into the psychological battlefield as well as the conventional theater. The aim in our

planning must now be twofold: First, continue to fight the source of terrorist threat; then harden the audience to its influence. This strategy employs a basic principle of preventive medicine.

Norman A. Milgram described the toxic effects of terrorism on our sense of security by noting:

"What satisfaction can we derive from our lives, property, pursuits, institutions or value systems if we cannot be reasonably sure that we can protect them against encroachment or attack? If we cannot control external events, we can possess and enjoy nothing."²¹

The challenge to military leaders and planners is to ensure that the morale-killing intent of this terrorist objective is countered by a well-thought-out plan to encourage a sense of security and control. In the face of these attributes, the theater of terrorism remains the negligible threat that it is rather than the monster under the bed that it is intended to be. **MR**

NOTES

1. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Publishing, Inc., 1947).
2. Leona N. Rosen, L. Z. Moghadam and Mark A. Vartkus, "The Military Family's Influence on Soldier's Personal Morale: A Psychoanalytic Model," *Military Psychology*, vol. 1, no. 4, (1989):201-13.
3. LTC Faris R. Kirkland and Pearl Katz, "Combat Readiness and the Army Family," *Military Review* (April 1989):63-74.
4. Nehemia Friedland and Anel Merari, "The Psychological Impact of Terrorism on Society: A Two-Edged Sword," *Stress and Coping in Time of War* (New York: Brunner/Mazel Publishers, 1986), 243-56.
5. COL James B. Motley, "Terrorist Warfare: A Reassessment," *Military Review* (June 1985):45-56.
6. Brian Jenkins, "Hostage Survival: Some Preliminary Observations," (Eglin AF Aux Fld 9, FL: US Air Force Special Operations School, April 1976), 1-13.
7. Field Circular/Operational Handbook 100-37-1/OH 7-14.1, *Unit Terrorism Counteraction* (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS/Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, VA, 15 November 1985).
8. Raymond H. Fernandez and James H. McIntyre, *Study of the Effects of Terrorism on U.S. Navy Members and Their Families*, (Reston, VA: Development Research Associates, Inc. 1985).
9. Anel Merari and Nehemia Friedland, "Social Psychological Aspects of Political Terrorism," 203.
10. David R. McDuff, "The Prevention of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Victims of Hostage Situations," unpublished manuscript, 1986.
11. C. Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Never-Ending War: Terrorism in the 80's*, (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1987).
12. Fernandez and McIntyre, II-1.
13. Frederick N. Garland, "After-Action Report of Consultation to Family Support Division," US Army South, Republic of Panama, 1990.
14. Merari and Friedland, "Social Psychological Aspects . . ." 200.
15. Richard Trumbull and Mortimer H. Appley, "A Conceptual Model for the Examination of Stress Dynamics," in M. H. Appley and R. Trumbull, ed., *Dynamics of Stress* (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), 318.
16. *Ibid.*, 321.
17. LTC Michael W. Totten, "US Army Psychological Operations and the Army Reserve," *Military Review* (December 1983):48-65.
18. GEN Colin L. Powell, "National Security Challenges in the 1990s," *Army* (July 1989):14.
19. Jenkins, 13.
20. Benjamin Shalit, "Structural Ambiguity and Limits to Coping," *Journal of Human Stress* (December 1977):34-45.
21. Norman A. Milgram, *Stress and Coping in Time of War* (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1986), 11.

Major Frederick N. Garland is director, Clinical Child Psychology Fellowship, Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served as division psychologist, 3d Infantry Division, and as instructor and subject matter expert on the psychological aspects of terrorism at the Academy of Health Sciences, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Lieutenant Colonel Franklin R. Brooks is chief, Psychology Service, and director, Clinical Psychology Internship Program, Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia. He received an M.S. and Ph.D. from North Texas University and is a graduate of Texas A&M University. He has served as platoon leader, 82d Airborne Division, Pathfinder Detachment commander, Vietnam, and as an instructor and executive officer at Field Medical Service School, Academy of Health Sciences, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Taking RESPONSIBILITY for Our Actions?

Establishing Order and Stability in Panama

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve,
and Major Richard D. Downie, US Army

In the wake of Operation Just Cause, the Panamanian police force was in a state of turmoil. The authors describe the postoperations situation in Panama and outline the challenges the new government faced in establishing a police force. They discuss the organization and conduct of the US assistance effort, and finally, they highlight some lessons concerning how and how not to conduct US civil-military relations.

PANAMA CITY was in shambles after the US intervention on 20 December 1989. Widespread looting had stripped the shelves of merchandise in most of the businesses in the shopping districts. Rioters, often led by armed members of former dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega's Dignity battalions vandalized countless buildings. In sum, Panama City suffered over \$1 billion in losses.

Hundreds of criminals, escapees from Panama's ancient prisons, ran loose; many were armed with weapons that ranged from handguns to assault rifles. US forces continued to discover

immense weapons caches throughout the country.¹ Justifiably, the new Panamanian administration feared that Dignity battalions, led by former Panama Defense Forces (PDF) members or Noriega loyalists, would counterattack to destabilize the new government. Indeed, on Friday, 22 December, President Guillermo Endara and Vice Presidents Guillermo Ford and Ricardo Arias Calderón were attacked outside the legislative assembly. Wealthy citizens formed armed neighborhood defense/vigilante groups, meting out rough justice (and injustice). Added to this economic and political chaos, the absence of transit police and destroyed or nonfunctioning traffic signals jammed traffic in the city to a standstill.

The police force, controlled by the PDF under Noriega, disappeared during the US invasion.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

No organizational structure existed and former facilities had been destroyed. The only law enforcement authority available was that of US infantry and military police units. Panama desperately needed the immediate formation of a civilian police force.

The credibility of the new government was at stake both at home and abroad. To prove legitimacy, the government needed to gain and maintain control of this chaotic domestic situation, restore order and stability and demonstrate its authority.

The Political Challenge

The massive looting and vandalism motivated the United States, as well as the new Panamanian administration, to place Panamanian policemen on the streets. For both governments, the objective was to establish a first-rate, professional police force capable of implementing an effective system of law enforcement as rapidly as possible. Without the stability represented by such a police force, the viability of the new government would remain in question, the domestic economy would not recover, investment opportunities would wither and tourism, a major potential industry for Panama, would not develop. The situation demanded that the new government make immediate decisions about its new police that involved divisive political trade-offs. The new government considered two options in finding the manpower to organize the new force.

The first option was to recruit an entirely new force and fire all previous members of the PDF. This alternative risked leaving 13,000 trained, disenfranchised, and angry former military and police (most still in organized units in the interior of the country) without jobs or prospects, in a confused political environment—a choice that invited the development of a violent opposition group to rise and challenge the fledgling government. Further, it could take years to recruit, select, organize and train a new police organization from inception. Such a force would be devoid of experience and more important, the United States would be required to maintain the role of

an occupying power to ensure public order in Panama in the interim. The political implication of this choice, that of leaving Panama dependent on the United States for the provision of security—the most basic act of governance—would have measurably degraded the new government's international legitimacy.

The other option was to organize a police force from among former members of the PDF. These soldiers were a disciplined group, many of whom had previous training and experience in law enforcement, and the entire force was readily available. By choosing this option, the Panamanian government could rapidly solve the problem of order on the streets, while maintaining a measure of Panamanian control. Nonetheless, the loyalty of these individuals was in question, and the selection of this alternative would be politically unpopular due to the fear and distrust the population felt toward the PDF and its members. Many Panamanians had been brutalized by PDF thugs and saw a police force composed of these men to be an unacceptable vestige of the past regime. The selection of this option would, therefore, attract public resentment and scorn for the new force.

Based on the urgency of the situation, the government elected to employ PDF members as the core of the new police force—the *Fuerza Publica de Panama* (Panamanian Public Force), later named the *Policia Nacional de Panama* (PNP).² To implement its decision, the government imposed several conditions. First, the new leadership could not be tainted by the Noriega regime. Hence, the new leaders of the PNP were selected from among the coup plotters who had been jailed or exiled after the attempt against Noriega on 16 March 1988. This group would be supplemented by surviving members of the 3 October 1989 coup plot and by officers who had continued to serve the regime but were relatively free of corruption or abuse of power. Second, the government intended to weed out unsuitable individuals as time passed; no police officer was immune to prosecution for past acts—the first police commander, Colonel Roberto Armijo, was relieved and charged with serious corruption

The government intended to weed out unsuitable individuals as time passed; no police officer was immune to prosecution for past acts—the first police commander, Colonel Roberto Armijo, was relieved and charged with serious corruption within two months of his appointment.

within two months of his appointment. Similarly, the deputy commander of the PNP, Lieutenant Colonel Aristides Valdonedo, a prominent leader of the 1988 coup attempt, was relieved in May 1990 and charged with abuse of power for actions that took place in 1987.

Third, the government intended to emasculate the PNP by dividing, among various agencies, the functional areas of responsibility that had previously fallen under the purview of the PDF. Thus, the air force and navy were established as separate institutions and were renamed the Air and Maritime services, respectively. Similarly, the immigration service and park and forestry police became separate entities and the criminal investigations department was placed under the operational control of the attorney general.³

The prison service was to be subordinate to the Department of Corrections. Finally, the Presidential Guard was reconstituted as an Executive Protection Service under the Ministry of the Presidency.⁴

Fourth, the new police force was to be subordinate to civilian authority, a particularly important factor in rural areas in the interior, where PDF zone commanders had previously been the "law" and final arbiters over decisions made by the provincial governors. With the new PNP in the same headquarters where previous PDF military zone commanders had ruled their areas, local civilian officials were concerned about their level of control over the police. The government wanted the provincial governors to maintain effective control over the new "Public Zone" commander; however, the commander was also to remain subordinate to the national chief of police. To clarify the situation, Calderón imposed a relationship he called coordination and consultation. In effect, this arrangement mandated that police zone commanders

coordinate their programs and activities with the provincial governor to ensure his approval. If the governor disagreed with a police program or the way it was implemented, he could go to Calderón for resolution, or in an extreme case, obtain the relief of a public zone commander.⁵

Establishing the Public Force

Panama required immediate and significant US support in establishing a civilian police in Panama. The infrastructure and equipment available to organize, outfit and train the PNP was nearly nonexistent. Police stations, jails, lockups and prisons had been destroyed; no courts functioned. No weapons or uniforms were available for the new police force, and over half the police vehicles—cars, buses and trucks—had been destroyed during the invasion; the rest had been stolen, captured or abandoned. The relatively sophisticated PDF communications system was nonfunctional; hand-held radios were destroyed or lost, base stations ruined, repeaters and the rest of the communications infrastructure were severely damaged.

The effort to rebuild the police force was critical in reestablishing the public security and political stability so necessary for Panamanian viability. The manner in which the United States supported this effort, however, indicated some lack of US commitment to honor its responsibility toward rectifying many of the systemic problems that economic sanctions and the US invasion had caused Panama. The United States provided a level of assistance sufficient to allow the Panamanians to start to build the police, but a level that forced continued reliance and dependence on US support. Despite initial confusion, military organizations, individuals and agencies worked industriously and innovatively to forge solutions to assist the establishment of the PNP. Thereafter, when the

The massive looting and vandalism motivated the United States, as well as the new Panamanian administration, to place Panamanian policemen on the streets. For both governments, the objective was to establish a first-rate, professional police force capable of implementing an effective system of law enforcement as rapidly as possible. Without the stability represented by such a police force, the viability of the new government would remain in question, the domestic economy would not recover.

newsworthy drama of the intervention in Panama faded and US policy makers reduced the priority on the reconstruction effort in Panama, the decisions and programs necessary to ensure follow-through on the actions already taken to facilitate the initial arming, equipping and training of the PNP

did not draw sufficient attention and political support. Our initial commitment withered.

Organizing the US Response

From the start, confusion reigned in the effort to form an effective Panamanian police force. Several civilian and military actors with varying capabilities were involved in the US-Panama civil-military relations effort. Without a US ambassador present, there was no leadership authority to delineate areas of responsibility. Each agency saw its mandate differently, which caused continuing conflicts in overlapping functional areas.

The US Embassy in Panama was theoretically in charge of all civil-military actions in country, however, the chargé d'affaires had not been aware of the civil-military operations plan prior to the invasion, nor was his embassy staffed to deal with it. Following the May 1989 elections, the embassy strength had been reduced from 120 to 45, only about 15 of whom were present for duty on 20 December; the rest were on leave (the political counselor did not return until January). As the US Embassy did not have enough personnel to be effective, it had nominal impact.⁶

The commander in chief, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), named Air Force Brigadier



dier General Bernard Gann, the SOUTHCOM J5 (plans and policy director), as the commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF). Thus, as the SOUTHCOM commander's representative for civil-military relations in Panama, he was in charge of all actions involving

the new government and exercised staff supervision over Joint Task Force (JTF) South elements in his area of responsibility.

JTF South had been responsible for all combat and quasi-combat operations, which included joint patrols with the new police. On 26 December, Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, commander, JTF South, responsible for the execution of Operation Just Cause, established the US Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) in the headquarters of the National Police under the direct command of Major General Marc A. Cisneros, commander, US Army South. The purpose of the USFLG was to "get things done," but more specifically to assist with the transition of the police from the remnants of the PDF. The officers and men selected to man this office came from Active and Reserve components of the Army. Nearly all were Spanish linguists, and most of the officers were products of the Army's foreign area specialization program.

Finally, the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was brought in to create a "civilian" police force, impart modern methods of policing and replace the military as advisers to the PNP. ICITAP is a Department of Justice agency with a small permanent staff that operates through consultants and

The new police force was to be subordinate to civilian authority, a particularly important factor in rural areas in the interior, where PDF zone commanders had previously been the "law" and final arbiters over decisions made by the provincial governors. With the new PNP in the same headquarters where previous PDF military zone commanders had ruled their areas, local civilian officials were concerned about their level of control over the police.

instructors hired to provide all overseas support services. The director is an FBI agent, his deputy director is from the Department of State and the majority of consultants and instructors are retired FBI agents. ICITAP had conducted short courses, workshops and conferences for functioning police departments, primarily in Latin America, along with advisement and limited logistic support for law enforcement investigative agencies. Based on its past experience, ICITAP was chosen to develop the Panamanian police agencies.

A constant state of reorganization, deployments and redeployments compounded the situation. In January, Ambassador Arthur H. Davis returned to Panama. A short time later, however, Deane R. Hinton was appointed as the new US ambassador, and Davis departed. Stiner returned to the United States with a number of combat units, leaving the commander of the 7th Infantry Division in charge of the reduced JTF South. At the end of January, a military support group (MSG) was organized under the JTF to take charge of all civil-military relations with the new government, which resulted in the deactivation of the CMOTF. Subordinate elements of the CMOTF were placed under the MSG along with psychological and special operations elements, an engineer unit and the USFLG (later changed to the Public Force Liaison Division [PFLD]). Finally in February, JTF South was deactivated and replaced by JTF Panama under US Army South.

The US Assistance Requirement

Despite the confusion and reorganization, the US agencies committed to the establishment of the police force innovatively used whatever resources they could find to take the actions neces-

sary to assist the establishment of the PNP. Congressional approval for aid to Panama appeared imminent, so many projects were begun as stop-gap measures, in the belief that the more costly, permanent solutions would be undertaken when the aid was approved and provided.⁷ As time passed, the level of US commitment to follow through on funding the initial effort waned.

Facilities. As a result of the fighting during *Just Cause*, most of the police stations and sub-stations in Panama City were demolished, and what few remained had been looted. Consequently, these stations needed massive repairs, including the restoration of electricity, water, phone and toilet facilities, new roofs, furniture and office supplies. Holding facilities or lockups for captured criminals were largely unusable. Early in the assistance effort, US facility engineers started to repair some of the damage to restore electricity and permit the police to occupy some of the stations in the city. Based on security assistance legislation, especially the Urgent Assistance to Democracy in Panama Act, the United States quickly ruled that such assistance was unauthorized. The Panamanians were to be responsible for funding these repairs themselves. In the end, the policemen assigned to each station had to find ways to repair their facilities.

Weapons. To arm the PNP, the United States decided to provide weapons from stocks of materiel captured from the PDF. Based on the USFLG's initial analysis of PNP weapons requirements, the CMOTF commander issued a directive placing limits on weapons to be turned over to the new force such that each on-duty policeman would have a weapon.⁸

During this period, however, US military logistics organizations worked at cross-purposes to ship all captured weapons back to the United

Panama required immediate and significant US support in establishing a civilian police in Panama. The infrastructure and equipment available to organize, outfit and train the PNP was nearly nonexistent. Police stations, jails, lockups and prisons had been destroyed; no courts functioned. No weapons or uniforms were available for the new police force, and over half the police vehicles—cars, buses and trucks—had been destroyed . . . stolen, captured or abandoned.

States. After considerable bureaucratic effort, JTF South obtained approval for the logistics agencies involved to retain some of the weapons required for the PNP. Due to the miserable quality of the revolvers and pistols returned to the PNP, allegations were made that JTF J4 (logistics) personnel had selected the weapons in the poorest condition to be turned over to the PNP. Whether true or not, a weapons purchase through security assistance funding, which took months to complete, was needed to obtain additional revolvers, shotguns and 9mm pistols to fulfill remaining weapons requirements and replace the many unserviceable PNP weapons. The provision of serviceable, high-quality weapons should have been a priority to ensure the safety and viable defensive capability of the members of the new police force. The US response in this regard was minimal. Our initial transfer of weapons included a large quantity of poor-quality weapons for the PNP.

Uniforms. Another problem to be overcome was to obtain a uniform for the PNP that did not conjure up memories of the PDF. Nearly all former PDF members reported in when called to swear allegiance to the new government and work in the new police force. During this period, many new policemen showed up for work in their old PDF uniforms. For the Panamanian public, who remained violently hostile toward the PDF, seeing the new police officers in former PDF uniforms created solid psychological prejudice against the new force.

Stiner directed that the police wear a different uniform. Fortunately, US forces had recently changed their official uniform from green jungle fatigues to the camouflage pattern battle dress uniform (BDU), and warehouses held some 50,000 fatigue sets in varying states of re-

pair. As a temporary measure, three sets of these used fatigues were issued to each policeman, while the search went on for permanent uniforms. Only limited numbers of holsters, night sticks and other uniform accessories were available from the piles of captured PDF equipment, so most policemen had to carry their weapons in their pockets or tucked in their belts.

As the green jungle fatigue uniform looked very similar to the PDF utility uniform, the government and US advisers placed great emphasis on putting the police force in civilian-style uniforms. After some discussion between Arias and the PNP leadership concerning the permanent uniform, the Panamanians decided upon a khaki uniform with the traditional military police cap. The Panamanian leaders had high hopes that sharp, professional-looking uniforms would increase the public perception of the police as a credible and less intimidating force.

Consequently, their disappointment was great when the shirts and pants that finally arrived from three different US manufacturers were in three different shades of khaki—only one of which matched the material purchased for epaulets. Nonetheless, as all of these items were within government specifications, the agents involved in the transactions washed their hands of the issue. A similar episode occurred in the procurement of police "Sam Browne" gun belts. Most galling to the Panamanians, however, was that after having committed \$1.6 million of their own scarce funds to the uniform purchase, it appeared that US government agents were cheating them. No high-level interest among US policy makers could be generated to review the incident; to the Panamanians, it seemed like another bitter pill that the United States was forcing them to swallow.⁹

The US Embassy in Panama was theoretically in charge of all civil-military actions in country, however, the chargé d'affaires had not been aware of the civil-military operations plan prior to the invasion, nor was his embassy staffed to deal with it. Following the May 1989 elections, the embassy strength had been reduced. . . . As the US Embassy did not have enough personnel to be effective [15 staffers], it had nominal impact.

Vehicles. To function effectively, a police force must be able to respond rapidly to calls for service—or at least to transport men to their posts—and the PNP had no vehicles, so PNP transportation was an area of immediate concern. The initial plan was to implement US-Panamanian joint patrols in US vehicles, gradually reducing the US presence and increasing the number of Panamanian patrols as the Panamanians acquired sufficient numbers of vehicles and were prepared to accept the task. Hence, US military personnel initiated joint US-Panamanian vehicle-mounted patrols in military police (MP) HMMWVs (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) to supplement the ongoing program of joint walking patrols with US infantry. MPs soon replaced infantrymen, as infantry units redeployed from Panama City, and the US Army leased sedans to replace the camouflage tactical HMMWVs on patrol in the city, thus lowering the military image.

US security assistance restrictions prohibited the provision of fuel or repairs on Panamanian vehicles and prohibited Panamanians from operating vehicles owned or leased by the US government. The US military could not loan vehicles to the PNP or facilitate vehicle repairs beyond that which they had already accomplished with the sedans. Thus, the Panamanians were forced to depend on the United States for nearly all of their vehicular patrol needs.

Due to restricted Panamanian funding from their government's budget, Panamanian police cars were limited to five gallons of fuel per day. Consequently, the few functional police vehicles assigned to each police precinct in Panama City were parked for two to three days a week because there was no fuel to operate them. Due to the unavailability of funds to purchase spare parts,

many other police cars were deadlined for long periods. The United States did little, if anything, to assist in redressing these problems, nor did US representatives pressure the Panamanian government sufficiently to increase the PNP budget to permit the purchase of additional fuel and necessary spare parts. The only solution for this dilemma was to continue the existence of US-Panamanian joint patrols. Indeed, were it not for the US vehicles, there would have been no patrols until more than six months after the invasion, when vehicles purchased through security assistance funds arrived.

As a longer-term solution, Panama purchased vehicles with security assistance funds. They bought 250 M880s (1976 Dodge 3/4-ton pickup trucks) from US military stocks in England at \$442 each plus \$2,580 shipping—a relatively good deal, although these trucks had a reputation of considerable maintenance and low gas mileage.¹⁰ Additionally, Panama purchased 100 new Chevrolet Corsicas with appropriate police patrol car accessories.

Nonetheless, the fuel and spare parts problems of the few vehicles the PNP had prior to the purchase would be magnified markedly after the shipment arrived. US advisers had foreseen this problem, but, like the fuel and spare parts situation, they could not influence Panamanian or US policy makers to overcome bureaucratic obstacles to prevent this potentially force-crippling problem.¹¹

Radios. Both hand-held and car-mounted radios are required for an effective police force, as are net control stations that coordinate communications and relay messages to policemen with radios. An early US assessment pegged the number of hand-held radios required for the police in Panama City at 1,300. Recogniz-

As a result of the fighting during Just Cause, most of the police stations and substations in Panama City were demolished, and what few remained had been looted. Consequently, these stations needed massive repairs, including the restoration of electricity, water, phone and toilet facilities, new roofs, furniture and office supplies. Holding facilities or lockups for captured criminals were largely unusable. Early in the assistance effort, US facility engineers started to repair some of the damage.

ing the immediate need and importance of hand-held radios to enable the new police force to function, the United States intended to make a purchase of radios for the Panamanians. The SOUTHCOM commander in chief, General Maxwell R. Thurman, personally limited the purchase of radios to 500, a decision that resulted in extending Panamanian dependence on US joint patrols.

Attempting to fill the gap, US forces executed a "Cash for Radios" program as an adjunct to the "Cash for Weapons" program that had been functioning since the early days of the operation. To get as many weapons as possible off the streets, the United States had offered cash rewards to Panamanians who handed in weapons at turn-in points. Similarly, the United States paid for PDF hand-held radios and communications equipment, most of which had disappeared during the fighting. The program was successful in bringing in communications equipment; most, however, needed extensive repair.

Training. Although many PDF personnel had been policemen rather than soldiers under Noriega, the police were at best reactive and at worst, oppressive. Despite their initial police training, an important part of the PDF socialization process, particularly for the officer corps, was the inculcation of a military mentality. Moreover, the PDF as a military entity propagated the sentiment that policemen were second-class citizens. Former PDF members clearly required a reorientation to instill a "protect and serve" mentality, as well as to ensure a fundamental understanding of human rights



and a knowledge of basic police procedures.

To fulfill this requirement, the USFLG/PFLD initiated what came to be known as the 20-hour course. US Army Reserve Component personnel who were police officers in civilian life (they came to be known as RC cops), at-

tached to the USFLG/PFLD from the civil affairs task force, designed and taught a basic "quick fix" course to PNP policemen who, in turn, taught the course to the police in all the metropolitan areas (precincts) and rural zones.

While the course was being developed, the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy, John Bushnell, recommended that the USFLG/PFLD assign RC cops to each metropolitan police area and rural police zone. To the contingent in Panama City, the commander of the newly formed MSG, Colonel James Steele, added Special Forces (SF) soldiers, forming four-man teams of two SF soldiers and two RC cops in each precinct. These teams combined the technical police expertise of the RC cops with the Latin American experience, language capability and training expertise of the SF. Initially, these teams served as police trainers, which permitted rapid development and training of the police forces in their precincts. This program turned into one of the most important and successful of those conducted by the MSG. The Panamanian police were eager for, and reacted positively to, the knowledge that the RC cops brought. Despite the success of this program, upon termination of *Just Cause* on 31 January 1990 and the passage of the Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Pan-

JTF South had been responsible for all combat and quasi-combat operations, which included joint patrols with the new police. On 26 December, [JTF South] . . . established the US Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) in the headquarters of the National Police under the direct command of Major General Marc A. Cisneros. . . . The purpose of the USFLG was to "get things done," but more specifically to assist with the transition of the police from the remnants of the PDF.

ama Act, the US government ruled that the US military was prohibited from training the Panamanian police. From then on, the RC cop/SF teams could only monitor the conduct of training, participate in joint patrols and advise their counterparts.

The Department of State intended to replace military advisers to the police with civilians, giving ICITAP the mission to train the police. Unfortunately, ICITAP initially proved to be ill-suited to the task of building a national police force from the remnants of an army. Standard ICITAP methods were to undertake short-term instructional sessions for small groups in formal classroom settings, using consultants as instructors. In other countries, ICITAP taught courses to existing police force members, who could assimilate that knowledge and instruct the rest of their force through their own established training systems. At its incipient stage, the PNP had neither an established training system nor the capability or funding to reproduce the fairly technical instructional material for police precincts and rural zones. Thus, their instructional technique was both expensive and counterproductive for PNP training requirements.

ICITAP worked toward the establishment of the PNP police training academy and the development of a 120-hour transition course, which was to be taught to all policemen at the academy. While this conventional concept seemed rational for a police department, simple arithmetic showed that, in the best of circumstances, it would take from 18 months to two years to train the entire force. The PNP operations officer continually stressed that the need for immediate training was widespread at all of the police precincts and zones. ICITAP finally accepted the need for training beyond the formal academy

classes and supported the proposal for "roll call training," which the PNP and PFLD advisers had recommended for months. Consequently, as an addition to instruction at the academy, PNP trainers at each police precinct used transition course lesson plans during the briefings for each oncoming shift.

The entire training effort was crippled to a large extent by the lack of funds available for the purchase of even the most basic supplies. ICITAP did donate some supplies for the establishment of the police academy, but most precincts and rural zones that were required to complete training did not have pencils or paper, let alone training manuals or aids to enhance instruction. Hence, PNP training effectiveness was low, despite elaborate planning.

The most expedient means of training the PNP would have been to continue the effort by US military trainers. The military had the skills and the manpower assets necessary to complete the task countrywide. Though the Department of State's decision to empower ICITAP as the institution to organize and train the PNP civilian police force seemed logical, there were no systematic checks to ensure the quality of the output. Such checks would have revealed that their small program could not be staffed or adequately funded to cope with the immense task it was assigned—to organize and train the PNP.

Funding. Although previously frozen security assistance funds were finally used to assist the procurement of weapons, vehicles, radios and training programs, security assistance legislation prohibited their use for operating expenses, and as described in the preceding sections, funds budgeted for the police to operate on a daily basis were grossly inadequate. Police stations had no writing materials for patrolmen to write re-


To get as many weapons as possible off the streets, the United States had offered cash rewards to Panamanians who handed in weapons at turn-in points. Similarly, the United States paid for PDF hand-held radios and communications equipment, most of which had disappeared during the fighting. The program was successful in bringing in communications equipment; most, however, needed extensive repair.

ports on crimes or incidents or for administrative personnel to perform record-keeping. Little funding, if any, was available for training aids, manuals and study materials. The majority of the Panamanian police vehicles remained parked, unable to be moved for several days a week, due to the five-gallon per day fuel limit for each

police vehicle, as well as restricted funding for spare parts. In addition, there were serious delays in paying policemen in a number of precincts and rural police zones because of the difficulty of putting the pay system in order.

The United States was not responsible for providing the funds for all these services. Indeed, after the first six months, although the Panamanian government had to allocate scarce funds among many government agencies, it could have budgeted funds to cover minimal PNP operating expenses. The government comptroller, Ruben Carles, who bore longstanding, vindictive resentment toward the PDF, stated openly that he felt he could get back at the PDF by "bleeding" the PNP.¹²

Due to the delicate coalition between the three political parties represented by the president and the two vice presidents, the government comptroller's decisions on the allocation of funding was final. This key official's bias prevented the PNP from acquiring sufficient funds to operate in a professional manner, which forced the continued dependence on the United States for support. Though this situation was well known, US officials either failed to take sufficient action or were unable to persuade the Panamanian government to provide the PNP with



the minimal funding necessary to operate and ensure public security without considerable US support.

Disjointed Effort

In retrospect, the US effort to establish the PNP was extremely disjointed. Our policy structures were unprepared for the war, as well the impact of inaugu-

rating a government whose resources consisted of little more than the three men elected by the Panamanian people in May 1989.

The impact of the conflicting military and civilian agency perspectives on time available for project accomplishment created frustrating situations for the military. Civilian agencies took a long-term view on the resolution of problems in Panama; the military, on the other hand, faced real-world problems requiring immediate solutions. The embassy and ICITAP were willing to take several years to establish an effective police force. In contrast, the military needed to get the police operating to reestablish order on the streets and end the role of US soldiers acting as policemen in Panama. In truth, the civilians' long-term view was often an excuse for not having a strategy to deal with immediate problems in the framework of a permanent solution.¹³

Military organizations did usurp decision-making authority, but only because higher-level policy makers were simply not making decisions on critical issues. As such, the USFLG, the MSG and the CMOTF commander did what they perceived to be necessary, but were never completely certain that their ongoing efforts would be allowed to continue. Within Panama, the lack of leadership at the embassy until Hin-

As the green jungle fatigue uniform looked very similar to the PDF utility uniform, the government and US advisers placed great emphasis on putting the police force in civilian-style uniforms. . . . The Panamanian leaders had high hopes that sharp, professional-looking uniforms would increase the public perception of the police as a credible and less intimidating force.

A police force must be able to respond rapidly to calls for service—or at least to transport men to their posts. . . . The initial plan was to implement US–Panamanian joint patrols in US vehicles, gradually reducing the US presence and increasing the number of Panamanian patrols as the Panamanians acquired sufficient numbers of vehicles.

ton's arrival, forced decisions to be made at inappropriate levels.

Another counterproductive development was that US interagency coordination became more important than US–Panamanian coordination. After much bickering involving ICITAP complaints that the MSG had usurped its role and MSG charges that ICITAP had failed to do its job, Hinton finally gave the MSG the mission to support ICITAP. Nonetheless, ICITAP officials did not articulate the support they required. At times, personnel from the two organizations negotiated mutually acceptable approaches or program decisions among themselves to ensure agreement between their organizations and virtually dictated a format to the PNP, often without regard for the PNP leadership consensus.¹⁴

Based on its previous dealings with foreign police departments and its view of the incongruity between military and civilian police experience, ICITAP did not take advantage of the experiences or the willingness of MSG/PFLD personnel to assist in its programs. Unlike a normal civilian police force, the PNP was an army converting to a national police. This unique factor allowed US military advisers to develop strong relationships among the PNP leadership. The PFLD was staffed with foreign area officers, who worked closely with their counterparts and understood the cultural nuances that permitted them to build rapport and gain special access.¹⁵

As a result, a fully cooperative effort between the MSG and ICITAP could have been extremely fruitful. Indeed, when the ICITAP leaders ultimately realized the magnitude of their

task and the insufficiency of their resources, they recognized that US military resources could be helpful.

In sum, the meandering US effort to assist the Panamanians to establish the PNP was plagued by organizational confusion, US interagency conflict and a lack of funding to accomplish essential tasks.¹⁶ Despite initial successes, this assistance effort resulted in the establishment of a police force that was largely incapable of independent action and whose long-term prospects included a continued reliance on US assistance.

Lessons for an Effective US Civil–Military Response

First, the United States must commit itself solidly to assume responsibility for its actions. We must identify key objectives and do what is required to adequately resource those objectives in a timely manner. If the accomplishment of worthy projects requires congressional waivers to security assistance legislation, we should rapidly seek to accomplish that task (before national priorities change and the interest of policy makers fades). While a truly effective law enforcement system in Panama will be long in development, we unnecessarily dragged out the initial phases, which caused the Panamanians undue confusion and hardship.

Additionally, a viable, realistically time-phased strategy is essential in developing our near-, mid- and long-term objectives. Near-term objectives must feed the mid-term which, in turn, feed long-term objectives. Most important, all US agencies must be held accountable for the execution of this strategy and the results

Military organizations did usurp decision-making authority, but only because higher-level policy makers were simply not making decisions on critical issues. . . . The lack of leadership at the embassy until Hinton's arrival, forced decisions to be made at inappropriate levels.

of their activities. The ambassador must be the final US arbiter.

Second, someone must be in charge of a civil-military operation. In Panama, after *Just Cause*, that someone needed to be the US ambassador, who should have been on the scene as soon as the new government was inaugurated. One of his first actions should have been the establishment of a high-level, civil-military coordination mechanism to accomplish the liaison and planning required to determine needs and set objectives for the US assistance effort. The appointment of a military officer to assist the ambassador at the embassy would also have been a positive step in ensuring the integration, coordination and accountability of the activities of civilian and military agencies. Subordinate working groups can be established at lower levels to identify needs, determine requirements and monitor the development and execution of plans and projects. Such working groups must avoid favoring any particular political party or group bias, while monitoring whether committed resources actually meet identified needs.

Third, there is always a cultural and political dimension that must be considered. US agencies dealing with foreign nationals must make the effort to understand and gain rapport with their counterparts. The directors of ICITAP refused to take on the close liaison/adviser role with the PNP leadership that the military had long maintained. As a result, they failed to gain the leverage necessary to be truly effective in influencing PNP leaders. A lack of cultural understanding complicates and delays effective action.

Finally, we must emphasize coordination of the US assistance effort with the host nation; despite expedient results, unilateral US activity is most often counterproductive. Through effective coordination, we can resolve problems before they become too great. We should never arrive at a point, as occurred in Panama, where the importance of US interagency coordination takes precedence over US-host nation coordination. At best, if the host nation does not agree, the effort is wasted; at the worst, we can create hostility toward a sincere humanitarian assistance effort. **MR**

NOTES

1. Ultimately over 50,000 military weapons came under US control.
2. We refer to the Panamanian National Police, their most recent title as the PNP to avoid confusion. However, the PNP is today one of three components of the Public Force; the other two are the National Air Service and the National Maritime Service.
3. The attorney general is under the judicial branch, not the president. This

- action is pending legislation for permanent implementation of the transfer.
4. While none of these structural changes occurred immediately and some were still pending as of this writing, the government clearly planned these measures when it opted to build a new force from the remnants of the Panama Defense Forces. The air and maritime services and the PNP form the Panamanian Public Force. The other entities, except the Executive Protection Service, are

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve, is a consultant with Booz-Allen and Hamilton Inc. in Panama. He received a Ph.D. from Indiana University. While on active duty he served in a variety of assignments with the US Southern Command, including deputy chief of the US Forces Liaison Group/Public Force Liaison Division, and special assistant to the commander of the US Military Support Group-Panama. He has also taught political science and Latin American studies at the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse, the American Graduate School of International Management and the US Army Foreign Area Officer Course.

Major Richard D. Downie is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. An infantryman and a foreign area officer, he has held a variety of positions in Panama, including battalion operations and training officer with the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry; adjutant for the 193d Infantry Brigade (Light); and aide-de-camp to the commander, US Southern Command. He served as chief of war plans at US Army South in Panama until the execution of Operation Just Cause and, immediately thereafter, assumed the position of operations officer for the US Forces Liaison Group/Public Force Liaison Division and adviser to the operations officer for the Panamanian National Police until June 1990.

part of the Ministry of Government and Justice.

5. Several governors did cause the transfer of newly appointed zone commanders, which demonstrated viability of civilian control over the new police.

6. As officer in charge of the contingency planning for Panama restoration, one of the authors was directed not to coordinate with the US Embassy on the grounds that the plan was still classified exclusively within Department of Defense channels. With the exception of a roundabout discussion between this author and the political counselor in July 1989, no further discussions of restoration plans were held until after 15 December 1989. Staffing numbers were drawn from conversations between the author and embassy personnel.

7. The 1987 security assistance budget for Panama, which had been frozen when US-Panama relations soured, could be made available to aid the establishment of the PNP. This account included \$5.5 million in Military Assistance Program grants, \$3.8 million in foreign military sales credits, and another \$3 million in loan guarantee authority. Recognizing the importance of establishing the police, the new government made available \$1.6 million of its own scarce resources for the purchase of uniforms. Additionally, under *Just Cause*, the US Forces could make available some resources in kind to the new force. Thus, nearly \$14 million could be used to organize and establish the police.

8. These limits were as follows: revolvers, .38 caliber: 6,000; pistols, 9mm, 1,000; shotguns: 900; M-16 (T-65): 1,000; Uzi submachineguns: 100 (Memorandum for all USSOUTHCOM Forces, ATTN: JTF SO J-4, Subject: Policy for Re-Issuance of Captured Weapons to GOP Authorities, SCJ-5, 7 Jan 90).

9. The authors were present when the PNP chief of logistics made these specific changes. The 13 senior US officers involved in the uniform incident corroborated the story in the presence of the authors, and both authors witnessed the arrival of shirts of three different shades, as well as poor-quality "Sam Browne" gun belts.

10. Approximately 8 miles per gallon. The M880s were in near mint condition.

11. The current director of the PNP, Ebrahim Asvat, is still critical of the US

aid he is receiving, stating that "we finally got cars but no spare parts and too few radios" quoted in: Linda Robinson, "Winter of Their Discontent," *U.S. News and World Report*, 17 December 1990.

12. Interview with US adviser. See also Linda Robinson, "Government controller, Ruben Carles has argued against police purchases of computers because they can be used for sinister intelligence, such as Norega did."

13. Numerous conversations, meetings and coordination with International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and an analysis of its written plan for developing the PNP convinced the authors that ICITAP, in particular, had no strategy in terms of objectives, ways and means. The ICITAP plan stated objectives in terms of courses to be taught to small groups, rather than capabilities to be acquired by the force, and the plans and resources needed to disseminate that training to the entire police force.

14. Both authors regularly engaged in these negotiations with ICITAP. During the period under discussion, ICITAP was staffed with two senior Department of Justice (FBI) agents, who alternated in country every two weeks, and a large number of consultants, who implemented the ICITAP program. A few consultants established a significant long-term presence in Panama and developed close working relationships with the Public Force Liaison Division (PFLD) personnel. At this level, the ICITAP/PFLD interface was exceptionally positive.

15. The staff members of the PFLD were selected based on their linguistic ability and their past experience in Latin America. Those who were not foreign area officers had similar experience and cultural awareness.

16. Interagency conflict was not limited to ICITAP and the military support group/PFLD. An embassy USAID (Agency for International Development) official also related to one of the authors that similar conflicts existed between ICITAP and USAID. This critique is not meant to disparage any of the actors. Rather, it points to a systemic problem that began with a lack of interagency coordination during early contingency planning over issues that were never resolved.

MR INSIGHTS

Protecting Subordinates' Ethics in the War on Drugs: A New Challenge for Senior-Level Leaders

Lieutenant Colonel Carlos A. Velasquez R., Colombian Army

Today's US military is involved in the war on drugs. Joint Task Force (JTF) 4 and JTF 5 have been created to plan and coordinate drug detection and monitoring operations. A third force, JTF 6, was established to support land interdiction activities on the southwest border. Also, National Guard units are becoming increasingly committed in their support of interdiction operations. Even though the missions of the Colombian armed forces in this war are, to some extent, different from those of the US Armed Forces, and although there are legal, cultural and environmental differences, I believe some experiences in the field of leadership can be shared to benefit both countries.

How drug trafficking threatens US national security does not need discussion for it has been defined by the federal government in several documents. But, because of the unethical environment that this kind of war promotes, the threat of corruption could affect the heart of the US Armed Forces—its ethical values. Senior-level leaders committed to the war on drugs must take on a new leadership challenge, one of protecting subordinates' ethics. Senior-level leaders must tactfully help subordinates neutralize their vulnerability to intimidation or bribery, and most of all, they must make their units' actions unpredictable.

The hostile winds blowing against the honesty of the Armed Forces' men and women who are committed to the effort against drug smuggling may come in different ways according to their vulnerability levels and the roles they play. Individuals selected as targets by drug traffickers have vulnerability levels that are high, medium, low and unlikely. Drug traffickers try to select, as targets, those individuals with access to key information such as schedules and areas of planned operations, schedules of the operators of monitoring devices, and those persons with knowledgeable roles in the decision-making process such as the J2s, J3s, their assistants and the liaison officers.

To counter the above, some protection methods can be designed. Highly vulnerable subordinates are those with problems of alcoholism, drug addiction or sexual disorders. For active duty soldiers with any of these problems, the only effective protection method is to remove them from the unit or at least keep them from working in key positions. For traffickers to approach them with appealing temptations is not difficult. After they have fallen for a temptation, they are blackmailed or given easy money in exchange for key information.

A medium-level vulnerability is normally found in subordinates with family care or debt-payment

problems, in other words, in those who are unconsciously willing to have "money coming from heaven." It might seem unlikely that drug traffickers could detect these circumstances, but we must not forget that they also have their intelligence net, which sometimes possesses unbelievable sources of information. The drug trafficker may approach this type of subordinate through a third person, such as a bank employee or someone working in a business with a close relationship to the unit. This third person first "detects and prepares" the target and, then, attempts to bribe him. Neutralizing vulnerability in such a case is one of the functions that senior-level leaders have in any type of command. Improving the status of family care and helping obtain low-interest loans to encourage subordinates' prompt payment of debts are some applicable prevention measures.

A low-level vulnerability is found in individuals whose will to fight is not strong. These are the ones who complain that the military was not created to act as a police force, the mission or the measurements of success are unclear, or that they would rather be training for real combat. They also complain that we might be getting into another Vietnam or that there is no solution for this complex problem.

A trafficker's approach to this type of individual is more carefully planned, which means that, once in execution, it is difficult to detect. Again, an individual is approached through a third person, normally a friend of the individual. The drug trafficker's objective is to get the soldier to a point where his or her rationale might be: "If I am losing my time and energies in this unsolvable problem, why not at least obtain a profit, as many other people do?"

At this point, the target is ready, and bribery or intimidation, with special characteristics, will appear. For example, a monitoring device operator might receive, by mail, a deposit receipt for a large amount of money in a new savings account opened in his or her name at a bank in Panama or Switzerland. An unsigned note comes with it saying, "This account is just the first payment to begin business. You will not detect a shipment of merchandise that will be passing through 'x' area, 'y' day at 'z' hour." Ending the note, they let the individual know how well informed they are about the place where he lives, the office where his wife works and the school where his children study, saying that they "would be very sorry if something happened to any of them."

Furthermore, to reinforce the offer, the traffickers might make it even easier for the target to accept. They will inform the soldier that if he or she becomes a team player, they will provide protection by sending valuable information about the location of their competitor's drug shipments; this information allows the operator to appear to his superiors as a

committed soldier accomplishing the mission.

Two effective methods to protect subordinates of this type are: first, to set a strong example of commitment; and second, to conduct training oriented toward reinforcing their ethics. In the training, discussions dealing with the answers to why drug smuggling is a threat to national security, the effects of drugs on the citizens and how to make the soldier's role in the war on drugs "combat applicable" would benefit their commitment. In other words, training that focuses on convincing the soldier that the war on drugs is a just and worthy effort and that this fight is necessary and possible to win can motivate the soldier to resist temptation and commit to the fight.

The unlikely target of corruption is, of course, the type of professional soldier who is naturally deeply committed and highly ethical. This is the soldier to place in a key role in the war on drugs. This soldier will only be approached by traffickers if there is no other way to save a huge investment. The approach to this high-risk target will be sophisticated and will normally end in serious intimidation. If this occurs, the only solution might be to transfer this soldier to another unit.

As has been described, the unhealthy environment of the war on drugs makes the possibilities of corruption or intimidation real and very difficult to avoid or control. To make control feasible, it would be necessary to create some kind of KGB-like intelligence net, which obviously is not desirable. Moreover, it would be unreal to think that the people serving in a unit with a positive ethical climate will be protected by their ethics and bravery against those threats. We must not forget that two of the traffickers' principles are: "Everyone has a price" and "Everyone fears death."

US Army Field Manual 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, defines leadership and command at senior levels as "the art of indirect and direct influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result." The result military units committed to this war seek to achieve is to reduce the availability of drugs in the United States. One condition—keeping subordinates out of the reach of bribery or intimidation—must have first priority not only to accomplish the mission but also for the sake of the US Armed Forces.

Protecting subordinates against bribery or intimidation may not be easy, but it is not impossible. The first thing to look at is the vulnerability of key subordinates, and once their vulnerability is established, either relieve them or take steps to help them overcome their weak points. Of course, the latter must be done, when possible, in conjunction with the affected person.

But senior-level leaders have a lot of ways to help overcome vulnerabilities, as was suggested before. One method that guards against all types of vulnerabilities, the one that in Colombia has proved to be the most effective against the drug traffickers' approach, is to *make operational matters unpredictable*. For instance, the schedules of some key operators may change daily while others' schedules change every two or three days. Persons with access to the schedules of planned operations must be carefully selected. Random inspections of the information process in the J2's office and the planning process of the J3 must become frequent. In other words, operational security must be practiced not only externally but, to some extent, internally.

The above are just some examples of actions that, when combined with those actions born in the mind of a committed and imaginative senior-level leader, will attain an *unpredictable unit* and create an environment that will be an unbreakable shield for subordinates against bribery or intimidation. Drug traffickers will find it very difficult to either establish who must be approached or when it can be done.

But logical questions may arise. In a society that has as one of its principles the basic belief in the honesty of its members, and of course, of those in

the military, how can these actions be implemented without hurting sensibilities and trust? How can these measures not be perceived as commanders' distrust? I would respond that senior-level leaders must be tactful, and while implementing those measures, they must honestly inform their subordinates of the reasons for their actions, emphasizing that the major concern is security for them and their families.

All in all, senior-level leaders assigned to command units committed to the war on drugs have the challenge of defeating an enemy that not only is a threat to US national security but also to the ethical values of the Armed Forces. *Avoiding temptation* is the best prevention for subordinates to protect their ethics. When this is not possible, senior-level leaders must help through example, training and unit unpredictability. Keep in mind that any application must be tactful in order to maintain the necessary mutual trust. **MF**

Lieutenant Colonel Carlos A. Velasquez R. wrote this article while attending the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1990-1991. He has since returned to Colombia to further serve in the Colombian army.

MR LETTERS

Conflict Termination Phase of AirLand Operations

The School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, and *Military Review* are to be commended for beginning the needed dialogue and surfacing the issues to be addressed as AirLand Operations matures and grows to adapt to the environment that will be 2005. This letter is in response to Lieutenant Colonel John W. Reitz's letter answering mine in the January 1992 *Military Review* and to amplify some of my previous thoughts.

It is gratifying to know the ideas in AirLand Operations are not yet doctrine, only concepts. I say gratifying because, since we are in the concepts phase of the doctrinal development process, it means there is time to have discussion and to ensure that the eventual doctrine does reflect the political-military reality.

I wish Reitz had gone on to describe another aspect of the Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference (SLWC)—the discussion of conflict termination. The decision was made that "war-termination and post-conflict activities must be an integral part of

[Field Manual] 100-5, [Operations] and future joint doctrine; significant work [is] required in this critical area." In the SLWC discussion, the following important points were made:

- The Clausewitzian assertion to consider the last step before taking the first step, now extended through war-termination and post-conflict activities to achieve national strategic aims, is important.
- It is very likely the military may have to conduct war-termination and post-conflict activities as a *third* (emphasis added) party to a conflict.
- A national military strategy is crucial to determine the objectives after the fight, and these objectives affect how long the US Army must stay.
- There is a need for US Army doctrine to address all the above, and the resulting campaign plan should reflect the reality of these points. (The Army War College has been teaching this point for a year.)

In my last letter, I pointed out that "any war we will fight is bound to be a coalition effort and we should plan for it and write doctrine that reflects this reality. We should plan for the following three phases of such a conflict:

- "The defense phase in which primarily indigenous forces are defending against a potential aggressor and the United States is using political and economic efforts while conducting a military show of force to dissuade or deter the aggressor from beginning offensive military operations.

- "The defense and lodgment phase in which a joint US or host nation force is defending while the United States builds its forces and targets (with the appropriate element of power) the group that can change the opponent's objectives.

- "The offensive phase in which attacks are conducted, not necessarily against the opposing force but against the opponent's strategy and its political center-of-gravity as it has been translated onto the battlefield."

These three phases track with the outcome of the SLWC, except, I should have had a fourth phase:

The termination phase in which hostilities may continue, though the level of violence may have greatly declined, but political actions have begun or been intensified to terminate the conflict. At the end of this phase, hostilities will have ended and political-military activities to consolidate the victory and preclude future hostilities will be occurring.

In essence, this fourth phase may be envisioned as a reverse movement along the conflict continuum. The SLWC, in its deliberations, identified this phase and discussed the need to have a command and control structure to deal with it and to work with the State Department in developing a smooth transition for reconstruction of the country. They agreed that "winning the peace may be more difficult than winning the war." This is a critical realization and suggests that we have matured significantly in our thinking about victory and what it means to win. This is a crucial concept, and in a forthcoming Strategic Studies Institute paper, I argue that winning occurs when an opponent changes its objectives to accommodate ours.

To win, we must successfully attack an opponent's political-military center-of-gravity while defending our own. This is easy to say but much more difficult to translate into political-military activity. It is a subject for continuing discussion.

Military Review is to be commended for its role in this process of discussion of the concepts and doctrinal development. As General Frederick M. Franks Jr. points out, "The process is as important as the product." It is through the process of discussion and debate that the Army and its leadership will be educated and come to understand and internalize the new doctrine.

COL. Bruce B. G. Clarke, USA, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Know Your HF Radio

In the November 1991 *Military Review*, Colonel Randolph W. House and Captain Gregory L. Johnson describe the tactics and doctrine developed by the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in command and control (C²) of a heavy brigade when conducting a "movement to contact." In their article, "C² in a Heavy Brigade Movement to Contact," they show their impressive tactical successes in training and actual combat during operations *Desert Storm* and *Desert Shield*.

Deeper examination reveals there were serious problems in the 2d Brigade C² communications systems that had to be dealt with and overcome in order to fight successfully. From a signal corps officer's point of view, House and Johnson's article shows the following points about the lack of adequate 2d Brigade communications capabilities:

First, brigade communications equipment consisted primarily of Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). Both these systems are limited in distance by their use of VHF radio (30-88 megahertz [MHz]) and vertical (whip) antennas to line of sight (LOS) transmission ranges. These limited radio ranges made it very difficult to maintain communications with forward (scout) elements, support (rear) elements and flank elements while in the wedge formation from the brigade main and tactical command post locations. If the brigade had been forced to redeploy into a line formation, complete communications would have been impossible without relays. This was a particularly difficult problem during *Desert Storm* because the fast movements of the brigade made it very easy to quickly exceed the range of the radio equipment in use.

Second, it was necessary during combat operations for the brigade commander to relay instructions manually through subordinate units to brigade elements located beyond the radio range of the brigade's LOS communications system. This slows the pace of combat, causes orders to be misunderstood and makes the unit more vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare measures.

In addition, the article clearly states the commander's misconception that "long-distance rapid movement must still be controlled primarily by FM (VHF) radio," and that an important lesson learned is the "difficulty of the brigade main CP and brigade TAC in keeping up with the battle as it progresses over long distances." The article also concludes that MSE "is a critical asset, especially during planning phases."

The communication problems described by House and Johnson are not surprising to the signal corps officer since they are caused by the technical

characteristics of the VHF radio (30-88MHz) equipment used. This equipment produces radio energy that travels along the surface of the earth (ground wave) until a distance is reached where the energy (signal) can no longer be used for communication. This distance varies with the tactical situation and depends upon the following factors: transmitter power, frequency, antenna radiation efficiency, antenna height, ground composition, intervening terrain features and sometimes enemy jamming. In typical armored combat using either mobile subscriber radiotelephone terminals (MSRTs) or SINCGARS mounted on standard vehicles, this range rarely exceeds 10 kilometers and is often quite a bit less, particularly in hilly areas or heavy jungle.

What is shocking about this article is that the brigade communicators (signal corps officers) did not solve their commander's problem by immediately switching critical command stations located beyond SINCGARS range to high frequency (HF) radios operating in the lower portion of the 2-30 MHz frequency range. These radios (such as the AN/GRC-193 radio set) are in the US Army inventory and were used successfully in *Desert Storm* and *Desert Shield* in similar applications by the US Marine Corps (USMC) and other Army elements in theater. This standard equipment is not even mentioned as a possibility in House and Johnson's article, and one gets the impression that the authors were not informed about the existence of this available equipment or its long-range communications capabilities.

When used with standard vertical (whip) antennas, HF radios will produce surface wave energy in the same way as VHF radios such as SINCGARS; however, due to the lower frequencies used, the energy will travel so much farther (than VHF signals) over the same ground that it becomes unusable for communications. The main reason for the range difference is the reduced energy absorption effects of both ground and terrain features at the lower (HF) frequencies. Standard vehicular HF radios also have higher power transmitters than VHF radios (100-400 watts), which also helps increase ground range when compared to SINCGARS or MSE.

In addition to the increased surface wave range provided by the standard HF radios when compared to VHF equipment, HF radios can also communicate via what is called sky wave transmission. This mode of transmission takes advantage of the phenomenon that when energy at HF radio frequencies enters into the ionized gas layers surrounding the earth (ionosphere), the energy is bent back (reflected) toward the earth. This reflected energy returns to earth at usable levels for communications and covers a circular area with a radius of up to 400 miles without gaps or dead spaces. This effect is

similar to taking a water hose with a fog nozzle and pointing it straight up. The water falls back in a circular pattern. This concept will not work with VHF because energy at these (SINCGARS and MSRT) frequencies will penetrate the ionosphere and will not be reflected back to earth. In the sky-wave mode, ranges of 0-400 miles in all directions can easily be achieved without the need for relays. Transmitter power levels of from 20 to 50 watts are sufficient for reliable communications in this mode because there are no signal losses due to the effects of the ground or terrain.

These effects are easily generated by the use of horizontal wire, bent ship or loop antennas and selection of a proper radio frequency. Had this technology been used by the 2d Brigade, much more flexibility in combat formations without the loss of communications with subordinate elements could have been achieved. A simple brigade HF radio command net between major elements of the unit should have been structured. This would have given the commander the capability to communicate with his forward elements well in front of the main body, his support elements well to the rear and every other unit and location under his command without regard to conditions or terrain. This capability would have made the brigade's movement swifter, its combat power more focused and the brigade command group's life much easier.

Over the last 15 years, extensive experiments using these techniques and equipment have been conducted successfully by troops of the New Jersey Army National Guard (NJARNG), including the 50th Armored Division, a unit similar in structure to the 1st Cavalry Division. These techniques were so well proven by the NJARNG that they have been emulated by the USMC, which places such a high value on these techniques that it conducts a special periodic class for USMC communications officers strictly to teach the technique and its application.

It is a great pity that the opportunity to increase the combat power of the 2d Brigade and other organizations like it by providing long-range communications was not achieved. The signal unit's chain of command and its parent organization failed since the radio equipment was available and the techniques of long-range communications were known and are Army doctrine. Fortunately, US forces were able to bring overwhelming combat power against an enemy who did not fight well. Had another situation existed and had the enemy been able to put up a more serious fight, the lack of long-range tactical communications could have made a difference in the outcome.

David M. Fiedler, All Source Analysis System Project Liaison Office, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

The Stars and Stripes

Michael E. Unsworth Copyright 1992

"The Stars and Stripes was the only part of the [US] Army that cared about you." Former 42d Infantry Division combat infantryman Henry Koch's praise of *The Stars and Stripes* is typical of the affection GIs had for the newspaper that followed them from its first issue on 18 April 1942 through to the liberation of Europe—V-E day, 8 May 1945. *Stripes* not only told them about their unit's fighting and information about action on other fronts but also gave them news from the States, comics and sports. It was a window on the world for the hundreds of thousands of wartime draftees cut off from the peacetime flow of news.

Early in the conflict, the upper echelons of the War Department were aware of the need for such a publication. Wendell L. Willkie, who had toured the Allied countries as a special presidential envoy, brought back complaints from servicemen stationed overseas about a lack of information from home. US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall recognized the validity of Willkie's message. Marshall, a protégé of General of the Army John J. Pershing, had seen firsthand the success of Pershing's experiment with military journalism—the World War I American Expeditionary Force's (AEF's) *The Stars and Stripes*.

Moreover, Marshall realized that a successful publication had to have credibility with its audience. He saw this happen when, as assistant commandant of the US Army Infantry School, he gained wide acceptance for the school's *Mailing List* by having interesting, well-written articles. Marshall's experience with the Illinois National Guard also exposed him to the American civilian's desire to be kept informed. Thus, the Army chief of staff was prepared to back a publication that would be more attuned to its conscript readers than to the traditional military hierarchy.

The Army had little experience dealing with an official newspaper for the enlisted ranks. The AEF *Stripes* did not survive the post-World War I demobilization. Officers' magazines such as *The Cavalry Journal* were essentially self-censoring. Commercially published ventures such as *Our Army* and the newly established *Army Times* could be kept in line by withdrawing easy access to official information




Soldier-journalists at work in Teheran, Iran, 1943

and by restricting its circulation on military bases.

Since the Army lacked institutional expertise, it relied on newspapermen who had entered the service in the mass of wartime "selectees." Thus, the military gained people who had done some soldiering and understood the life of their readers. In using this manpower, the Army inadvertently sowed the seeds of future discord. Journalists of this period were generally cantankerous individuals who skeptically viewed the world and its happenings. They were not willing to change their work ethics simply because they were in uniform.

The first issue of the reborn *Stripes* appeared in Great Britain on 18 April 1942 with Volume 2, Number 1 (the World War I *Stripes* being Volume 1). Produced by a staff nominally under the Army Service Forces' Special Services, the reincarnation



Stars and Stripes staffers preparing an issue from an office room of the *Cherbourg Eclair*. Cherbourg, France, 14 August 1944.



A French boy passes out copies of *Stars and Stripes* to GIs in Saint-Lô, France.

was printed on the presses of the prestigious *Times* of London and quickly became popular with the troops coming into the British Isles. Unlike its ancestor, it contained no advertising and was supported by subscriptions and an Army subsidy. Its popularity soon convinced the *Stripes*' staff that its initial weekly appearance was not sufficient and that it would have to become a daily. This transition was an important milestone for the newspaper. The World War I *Stripes* had a high literary quality because its weekly deadline gave its writers time to polish their pieces. Daily deadlines forced the editorial staff to follow the writing and reporting habits of American big-city journalism. *Yank*, *The Army Weekly* magazine was the literary successor to the Great War's *Stripes*.

Another important development for the newspaper was due to a change in Allied strategy. The decision to delay a 1943 cross-channel invasion and, instead, invade North Africa caused some US

forces in Britain to be sent to the new fighting front. The *Stripes*' staff decided that these troops should continue to have the newspaper. Thus, in Algeria, an Algiers edition appeared on 9 December 1942 beginning the policy of having different editions follow separate operations. Eventually, there were 30 editions, ranging from a mimeographed version produced on a landing ship, tank (LST) to one produced on the presses of the *International Herald-Tribune* in Paris.

Stripes' main focus was on the war since that was the topic that interested its readers. It emphasized the actions of combat soldiers, not those of senior commanders. From its first issues, the newspaper had heavy coverage of Army air force units since they were the first Americans to see action. When other fronts opened up, the *Stripes*' correspondents followed the ground troops and wrote knowledgeably about the fighting. *Stripes*' coverage of domestic US news approximated that of a major American big-city daily. The sports section was a big favorite; its comics section had not only syndicated strips such as "Terry and the Pirates" and "Li'l Abner" but also ones produced by GIs—Bill Mauldin's "Up Front," George Baker's "Sad Sack" and Dick Wingert's "Hubert." Perhaps the one feature most loved by the readers and also the most annoying to senior officers was the "B-Bag: Blow It Out Here" letters-to-the-editor section that aired soldiers' complaints about the Army. From complaining about strikes in the United States to griping about *Stripes*' editorials, the "B-Bag" column reflected what many troops thought about Army life.

Many commanders had a hard time coping with the newspaper. Most were not used to an official

publication reporting what they considered to be sensitive aspects of military life. They complained about everything from the leak of information about the newly introduced P-47 Thunderbolt fighter airplane to corruption in the rear areas of the Italian front and treatment of black soldiers. Mauldin's "Up Front" drawings particularly incensed General George S. Patton Jr., who wanted *Stripes* banned within his US Third Army. Moreover, the *Stripes*' staff tended to ignore suggestions for articles that came from various public affairs officers in the European Theater of Operations.

This tension between senior commanders and the mainly enlisted editorial staff lasted throughout World War II and was never truly resolved. The senior commanders, General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Northern Europe and General Mark W. Clark in Italy, tried to protect *Stripes*' editorial independence. Intermediate commanders often continued to try to shape *Stripes* into a malleable service publication. One attempt at this backfired badly. Colonel Arthur Goodfriend, *Stripes*' nominal editor and commanding officer, wrote a series of editorials designed to "orient" the soldier's thinking. His piece, "So You Want To Go Home" (25 September

1944), berated the troops' desire for a quick end to the conflict. GI comment was quick and damning, so much so that Eisenhower pleaded with the newspaper to stop running such writing. Other officers in charge of the enlisted staff, such as Lieutenant Colonel Ensley M. Llewellyn, were more successful in shielding the newspaper from outside interference.

The size and spread of *Stripes* made it similar to a newspaper chain rather than a single publication with a number of different local editions. Coordination was rather loose with each edition having a large amount of autonomy. During periods of movement, such as the amphibious invasions in the Mediterranean and the pursuit of German forces in France and Belgium, editions usually packed up and followed the troops. Printing plants were "discovered" or "liberated," communications with upper echelons and with other *Stripes* editions were established, and local nationals and vehicles were hired to distribute the newspaper.

Sometimes these editions were premature for their new locations. The Liege, Belgium, edition had to suffer through V-2 rocket attacks. The small staff of the Strasbourg, France, edition, not hearing



of a withdrawal order during the Battle of the Bulge, provided a "defense" of that border city by continuing to produce *Stripes*. During stabilized times, the editions in the big cities, such as London, Rome and Paris, provided direction and help to the ones closer to the fighting lines.

Much of the *Stripes*' success can be attributed to its reporting staff. Many had been in the news business and showed the initiative that successful journalism demanded. They also were good role models to the younger, less experienced reporters. The military training that all of them had to undergo gave them credibility when covering frontline troops. Their writing was direct, lacking the grating flamboyance of much wartime journalism, and it was appreciated. Most of the staff had productive journalistic careers after the conflict. Two of the most prominent are cartoonist Maudlin and "60 Minutes" commentator Andy Rooney.

Equally important were the efforts the *Stripes*' circulation staff displayed in getting the newspaper to the soldiers. Trains, trucks, jeeps and even mules were used for circulation. Oftentimes, the newspaper was sent to food, ammunition and fuel depots to ensure its easy access to the units. Soldiers in the rear areas had to pay for the newspaper, while frontline troops received free copies.

The end of the war saw *Stripes* printing editions in the heart of the Third Reich, Japan and China. Unlike its Great War predecessor, the *Stripes* of World War II was not demobilized. US troops would remain overseas, and the military decided they would continue to need a newspaper.

Beginning with the early postwar period, critics contend that *Stripes* is not the newspaper that it was during World War II, and in a sense, they are correct. The conditions under which the newspaper operated were unique. With a worldwide fighting Army that had rapidly expanded to several times its prewar strength, it was much easier for that free-wheeling organization to find and keep an audience, especially since it had the backing of senior commanders. Now, with close to 50 years' experience with in-house journalism, the Armed Forces' senior commanders should ensure *Stripes* has the credibility it enjoyed during World War II. **MR**

Michael E. Unsworth is the history bibliographer at the Michigan State University Libraries, Lansing, Michigan. He received a B.A. from Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, an M.L.S. from Indiana University and an M.S.A. from the University of Notre Dame. He is the co-author of Future War Novels and author of Military Periodicals.

April 1942 Compiled by Major George J. Mordica II, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

Wednesday 1—Japanese forces begin landing on Dutch New Guinea.

Friday 3—In the Philippines, Japanese renew attacks on Bataan. US and Filipino forces there are battle weary, sick and short of rations.

Wednesday 8—US II Corps disintegrates under sustained Japanese attack in Luzon, Philippines. Of the 78,000 men of the Luzon Force, 2,000 escape to Corregidor.

Thursday 9—Bataan falls to the Japanese after a 13-week siege. Major General Edward P. King Jr. surrenders his forces unconditionally on Luzon. The infamous Bataan Death March follows.

Tuesday 14—In France, Pierre Laval forms a new government in Vichy, France. Henri-Philippe Pétain remains its head of state.

Wednesday 15—French Resistance Forces attack German headquarters at Arras, France.

Thursday 16—King George VI awards Malta the George Cross for collective gallantry in the face

of Axis air attack. During World War II, Malta will become the world's most bombed spot, undergoing more than 1,200 air raids.

Saturday 18—Tokyo and other Japanese cities are bombed by 16 B-25 Mitchell bombers in the daring "Doolittle Raid," which, in turn, causes Japan to review its defenses.

Monday 20—French Resistance Forces attempt and fail to assassinate Jacques Doriot, leader of the French Fascists party.

Tuesday 21—The Soviet Union-German pocket at Demyansk is relieved after being cut off from air support for over two months.

Monday 27—The US economy is placed on full war footing by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Wednesday 29—Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini meet in Berchtesgaden, Germany, to discuss the Axis territorial dispute between Hungary and Romania and other key issues.

MR BOOK REVIEWS

PANAMA: The Whole Story by Kevin Buckley. 304 pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York. 1991. \$21.95.

THE NORIEGA YEARS: U.S.-Panamanian Relations, 1981-1990 by Margaret E. Scranton. 246 pages. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, CO. 1991. \$30.00.

Both these books contain material about the December 1989 Operation *Just Cause* in Panama, but neither professes to chronicle the details of that military enterprise. Rather, each author focuses on internal Panamanian developments and the deepening crisis in US-Panamanian relations that led to the invasion.

Having this in common, both authors cover much of the same ground: the rise to power of Manuel Antonio Noriega; the September 1985 murder of Hugo Spadafora (an outspoken opponent of Noriega); Noriega's removal of the "elected" president of Panama in the wake of the Spadafora affair; revelations in *The New York Times*, followed a year later by the accusations of a former crony of Noriega that the general was guilty of murder, election fraud and drug trafficking; the merging of opposition groups in Panama and their taking to the streets in protest; the February 1988 indictment of Noriega by two US federal grand juries and subsequent efforts by the Ronald Reagan administration to negotiate the general's retirement; the Panamanian election crisis in May 1989 that caused President George Bush to send additional US troops to the country; the unsuccessful coup against Noriega the following October; and the events leading up to the invasion.

Although both authors address the same cluster of issues and events, their approaches to the subject and subsequent analyses often differ. Kevin Buckley's journalistic background opened several doors for him to obtain government documents and interviews with many participants, but it also limited his contribution to the emerging literature on the Panamanian crisis. The book's subtitle promises "the whole story," but, while Buckley often uncovers what went on behind the scenes in terms of personal interactions, his episodic narrative leaves much of this complex affair untouched and makes little pretense of in-depth analysis. The result provides much new and interesting information that is

necessary to read. But it is just one of several books that must be perused in coming to grips with the multifaceted nature of the crisis.

Another one is Margaret E. Scranton's book. A political scientist, like Buckley, Scranton uses documents, news accounts and secondary sources; she simply uses more of them. She also interviewed several participants in the crisis, although as might be expected, far fewer than Buckley with his journalistic contacts. Her book lacks the breezy style and sense of intimacy imparted by Buckley's. Although *The Noriega Years* is often unnecessarily dulled by political science jargon, Scranton's attempts to assess the crisis offer a broader perspective and more penetrating analysis than most accounts published to date.

Scranton applies (to use the terminology she employs) system-level analysis, state-level analysis and decision-making analysis to the Noriega years 1981-1990. In doing so, she by no means downplays the importance of personal interaction in the crisis, but she reminds the reader that larger issues also affected the unfolding drama. The US government, for example, had what it perceived as vital security interests in Panama and the region, thus warranting close relations with Noriega, no matter how obnoxious he was. Scranton also demonstrates how the Spadafora affair—Noriega's "Watergate"—had repercussions that ultimately led the United States to seek Noriega's removal (but not that of the Panama Defense Force [PDF] he controlled).

After Noriega's indictment, however, infighting in the Reagan administration created bureaucratic and procedural barriers to creating a coherent policy. Only after the May 1989 election crisis and the October 1989 coup attempt did the affected agencies in Washington reach consensus that, given the opportunity, the United States must restore the civilian government to Panama by removing not only Noriega from politics but the PDF as well. Scranton unearths little new information about the crisis; her analysis, however, is often crisper and her insights more penetrating than those provided by other journalists and scholars who have newer information.

Readers familiar with the crisis will note a number of factual errors in both books, and some of the

opinions offered by Buckley and Scranton will no doubt be challenged not only on the basis of existing information but also by that which has yet to surface. Still, thanks to both authors, we have a fuller understanding today of the events that led to *Just Cause* than we had just a year ago.

Lawrence A. Yates,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

COCAINE POLITICS: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America by Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall. 279 pages. The University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. 1991. \$24.95.

The US national security establishment emerged victorious over fascism in 1945, then erected the threat called "Soviet communism" to maintain its control. When this exaggerated menace was discovered to be toothless in the 1980s, the "narcoterror" menace was invented to "keep the national security apparatus powerful and well funded." This is the thesis of the latest *j'accuse* in US-Latin American diplomatic relations, written by Peter Dale Scott, an English professor at the University of California at Berkeley, and Jonathan Marshall, editor of the financial analysis page of the *San Francisco Chronicle*.

This book will be considered respectfully by scholars because of its prestigious publisher, its footnote-laden format and the fact that its authors, while not Latin America specialists, are serious researchers. In fact, Scott and Marshall use footnotes showing events that were incomplete, and they ignore critical events that happened between 1987 and the book's publication. The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, chaired by Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA) issued a 1989 "Report on Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy" that also figures heavily in the thinking of Scott and Marshall.

The authors lead one to believe that all Latin American narcoterrorists appear to be still at large, protected by former President Ronald Reagan's national security leaders. However, when checking off the roster of villains with a pencil, one notices that the Latin American rascals in the story are all dead or in jail. As for Reagan's own former team, National Security Adviser Admiral John M. Poindexter; his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams; Iran-Contra middleman, Major General Richard Secord; and several more of the national security policy men have been prosecuted and punished.

Nor do the visually voluminous sources in *Cocaine Politics* make a convincing case that Latin

America's government leaders in Colombia, Panama, Honduras and El Salvador, who were involved in the narcotics industry, were truly under the "protective aegis of US national security leaders." Especially cruel is the assertion by Scott and Marshall that Colombian military commanders virtually sponsored the narcoterrorists there. The record of Colombian military and law enforcement deaths in battle against the heavily armed *narcotraficantes* and the Colombian armed forces' policy of bringing to courts-martial those who sullied the military profession by connivance with the drug producers is well known.

While indicting the United States' highest leaders for inventing and, then, sponsoring the narcotics menace, they also exonerate Fidel Castro and the former Sandinistas in Nicaragua of any connection. Yet, it was in 1989 that Castro executed his African Campaign war hero, General Arnaldo Ochoa, and three others for allegedly dealing in drugs. Leftist writers have stated for two years in such journals as *The Progressive* that Ochoa was a scapegoat by which Castro hoped to distance himself from association with a drug-selling policy.

Professor John N. Moore in his *The Secret War in Central America* made irrefutable linkage between the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, Castro's Cuban regime and the active selling of narcotics to raise cash. Daniel Ortega, then president of Nicaragua, gave well-publicized speeches flaunting his drug-selling policy, bragging about how it would "finance his revolution within, and bring down the Yankee war machine as a by-product."

Scott and Marshall's thesis is glib. When one examines the entire story of what was known from nonclassified sources by the authors' final press date, their villain theory collapses.

Russell W. Ramsey, *Air Command and Staff College,*
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

THE COMMANDANTE SPEAKS: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader. Edited by Courtney E. Prisk. 145 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1991. \$25.00.

Three interviews with Napoléon Romero García, known by his pseudonym "Miguel Castellanos," are combined with editorial insights to make a solid profile of a guerrilla leader. When Castellanos left his position as a leader of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in 1985, he no longer believed the violent overthrow of the El Salvadoran government was necessary but believed the government had changed enough to allow for significant economic and political changes without

fighting. For these beliefs and for abandoning his guerrilla leadership position, he was assassinated by his former followers in 1989.

Castellanos notes the positive effects of US support of the El Salvadoran government. The ebb of rebel capabilities during the heights of US support is his proof. He also notes a negative effect—the rise of terrorist acts rather than dangerous rebel military actions—and documents the use of Soviet, Vietnamese and Cuban training for Third World revolutionary leaders.

That this account gives one a good idea of the recruitment, training, development and life of a guerrilla leader in a Third World country makes the book required reading for the serious student of low-intensity conflict or of El Salvador. The casual reader, however, will most likely bog down in the myriad of revolutionary groups (each with its own set of initials) and can more economically spend reading time on other accounts of El Salvador.

2LT William K. Everett, ARNG, Tucson, Arizona

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES: The Search for Stability by Thomas M. Leonard. 245 pages. University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA. 1991. \$15.00.

In this volume, the first of a projected series covering the relations of the United States with the Latin American republics, Thomas M. Leonard analyzes two centuries of the interplay between the United States and the countries of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El Salvador. The story is told in an engaging manner, with Leonard touching on points not often considered. Of particular interest is his demonstration that US intervention was often at the request of either the native liberal or conservative political party, solely as a means to obtain or retain power.

Leonard's central theme in his treatment of the early period of these relationships was the accomplishment of three foreign policy imperatives for the United States—a transisthmian canal, new markets and opposition to the intervention of a European power in Central America. Later, new forces would drive our relationships, such as support for US companies (particularly the giant United Fruit Company), anticommunism and the balance struck between dictatorships that supported US interests and the quest for open, democratic societies.

The series has made an impressive start. Other titles in the series now available are *Chile and the United States*, *Panama and the United States* and *Cuba and the United States*. Due out in the spring is *Colombia and the United States*. These combined

volumes should be of great interest not only to historians but also to policy makers, who all too often have not put their actions in Latin America into historical perspective.

MAJ James J. Dunphy, USAR, Fairfax, Virginia

SETUP: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why by Earl H. Tilford Jr. 307 pages. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC) 1991. \$12.00.

"By late 1971 the enemy in Hanoi and the air power leaders in Washington, Honolulu, and Saigon—the former who refused to lose and the latter who did not know how to win—were both defeating the Air Force, and by extension, US objectives in Indochina." Earl H. Tilford Jr. joins a very select group of qualified authors rendering frank assessments of air power in Vietnam. In so doing, he reveals how the US Air Force's heritage, doctrine and myths ensured (set up) the overall US failure of strategy in Southeast Asia.

There is much to like about this book. It is well-written, documented and illustrated. If it has any shortcoming, it is that it could use more analysis and less description. Nonetheless, *Setup* is a sledge hammer that hits the air power enthusiast right between the eyes.

To develop his thesis, Tilford begins in the early years of the Air Force—"the time of atomic plenty." He postulates that the Air Force was a victim of its own brief history, wedded to an inflexible warfighting doctrine. This doctrine called for total war using strategic weapons of mass destruction against the industrial centers of modern nations. Such a doctrine could not and did not work in limited wars against agricultural societies such as North Vietnam.

As doctrine begets weapon systems, so Southeast Asia begot the development of tactical platforms and high-technology weapons. Tilford emphasizes the military's fascination with technology and its natural offspring—the managerial mind-set. In his view, neither the parent nor the child proved a suitable substitute for strategy—statistics became an end unto themselves and produced a perception that air power was winning the war.

One of the greatest losses during the 1960s and 1970s, he asserts, was the "intellectual acumen" of the Air Force leadership; he points to the abdication of strategic thinking to civilian "think tanks," and the steady decline in the intellectual quality of writing by Air Force officers, especially general officers. "In Vietnam," according to Tilford, "the Air

Force along with the other services was rarely outfought, but like the other services it was often out-thought." In his view, most Air Force generals were not masters of the art of war—a factor that ultimately led to the United States' defeat.

It is painful for one steeped in the traditions, doctrine and myths of one's service to accept judgments that run contrary. To some, it is anathema. *Setup* made this reader reexamine his view of air power in Southeast Asia. For those outside the Air Force, it provides one of the most even treatments of the subject available. That one comes away from this work with mixed feelings about the efficacy of air power is a strong indicator of good history.

LTC Jeffrey C. Prater, USAF, Headquarters, US Air Force, Washington D.C.

TO SHINING SEA: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991 by Stephen Howarth. 620 pages. Random House, Inc., New York. 1991. \$25.00.

British historian Stephen Howarth has undertaken the herculean task of writing a one-volume history of the US Navy. *To Shining Sea* is a narrative account that meets the author's goal of chronicling "the rise, and fall, and rise again of the US Navy—a naval history of a nation progressing, sometimes unwillingly, from colonial to superpower status . . ."

Howarth logically divides his history of the Navy into two books covering 11 rather arbitrary time periods. The first book describes the "wood and canvas" Navy and encompasses four timespans—Restriction, 1775–1793; Reaching, 1794–1815; Respectability, 1816–1865; and Reaction,

PASS IN REVIEW

ARAB NATIONALISM, OIL, AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEPENDENCY by Abbas Alnasrawi. 221 pages. Greenwood Press, Inc., Westport, CT. 1991. \$45.00.

The author traces the development of Arab nations' dependency on the West for economic development. The latest example is oil, which is usually the sole export for the few Arab nations that possess it. The military reader should examine this inextricable linkage between the US economy and Middle East oil, heeding the lessons of the epilogue that details the ecological-political events leading to the invasion of Kuwait and their implications for future US involvement in the region.—Aaron A. Danis, *Naval Investigative Service, Washington, D.C.*

MEMOIRS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: An Abridgment of the Six Volumes of the Second World War by Winston S. Churchill. 1,065 pages. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA. 1991. \$14.95 paperback.

This abridgment of Winston S. Churchill's enormously influential memoirs was produced under his supervision and so is worth noticing if only to see what he wanted to retain for the wider audience that the abridgment would presumably reach. Churchill's version of the appeasement years, the fall of France, the Battle of Britain and the alliance politics of 1941–1945 make up this volume, while much military detail is dropped. Left is the core of the Churchillian version of World War II. The curious will note that in his brief "Epilogue," covering 1945–1955, he is still lamenting the loss of India.—Raymond Callahan, *University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware*

THE PRESIDENCY OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Revised Edition, by Chester J. Pach Jr. and Elmo Richardson. 283 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1991. \$12.95 paperback.

Chester J. Pach has completely revised an error-filled book by Elmo Richardson both to correct the errors and to make it more readable. Incorporating information from previously unavailable sources, Pach argues that Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency was neither the abysmal failure described by the earliest assessments nor the glowing success presented by revisionist historians. Yet, he also accepts the basic revisionist argument that Eisenhower was a thoughtful and skillful leader. This balanced approach to the Eisenhower era makes the work valuable, and Pach's style makes it readable. This is an excellent, concise assessment of the Eisenhower presidency.—LTC Richard L. Kiper, *USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC*

1865–1881. Development of the “steam and steel” Navy is chronicled in the second book of seven time periods—Reconstruction, 1881–1897; Reville, 1898–1918; Restraint, 1919–1933; Reluctance, 1933–1941; Renown, 1941–1945; Reshaping, 1945–1963; and Reckoning, 1964–1991.

In any subject of such broad scope, the author may choose specific eras or operations for emphasis, and Howarth admits to doing this. His book is comprehensive, however, and its style is readable, anecdotal and includes numerous quotations from leading naval personages of the day. Howarth’s stated objective is to “present a panorama (usually sympathetic) of the US Navy, with most of its famous highlights and some of its infamous lowlights, both for those who have spent their life on the sea

and those who have never smelled a salt breeze . . .” In general, he achieves his objective.

As perhaps is inevitable in a history of this scope, but still regrettable, factual errors do intrude. For example, the highest professional post achieved by Thomas H. Moorer was not chief of Naval Operations but chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1970–1974). And the USS *Vincennes* (CG-49) is not a guided missile frigate but an AEGIS-equipped cruiser.

The US Navy, of course, is a subject about which countless pages of history have been written and for which source documentation is voluminous. Howarth has impressively consulted much of this material, as evidenced by his “Source Notes” covering 23 pages, followed by a bibliography of an additional

DESERT STORM by the editors of *Military History Magazine*. 176 pages. Empire Press, Leesburg, VA. 1991. \$34.95.

This is a comprehensive, illustrated history of the Gulf War from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait through the air and ground campaigns. Its 14 authors cover the efforts of all US services and some allied forces, quoting extensively from eyewitnesses. As might be expected for a book published just six months after the war’s end, there is not much analysis. The price may seem high, but it is justified by the excellent color photography.—SSG T. George Gray, *USAR, 81st Army Reserve Command, East Point, Georgia*

THE COMING WAR WITH JAPAN by George Friedman and Meredith Lebard. 429 pages. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York. 1991. \$24.95.

“Preposterous expectations” is an early phrase in this book and, on the surface, that Japan should declare war on the United States is indeed preposterous. The authors tell how the economic problems between Japan and the United States will result in strained political relations that will degenerate into military actions. This is classic Clausewitzian verbiage. Japan has no other options in seeking secure sources of raw goods and protected sea lanes. This book provides a starting point in the debate over Japanese-US policy development.—MAJ David A. Rubenstein, *USA, Medical Service Corps, Falls Church, Virginia*

AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD WAR II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs by Alison R. Bernstein. 175 pages. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK. 1991. \$21.95.

This extremely well-researched book covers the dynamic World War II period of US Indian Affairs policy. To fully understand these policies, one should understand the tremendous impact the Great Depression had on Indian Affairs policy development. The Indian New Deal under the direction of John Collier and related legislation by Congress laid the framework for a policy that influenced wartime measures. The war years and the efforts to mobilize the country did not pass the American Indian by quietly but thrust him into white society as never before. These two events in history shaped the policy and views we hold today of the American Indian.—MAJ William T. Bohne, *USA, National Simulation Center, Combined Arms Command Training, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas*

eight pages. From this plethora of background information, he has written a detailed but interesting history spanning over 200 years.

On balance, *To Shining Sea* is a readable and comprehensive history that can be absorbed and enjoyed by readers with little or no maritime background. Perhaps its most significant impact is to demonstrate how the history of the US Navy reflects the close relationship between the fleet and the society that it has served since 1775. Thus, in a broader sense, this book is not merely a narrow history of the US Navy but a more comprehensive naval history of the United States since it chronicles most of the nation's major social, economic and political changes from the Revolutionary War to the present.

**RADM William H. Langenberg, USNR, Retired,
Alamo, California**

MOVING TARGETS: Nuclear Strategy and National Security by Scott D. Sagan. 237 pages. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 1989. \$25.00 cloth-bound. \$9.95 paperback.

Many works on national security written two years ago are already obsolete. Major transformations in the Soviet Union undercut all assumptions and most conclusions, thus forcing strategists to jettison old ideas and themes. The international security environment foundation is so altered, in fact, that many strategic theorists are seeing their life's work grow rusty and meaningless. Because of the enduring relevance of its subject matter, Scott D. Sagan's *Moving Targets* bucks this trend. Even a Soviet Union stripped of offensive conventional capability will retain a powerful nuclear capability. For this reason, Sagan's study warrants careful consideration.

The core theme is the "usability paradox" that surrounds nuclear weapons. In order to pursue the twin goals of deterring aggression and preventing accidental war, the United States must craft a strategy that makes nuclear weapons "usable, but not too usable." The divergent nature of these two goals leads to tensions and trade-offs, and nuclear strategy attempts to ameliorate, balance or minimize such problems. As the title, *Moving Targets*, implies, nuclear strategy is also characterized by constant change. Even its most time-tested elements must be continually reexamined and analyzed. Sagan has made this task his lifework.

Moving Targets includes chapters on US nuclear doctrine evolution, counterforce-based deterrence, limited strategic defense and accidental war. From these, Sagan draws a number of sound and work-

able recommendations, all based on the fragile and changing balance between the dictates of deterrence and crisis stability. He describes a doctrine and force posture, for example, that would preserve deterrence by threatening Soviet leadership targets and holding a reserve for a retaliatory strike while augmenting crisis stability. Sagan advocates a highly restricted strategic defense aimed at reducing both the chances of decapitation through a Soviet first strike and accidental war. He also suggests a number of arms control measures that could lower the chances of accidental war without reducing the US deterrent.

Earlier in his career, Sagan coauthored a primer on nuclear strategy for the intelligent layman, *Living With Nuclear Weapons*. *Moving Targets* demands greater expertise from the reader—it is not intended as an introduction. Those who have such expertise and agree with Sagan's contention that nuclear deterrence requires careful management, even after the conventional military and ideological dimensions of the Cold War fade, will find many provocative and well-reasoned ideas in the book.

**Steven Metz, Department of Warfare Studies,
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama**

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II by David M. Glantz. 262 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1990. \$27.50.

This is an important, new contribution to the study of strategic intelligence and its role in the art of war. Glantz, a noted Soviet military scholar, has tapped newly available German archival material and collated other sources to analyze systematically, in a single work, the strategic intelligence relationship to national strategy and military operations in the Soviet experience during World War II.

The author's principal contribution is an analysis of the Soviet concept of *razvedka*—strategic intelligence collection and analysis—prior to and through three phases of Soviet military operations during the war. Soviet military strategy prior to and at the start of World War II was hampered by the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s, inexperience at the strategic level and Stalin's own personality. The Soviets improved their capabilities as the war proceeded and the inexorable pace of the war changed in their favor. Glantz details the factors involved in the evolution of this symbiosis between *razvedka* and strategy, through extensive examination of German and Soviet strategic and tactical archives.

As his examination of this important strategic case evolves, he correctly notes the disparities in skill in

intelligence collection and skill in strategic analysis. He adroitly illustrates the relationship between intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and political-military decision making. Each step depends directly on the preceding step, and failure in the process inevitably affects the succeeding elements. Soviet problems early in the war gained respite after Stalin-grad and between March and July 1943; after that, as the war progressed, *razvedka* became a refined and matured process contributing to strategic successes. More important, the experience sharpened Soviet appreciation for the process in the postwar period, especially as it applies to the critical period before war begins.

Glantz has provided a wealth of detailed analysis that will be of particular value to the Soviet specialist and the serious student of the strategic art. This is not a book for the casual reader, but it is an extremely significant addition for serious research and scholarship on the subject of national strategic planning and the role of intelligence in national strategy.

Colonel John B. Haseman, USA, *American Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia*

THE CONTROL OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE by Geoffrey Kemp and Shelley A. Stahl. 232 pages. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. 1991. \$11.95.

Written since the Gulf War, with a new regional strategic balance but a less stable environment in place, this reasonably priced, informative book examines the geopolitics and economics of arms sales. Geoffrey Kemp and Shelley A. Stahl argue very persuasively that arms control in the Middle East is increasingly tied to the political instability and weapons proliferation in South Asia and Soviet Central Asia. At this period in time, not only the Middle East but also India and Pakistan must enter into the arms control equation because of the large, complex arms sales occurring between the regions.

Two new systems have entered into the arms race that may complicate future agreements—long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological and nuclear). Most of the technology for these weapons has come from two sources—China and the West (including the United States and Europe). While Iraq must now submit to United Nations' inspections under Security Council Resolution 687, other countries are expanding their arsenals and may form a greater threat than Iraq did at the beginning of the Gulf War.

After a brief overview of previous Middle East

conflicts, Kemp and Stahl examine how different Middle East countries view their national security objectives. Chinese geopolitical interests in the area deserve heightened interest since the Chinese will attempt to step in and export arms aggressively to those countries where Western ideology prevents such sales or to those countries that need a new supplier as the Soviet Union withdraws from the region due to domestic and economic constraints.

The distribution of weapons of mass destruction is widespread. Discussions of the construction of a Chinese-supplied nuclear reactor in Algeria and Germany's help to Iran's nuclear project serve to illustrate how up-to-date the book is. Chemical weapons are spreading and are known as the poor man's nuclear bomb. All the powers have precursor chemicals, and most have weapons such as battle-field rockets and missiles to deliver these munitions.

The authors conclude that the best hope for the Middle East is a sound security structure for the region as a whole and negotiations between the regional antagonists. Outside intervention will be of limited use, but international organizations do have a role to play.

CPT Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, *Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.*

MY TURN TO SPEAK: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the U.S. by Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. 224 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1991. \$19.95.

The opportunity for an inside view into the dealings of those who ruled Iran in the late 1970s and the 1980s is not to be taken lightly. That pivotal era, beginning with the fall of the Shah of Iran and carrying into the end of the Iran-Iraq War, formed much of the background against which current US foreign and defense policies have been formulated. It also set the stage for events of pressing and significant impact on all of us, not the least of which was the Gulf War. A book such as this one, based on a series of interviews by French journalist Jean-Charles Deniau with the former president of Iran while the latter was in exile in Paris, promises a rare and fascinating insight into the machinations of government, such as it was, in that troubled land during those troubled times.

The promise, unfortunately, goes largely unfulfilled. This book is so blatantly self-serving that the reader will be unable to accept anything at face value. While this fact does not distinguish the book from many memoirs, its style makes it read like a leftist Arab newspaper, and none of Abol

Hassan Bani-Sadr's multitude of allegations have any supporting evidence. The most damning of these is the "October Conspiracy" theory in which Bani-Sadr claims that associates of then presidential candidate Ronald Reagan entered into secret agreements with the mullahs—who were the real power in Iran at the time—to prevent release of the US Embassy hostages prior to the presidential elections and, thereby, ensure the failure of President Jimmy Carter's reelection bid.

This is not to say that the book is without value. Bani-Sadr was incontrovertably one of the key players in Iranian politics during the period the book covers. He was a confidant of, and in almost daily contact with, the Ayatollah Khomeini, a figure that will certainly stand out in the history of the 20th century. He led his country and its army in the early days of the Iran-Iraq War and offers a view into the world of conspiracy, deceit and treachery that was Iranian politics.

As we are learning, "government" in that region of the world is a concept that bears little resemblance to our understanding of the term. Let the principle of *caveat lector* rule in accepting the author's conclusions and protestations of virtue, but imagine what his position must have been like if only a fraction of his claims are true.

LTC Thomas J. Costello, USA, 3d Battalion,
320th Field Artillery, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

FIRE IN THE STREETS: The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968 by Eric Hammel. 371 pages. Contemporary Books, Inc., Chicago, IL. 1991. \$24.95.

Fire in the Streets is a comprehensive, semianalytical review of the US and Vietnamese efforts to retake the city of Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968. Eric Hammel's review of the conditions prior to the offensive and North Vietnam's strategic and tactical objectives for the Tet offensive allow the reader to fully understand the importance of the city. Hammel approaches the narrative through the eyes of the fighting men in and around the city. His primary focus is the conduct of combat operations inside the city by elements of the US Marine Corps.

In addition to being a detailed narrative on the battle for Hue, the book captures some significant lessons learned by the Marines who fought in the city. The Marine leadership quickly moved to employ the tactics, techniques and procedures that were being developed during the fighting. Of particular note is the employment of the 106mm recoilless rifle and 3.5-inch rocket launcher in the strongpoint reduction role.

Hammel also addresses command relationships and Marine command and control throughout the battle. It is clear that there was a major gap between what the Marines in the city were encountering and the situational perception in their controlling headquarters, Task Force X-ray.

This is the best book on fighting in a built-up area I have ever read. It is a textbook on city fighting. The Marines quickly adjusted to the urban environment and defeated a numerically superior force of North Vietnamese regulars.

The book is well written and easy to read. The table of contents reads like a list of objectives in an operation order published in Hue. Hammel skillfully integrates the names of the key leaders and Marines into the events of the battle. He highlights the key personalities and what they brought to the operation.

Fire in the Streets is a historical narrative of the highest order. For professionals in the Armed Forces or students of the Vietnam experience, this book will capture the events in the battle for Hue.

CPT Mark Lisi, USA, Combined Arms Command
Combat Developments, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA by Lex McAulay. 226 pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York. 1991. \$19.95.

Although Japanese forces had been checked at Coral Sea, they still occupied most of New Guinea in early 1943 and threatened Allied toeholds there. In March, Japan sent a convoy of eight transports carrying 7,000 men, protected by eight destroyers and 100 aircraft, to reinforce Lae. With these troops, the Japanese hoped to push the Allies off New Guinea. The destruction of this convoy by air power was known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and is related by Lex McAulay, a historian and former intelligence analyst in the Australian army.

Allied intelligence knew the Japanese were sending a resupply convoy from Rabaul to Lae, but naval assets were too few to intervene. General Douglas MacArthur, therefore, tasked his chief airman, George Kenney, to use air power to stop the Japanese. Depicted as a tireless, tough-minded and innovative combat leader, Kenney planned to cut Japanese supply lines to southern New Guinea by first striking airfields whose planes would provide air cover for the convoy. After gaining air superiority, Allied aircraft attacked the ships with massed, low-level attacks. The results were spectacular. All eight transports were sunk, as were four of the destroyers, while over 50 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air and on the ground. The air vic-

tory in the Bismarck Sea was a turning point in the New Guinea campaign, ending Japan's offensive plans.

McAulay has written a good yarn complete with accounts by participants on both sides. His research into US, Australian and Japanese records presents a relatively balanced account. A major flaw is the author's unwarranted attacks on MacArthur for not giving credit to his Australian hosts, on Winston Churchill for deserting Australia in its time of need and on the Australian Labor Party for moral bankruptcy in not preparing the country for war. Worse, the ruthlessness of the Allied aircrews who repeatedly bombed and strafed defenseless survivors aboard lifeboats is described with cold and disconcerting detachment. War is certainly a bloody and miserable business, but simply stating that the Japanese had been equally barbarous on previous occasions and that it was more efficient to kill them at sea than it was to kill them on land is not good enough.

Nonetheless, this is a good book with insights into the fog and friction of war as exemplified by the bad weather that hampered air operations and the US torpedoes that failed to work when hung on Australian aircraft. More important, it sheds light on a key battle in the Pacific war and the central role played in it by Kenney, perhaps the top operational-level air commander of the war.

LTC Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

SECRET FORCES OF WORLD WAR II by Philip Warner. 245 pages. Scarborough House Publishers, Chelsea, MA. 1991. \$22.95.

Secret Forces of World War II traces the development of special forces from their infancy to the period shortly after World War II. Prior to 1940, special forces did not exist as we know them today and, as with any new organization, they had growing pains and a continuous battle to justify their existence. Despite setbacks, by 1942, special forces were working in close liaison with more orthodox arms.

The author makes a valid attempt to recognize the efforts and sacrifices of the men and women of special forces organizations that, because of the nature of their work, have had to remain silent all these years. In addition, large quantities of documentation have remained classified. To this end, Philip Warner does a creditable job. Some of the major accomplishments credited to special forces organizations of World War II were: denial of heavy water to Germany; the taking of Ems Emael

Fortress and Crete by German airborne units; sabotage by the British Special Air Service Regiment in the Western Desert of North Africa; commando activities in Norway and France; operations by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in both France and the Balkans.

The book has three segments. The first focuses primarily on the exploits of special forces in the North African and European campaigns. The principal reason special (secret) forces came into existence was the string of defeats suffered by the Allies in the spring of 1940. These setbacks made the British realize that it would take time to reconstitute its army, and to ensure they had sufficient time, the SOE, parachutists and commandos were formed.

Initially, secrecy shrouded these organizations and their mission, sometimes to the point that it actually hampered their operations, but their accomplishments quickly outweighed the hindrances. Organizations such as the Long Range Desert Group and SAS received their baptism by fire in the deserts of North Africa. The author provides detailed accounts of the Special Boat Section, Popski's Private Army, the Office of Strategic Services, the Abwabs and the SOE, as well as other organizations that operated in the shadowy world of unorthodox warfare.

The second segment deals with systems and equipment, as well as the countermeasures employed by both sides. Warner explains the use of *Enigma* by the Germans and *Ultra* by the British, as well as the many ruses attempted by both sides. The third and final segment focuses on the Far East and depicts the exploits of such men as Walter Fletcher, Wendell Fertig, Jim Wright and Colonel L. T. Ride, to name only a few. It also addresses the many personality conflicts of such noted gentlemen as Generals Douglas MacArthur, Joseph W. Stilwell, Claire L. Chennault, Tai Li, Ho Chi Minh, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. Strong-willed men, one and all, with different goals, they functioned in an all too hostile environment—not an enviable situation.

Warner, who concludes with the role of special forces as the war drew to a close, writes about a phase of warfare few readers have the opportunity to study. He concentrates on factual history and covers a broad spectrum of unorthodox combat during the World War II era. The book is easy to read, and Warner goes to great lengths to explain terminology, ploys and equipment developed and used by both Allied and Axis powers. I would recommend this book for anyone's library.

COL C. E. Hatch, USMC, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka, Japan

KISS THE BOYS GOODBYE: How the United States Betrayed Its Own POWs in Vietnam by Monika Jensen-Stevenson and William Stevenson. 493 pages. Plume, New York. 1991. \$10.95.

Kiss the Boys Goodbye is a good piece of investigative reporting that provides disturbing information about US soldiers still alive in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War. The reader will be familiar with many of the names, places and events used throughout the book. The authors give a detailed account of the five-year investigation into the status of these prisoners of war (POWs)/missing in action (MIAs).

The authors are husband and wife. William Stevenson is a former war correspondent with a vast knowledge of World War II espionage and the author of 12 books, including *A Man Called Intrepid*. Monika Jensen-Stevenson is a journalist and was a staff producer on the CBS television magazine "60 Minutes" from 1981 to 1986. This book grew out of a "60 Minutes" story she produced on missing POWs in Vietnam.

The authors report that, as late as 1989, US intelligence agencies continued to receive locational information on soldiers captured in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In spite of this information, the US government still maintains that there are no POWs remaining alive in Vietnam. The recent release of photographs of missing POWs, the resignation of the chief of the Pentagon's office for POWs/MIAs and a Senate hearing on the subject of the POWs further support the authors' theory that there are US soldiers alive in Vietnam.

The authors contend that a deliberate covert action exists to silence and discredit anyone—former POWs, family members—trying to investigate the possibility of live soldiers left in Southeast Asia. For example, Robert Garwood, the Marine private who came out of Vietnam in 1979, was court-martialed and convicted of collaborating with the enemy. It took seven years for the government to fully debrief Garwood and document his information on the location of other POWs. Former POW Major Mark Smith also gathered information on live sightings of POWs. He presented this information to his superiors and was told to get rid of it. He later filed a lawsuit to protect his character. The book claims that hundreds of refugees have reported seeing US prisoners in Vietnam since the war's end.

The authors also allege a global conspiracy by a second-layer government to conceal the existence of POWs/MIAs in Southeast Asia to cover up many other illegal activities such as drug trafficking. This covert organization has the capability to look for POWs, but any successful search would expose these illegal activities and, therefore, disrupt the illegal business.

Many questions still remain for the US government to answer: Are there still POWs alive in Vietnam? Is there an active cover-up to protect questionable operations in Southeast Asia? Is the US government using the POW/MIA issue as a political tool to keep the Vietnamese government in line?

LTC Rudolph E. Garity, USA, Retired,
Lacey, Washington

HEAR YE! HEAR YE! TELL US WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT LEADERSHIP

Military Review is planning its annual "Leadership" issue for August, and we solicit your views on this universal topic. We intend to compile this input and publish it as a feature in the issue.

Thus, we encourage *all* readers to share with us and their colleagues a few thoughts on leadership. Entries should be no longer than 100 words and may address one, or more, of the following questions:

- What is your definition of leadership? Why?
- What "Great Captain" epitomizes your concept of a leader? Why?
- What are the essential qualities of a successful leader? Why?
- If you do not like one of these questions, make up one of your own and answer that.

The important thing is that you take a few moments to express your ideas. This is not a contest. The only prize you will get is the satisfaction of participating in the effort and in seeing your name in print. You should mail your entries to: Military Review Leadership Project, US Army Command and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6910

DOOLITTLE'S RAID

The morning of 18 April 1942 dawned gray and cold over the USS *Hornet* as it steamed westerly 650 miles from Japan in a heavy sea. The sound of general quarters at 0730 sent the carrier's crew into a frenzy of activity. As the escorting cruisers and dive bombers attacked the Japanese picket ship *Nitto Maru*, the task force commander, Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, and Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle held a hasty meeting. Their decision was to go now, even though it would mean that the 16 specially modified North American B-25s might run out of fuel before they reached their final destinations. The deck crew of the *Hornet* adeptly pushed and pulled the B-25s into position on the stern half of the *Hornet's* flight deck, leaving little more than half of the carrier's length for the aircraft to get into the air.

Just 1 hour later the *Hornet* swung into the wind and increased speed. Doolittle inched his B-25 forward and pushed its throttles to full power. The pitch of the two Wright Cyclone engines split the air and held for a full minute before Doolittle released the brakes and began rolling down the flight deck. Slowly the aircraft climbed into the sky, the first B-25 ever to take off from an aircraft carrier. Within an hour, the other B-25s followed Doolittle. Their destination: Tokyo and four other Japanese cities.

Captain Francis S. Low, US Navy, first proposed the idea of a raid a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In those dark, uncertain days, when each radio broadcast brought more bad news, Americans needed a shot in the arm to lift their sagging spirits and instill in them hope that this great country would indeed fight on to victory. However farfetched the idea seemed—no Army bomber had ever flown off a carrier deck—there was just a chance that it might work. Low took his idea to Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, who passed it along to General Henry H. Arnold. Without hesitation, Arnold selected Doolittle, one of America's most experienced aviators and an accomplished aeronautical engineer, to organize, train and lead the mission.

Four hours after leaving the *Hornet*, the B-25s began arriving over their assigned targets. The raid caught the Japanese completely unprepared. Only a handful of fighters rose to intercept the B-25s, and they failed to press their attacks vigorously. It was, as one crewman wrote, "A nice, sunshiny day with overcast antiaircraft fire." Each plane dropped its one incendiary and three 500-pound, high-explosive bombs, then continued to fly east toward China. None of the aircraft were lost to enemy fire.

Fifteen crews reached China that night and either bailed out when their planes ran out of fuel or crash landed. Three crewmen on these planes were killed, and several others were seriously injured. One B-25 landed safely at Vladivostok. The Russians, officially neutral in the Pacific war, confiscated that plane and interned its five crewmen. Most of the crew members who participated in the Doolittle raid eventually returned to combat units. Eleven of these men subsequently died on active duty, and several others were shot down and spent the remainder of the war in German prison-of-war camps. The Japanese captured eight of the raiders and, after a mock trial, executed three of them. One other died in a Japanese prison. Doolittle received a promotion to brigadier general and the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Although most of the bombs fell on or near their intended targets, physical damage to Japanese facilities was slight. The raid did, however, convince the Japanese to reorganize their air defenses, pulling units back to the home islands that would otherwise have been used elsewhere. Nevertheless, an official Japanese announcement dismissed the raid as "just another Yankee joke and propaganda stunt for home consumption in America." It was, however, much more than that. It was an omen of the future.

Jerold E. Brown

Military History Instructor,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

